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English Summary 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate determinants and 
consequences of asymmetric cost behavior. Asymmetric cost behavior arises if 
the change in costs is different for increases in activity compared to 
equivalent decreases in activity. In this case, costs are termed “sticky” if the 
change is less when activity falls than when activity rises, whereas costs are 
termed “anti-sticky” if the change is more when activity falls than when 
activity rises. Understanding such cost behavior is especially relevant for 
decision-makers and financial analysts that rely on accurate cost information 
to facilitate resource planning and earnings forecasting. As such, this 
dissertation relates to the topic of firm profitability and the interpretation of 
cost variability. 
The dissertation consists of three parts that are written in the form of 
separate academic papers. The following section briefly summarizes the main 
research question, methodological design, data, findings and practical 
implications of each paper. 
 
Paper I:   Is Deliberate Cost Stickiness Economically Justifiable in the 
Presence of Adjustment Costs? 
Research Question: Is deliberate cost stickiness economically justifiable in the 
presence of adjustment costs? 
Methodological Design: Multiple linear regression and ANCOVA with focus 
on a firm-specific measure of asymmetrical cost behavior as well as an index 
capturing managerial intention when adjusting resources. Hypotheses are 
derived from adjustment cost theory and asymmetrical cost behavior theory.  
Data: Financial statement line items from US and Canadian companies for 
the years 1998 to 2012. 
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Findings: Allowing for a higher cost-to-sales ratio due to cost stickiness when 
demand is temporarily decreasing is economically justifiable if adjustment 
costs can be avoided. Firms with sticky costs have a lower average cost-to-
sales ratio than firms with anti-sticky costs if demand in the prior period 
decreases but rebounds in the current period. However, if activity decreases 
over two consecutive periods, the effects are strongly mitigated and yield no 
significant difference in the cost-to-sales ratio between both groups. Moreover, 
the positive economic consequence of avoiding adjustment costs during a 
temporary decline in demand diminishes with an increasing level of firm-
specific cost stickiness. 
Practical Implications: Contrary to conventional intuition, a temporary 
increase in the cost-to-sales ratio does not necessarily reflect costs getting out 
of control. Instead, it can reflect cost stickiness resulting from deliberate 
managerial decision-making in the presence of adjustment costs. Analysts can 
use this insight to improve the interpretation of common cost ratios as well as 
short-term earnings comparisons. In addition, findings highlight the economic 
importance of acknowledging adjustment costs when making resource 
adjustment decisions in response to fluctuations in demand. 
 
Paper II:  The Effect of Labor Supply Shortages on Asymmetric Cost 
Behavior 
Research Question: How do labor supply shortages affect asymmetric cost 
behavior? 
Methodological Design: Multiple linear regression with focus on the effect of 
supply shortages on cost behavior. Hypotheses are derived from dynamic 
labor demand theory and asymmetrical cost behavior theory.  
Data: Combination of longitudinal survey data and financial statement line 
items from Danish companies for the years 1998 to 2013. 
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Findings: If the supply of resources is scarce it is more difficult for companies 
to build up capacity which reflects an increase in adjustment costs and in 
turn affects firm-specific cost behavior. Specifically, labor supply shortages are 
associated with a decrease in cost stickiness. Firms reduce cost stickiness by 
raising selling prices and react to high demand by increasing work pressure 
and expecting more effort from their employees. This leads to an increase in 
labor productivity and therewith reduces cost stickiness. The effect decreases 
with the length of the labor supply shock and is more pronounced for 
companies located in less populated regions. 
Practical Implications: Costs are strongly influenced by the availability of 
resources. Thus, companies are advised to acknowledge the interplay between 
supply side effects in addition to demand side effects when taking resource 
adjustment decisions. This is particularly important for firms that rely to a 
greater extent on labor than capital resources. In addition, findings can help 
policy makers to evaluate the time lag and magnitude of policy changes that 
are likely to affect firms’ access to the labor market and specific skills. 
 
Paper III:  Price Changes, Resource Adjustments and Rational Expectations 
Research Question: How do managers adjust resources and prices in 
accordance with their expectations about future demand? 
Methodological Design: Multiple linear regression with focus on the effect of 
managers’ accuracy in predicting future demand on cost behavior. Hypotheses 
are derived from rational expectation theory and asymmetrical cost behavior 
theory.  
Data: Combination of longitudinal survey data and financial statement line 
items from Danish companies for the years 1999 to 2013. 
Findings: Cost stickiness decreases with increasing managerial expectation 
accuracy. Expectation accuracy captures the degree to which managers’ 
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beliefs about future demand coincides with the actual path of demand. 
Managers who correctly anticipate a negative demand shock lower cost 
stickiness by cutting resources and decreasing prices whereas managers who 
did not expect a fall in demand retain resources and do not change prices. 
Moreover, managerial forecast accuracy moderates the relationship between 
demand uncertainty and cost elasticity. Cost elasticity is higher when a 
demand decrease is expected among companies with similar exposure to 
demand uncertainty.   
Practical Implications: A high accuracy in predicting future demand is 
beneficial for companies. In case of an anticipated fall in demand, managers 
can avoid losses through an early reaction by cutting costs and reducing 
capacity before the shock occurs. In case of an anticipated rise in demand, 
managers can build up capacity in advance to skim the market when demand 
is high. Thus, managerial competences in predicting future demand determine 
firms’ profitability. This is particularly important when demand uncertainty 
is high or macroeconomic growth is declining. 
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Danish Summary 
Formålet med denne afhandling er at undersøge determinanter og 
konsekvenser af asymmetrisk omkostningsadfærd. Asymmetrisk 
omkostningsadfærd opstår, hvis omkostningsændringer er anderledes for 
aktivitetsstigninger sammenholdt med omkostningsændringer ved tilsvarende 
fald i aktiviteten. Såfremt dette er tilfældet kan omkostningerne benævnes 
”sticky”, hvis ændringen er mindre, når aktiviteten falder, end når aktiviteten 
stiger, mens omkostninger kan benævnes ”anti-sticky”, hvis ændringen er 
større, når aktiviteten falder, end når aktiviteten stiger. Forståelse af en sådan 
omkostningsadfærd er især relevant for beslutningstagere og analytikere, der 
er afhængige af nøjagtige informationer om omkostninger med henblik på at 
understøtte ressourceplanlægning og indtjeningsestimater. Denne afhandling 
relaterer  sig således til emnerne rentabilitet og forståelse for variabilitet i 
omkostninger.  
Afhandlingen består af tre dele, der er skrevet som akademiske papirer. I det 
følgende præsenteres forskningsspørgsmål, metodisk design, data, resultater og 
implikationer for hvert af de tre papirer. 
 
Paper I:   Is Deliberate Cost Stickiness Economically Justifiable in the 
Presence of Adjustment Costs? 
Forskningsspørgsmål: Er bevidst ”Cost Stickiness” økonomisk fordelagtigt, når 
der tages højde for omkostninger forbundet med at foretage tilpasninger? 
Forskningsdesign: Multipel lineær regression og ANCOVA med fokus på 
virksomhedsspecifik måling af asymmetrisk omkostningsadfærd samt et 
indeks, der adresserer ledelsesmæssige hensigter når ressourcer tilpasses. 
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Hypoteser er afledt af teorier om omkostningstilpasning og asymmetrisk 
omkostningsadfærd. 
Data: Årsregnskabsposter fra amerikanske og canadiske virksomheder for 
årene 1998 til 2012. 
Resultater: En højere omkostning/salgs ratio, på grund af ”Cost Stickiness” 
når efterspørgslen falder midlertidigt, er økonomisk fordelagtigt, såfremt 
tilpasningsomkostninger kan undgås. Virksomheder med ”sticky” omkostninger 
har en lavere gennemsnitlig omkostning/salgs ratio end virksomheder med 
”anti-sticky” omkostninger, såfremt efterspørgslen i den foregående periode 
falder, for derefter at vende tilbage i den indeværende periode. Såfremt 
aktiviteten falder over to på hinanden følgende perioder er effekterne dog 
stærkt formindskede og der er ingen signifikante forskelle i omkostnings/salgs 
ratioen mellem de to grupper. Derudover er den positive økonomiske 
konsekvens af at undgå tilpasningsomkostninger ved midlertidige 
efterspørgselsfald formindsket i takt med en stigende grad af 
virksomhedsspecifik ”Cost Stickiness”. 
Praktiske implikationer: I modsætning til almindelig intuition, så betyder en 
midlertidig stigning i omkostning/salgs ratioen ikke nødvendigvis at 
omkostningerne er ude af kontrol. Dette kan forklares ved omkostningernes 
”stickiness” som følge af bevidste ledelsesmæssige beslutninger, når der 
samtidig er tilpasningsomkostninger. Analytikere kan bruge denne forståelse 
til at forbedre fortolkningen af udbredte omkostningsnøgletal samt ved 
sammenligninger af indtjening på kort sigt. Derudover understreger 
resultaterne den økonomiske betydning af at tage højde for 
tilpasningsomkostninger, når der træffes beslutninger om ressourcejusteringer 
som reaktion på udsving i efterspørgslen. 
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Paper II:  The Effect of Labor Supply Shortages on Asymmetric Cost 
Behavior 
Forskningsspørgsmål: Hvordan påvirker knaphed i udbud af arbejdskraft den 
asymmetriske omkostningsadfærd? 
Forskningsdesign: Multipel lineær regression med fokus på effekten af knaphed 
i udbud af arbejdskraft på omkostningsadfærd. Hypoteser er afledt af teorier 
om dynamisk efterspørgsel efter arbejdskraft og asymmetrisk 
omkostningsadfærd. 
Data: Kombination af longitudinelle surveydata og årsregnskabsposter fra 
danske virksomheder i perioden mellem 1998 og 2013. 
Resultater: Hvis der er knappe ressourcer, er det sværere for virksomhederne 
at opbygge en kapacitet, der afspejler en stigning i tilpasningsomkostninger og 
igen påvirker virksomhedsspecifik omkostningsadfærd. Knaphed i udbud af 
arbejdskraft er forbundet med et fald i omkostningernes ”stickiness”. 
Virksomheder reducerer omkostningernes ”stickiness” ved at hæve 
salgspriserne og reagerer på høj efterspørgsel ved at øge arbejdspres og ved at 
forvente øget indsats fra deres ansatte. Dette fører til en stigning i 
arbejdsproduktiviteten og dermed reduceres omkostningernes ”stickiness”. 
Effekten aftager med længden af det chok, der er forbundet med 
arbejdsudbuddet og er mere udtalt for virksomheder beliggende i områder 
med lav befolkningstæthed. 
Praktiske implikationer: Omkostningerne er stærkt påvirket af 
tilgængeligheden af ressourcer. Virksomheder bør således være opmærksomme 
på samspillet mellem effekter på udbudssiden i tilknytning til effekter på 
efterspørgselssiden, når der tages beslutninger vedrørende ressourcetilpasning. 
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Dette er især vigtigt for virksomheder, der i højgere grad er afhængige af 
arbejdskraft frem for kapitalressourcer. Derudover kan resultaterne hjælpe 
politikere med at vurdere den tidsmæssige forskydning og omfanget af de 
politiske ændringer, der kan påvirke virksomheders adgang til 
arbejdsmarkedet og særlige kompetencer. 
 
Paper III:  Price Changes, Resource Adjustments and Rational Expectations 
Forskningsspørgsmål: Hvordan tilpasser ledere ressourcer og priser i 
overensstemmelse med deres forventninger til den fremtidige efterspørgsel? 
Forskningsdesign: Multipel lineær regression med fokus på effekten på 
omkostningsadfærd af hvor nøjagtigt ledelsen forudsiger den fremtidige 
efterspørgsel. Hypoteser er afledt af teorier om rationelle forventninger og 
asymmetrisk omkostningsadfærd.  
Data: Kombination af longitudinelle surveydata og årsregnskabsposter fra 
danske virksomheder i perioden mellem 1999 og 2013. 
Resultater: Omkostningernes ”stickiness” falder i takt med en stigende 
nøjagtighed i ledelsens forventninger. Forventningernes nøjagtighed er udtryk 
for i hvilken grad ledernes opfattelser af fremtidig efterspørgsel falder sammen 
med den faktiske udvikling i efterspørgslen. Ledelser som korrekt forventer et 
negativt efterspørgselschok, nedbringer omkostningernes ”stickiness” ved at 
skære i ressourcer og sætte priser lavere, mens ledere, der ikke forventer et 
fald i efterspørgslen, fastholder ressourcer og undlader at ændre  priserne. 
Derudover påvirker nøjagtigheden af ledelsens prognoser forholdet mellem 
usikkerhed i efterspørgslen og omkostningernes elasticitet. Omkostningernes 
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elasticitet er højere, når der forventes et efterspørgselsfald blandt 
virksomheder med ensartet eksponering overfor usikkerhed i efterspørgslen. 
Praktiske implikationer: Det er til gavn for virksomhederne at være i stand til 
med stor nøjagtighed at forudsige den fremtidige efterspørgsel. I tilfælde af at 
der forventes en efterspørgselsnedgang, kan ledelsen undgå tab ved rettidigt 
at nedbringe omkostninger og reducere kapaciteten før chokket indtræffer. I 
tilfælde af at der forventes en stigning i efterspørgslen, kan ledere opbygge 
kapacitet på forhånd med henblik på at opnå fordele i markedet, når 
efterspørgslen er høj. Således er de ledelsesmæssige kompetencer til at 
forudsige den fremtidige efterspørgsel bestemmende for virksomhedernes 
rentabilitet. Dette er især vigtigt, når usikkerheden i efterspørgslen er høj, 
eller når den makroøkonomiske vækst er aftagende. 
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A SYNOPSIS 
1 Motivation and Contribution 
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of determinants and 
consequences of asymmetric cost behavior. As such, it adds both practically 
as well as theoretically to the existing knowledge within the field of 
Management Accounting.  
The practical relevance of this project is anchored in a better understanding 
of the way costs behave and therewith a better predictability of costs on a 
firm basis. Because firms’ profitability is strongly influenced by the amount of 
costs incurred to provide products and services, effective cost management is 
on the top of most CEO’s agenda (McKinsey&Company 2010). However, the 
complexity of the business and environmental uncertainties make it difficult 
for companies to predict future resource requirements and control costs 
accordingly. A Deloitte survey from April 2016 finds that the lack of 
understanding cost behavior represents a major barrier for effective cost 
management. Many firms therefore have dedicated cost management positions 
for executive personnel to address questions related to cost control and 
measurement (Deloitte 2016). Thus, effective cost management is vital for 
companies to stay economically competitive and of fundamental financial and 
strategic importance for managerial decision-making (Horngren 2015). This 
dissertation therefore picks up a central topic for practitioners as well as 
analysts. Specifically, findings offer the following insights that can be applied 
in a practical context: 
1. If costs move less for decreases in activity (e.g., output volume) 
compared to equivalent increases in activity, they behave asymmetric. 
The magnitude of asymmetry is likely to capture adjustment costs that 
are incurred with the adaption of resources. This study shows how 
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adjustment costs can be estimated on a firm-basis by investigating the 
historical behavior of costs over time. Companies can use this 
information to improve the accuracy of cost forecasts or simply as a 
reference value when considering restructuring businesses or positioning 
the organization for growth.  
2. Asymmetric cost behavior oftentimes reflects the retention of resources 
when demand declines. In this case costs are said to be sticky 
(Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003). Sticky costs lead to a rise 
in the cost-to-sales ratio which is commonly interpreted as a negative 
signal about managers’ ability to control costs (Baumgarten, 
Bonenkamp, and Homburg 2010; Lev and Thiagarajan 1993). Managers 
who deliberately chose to maintain the current level of resources to 
avoid adjustment costs can refer to the findings of this dissertation in 
order to justify a short-term increase in the cost ratio. Results show 
that if a drop in demand is temporary, then sticky costs are positively 
associated with a cost reduction on average because the adjustment of 
resources is more costly than their short-term retention. 
3. Costs are strongly influenced by the availability of resources. However, 
the supply of resources is beyond the direct control of most firms. 
Especially in times of increased specificity of knowledge and globalized 
labor markets, companies face difficulties in finding and recruiting 
skilled employees. This study shows how particularly the availability of 
labor influences cost behavior. Findings suggest that labor productivity 
increases if firms are unable to hire additional employees and therefore 
temporarily expect more effort from their workforce. This implies that 
economic benefits can be realized by adapting a conservative staffing 
approach rather than optimistically building up labor capacity.   
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4. With respect to changes in demand, resources are adapted proactively 
prior to either a positive or a negative demand shock or after the shock 
occurred initially. What determines the choice of action is managers’ 
ability to predict future demand. This study shows that firms can 
prevent a decrease in profitability by increasing the accuracy of 
managerial expectations. In case of a foreseen drop in demand, 
companies can react early by cutting costs or lowering prices. In case of 
a foreseen rise in demand, companies can exploit purchasing power by 
building up capacity in advance. Both forms reduce adjustment costs as 
resources are adapted more gradually over time compared to a rapid 
and impulsive reaction.  
 
The practical relevance of this dissertation is refined by empirical work that 
contributes to the academic literature on asymmetric cost behavior. Following 
a positivistic approach, this dissertation draws on economic concepts to 
specify testable hypotheses. By doing so, each finding is linked to theoretical 
propositions that help to fill research gaps or reveal important alternative 
explanations which are new to the literature. To gain an overview of the 
current state of research as well as gaps and overlaps, a systematic literature 
review has been conducted at the beginning of this dissertation. A brief 
summary of it is embedded in this introduction to explain the positioning of 
this project in the literature. In a nutshell, this dissertation contributes to the 
scientific literature on asymmetric cost behavior in three ways: 
1. New theoretical concepts are introduced that help to explain 
inconsistencies and illuminate black boxes. For instance, this 
dissertation discusses the impact of labor hoarding in the context of 
labor productivity and shows how it affects asymmetric cost behavior. 
Moreover, it connects the notion of labor market thickness with 
research on asymmetric cost behavior in order to explain regional 
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differences in the degree of cost stickiness. Collectively, this allows 
investigating the interplay between supply and demand dynamics and 
directs promising areas for future research.  
2. This dissertation provides an insightful analysis of the mechanisms 
through which managers adjust resources and selling prices in 
accordance with their expectations about future demand. Analyses are 
conducted based on a pooled dataset containing cost and sales 
information as well as survey responses on e.g., management demand 
expectations, factors limiting the current business and selling price 
changes. Contrary to most other papers that use merely archival data 
from financial statements, the rich information of this study allows to 
not only identify different channels through which companies respond 
to fluctuations in demand, but also specify the magnitude and trade-off 
between effects.  
3. Drawing on adjustment cost theory, this dissertation estimates the 
economic consequences of asymmetric cost behavior. To do so, a firm-
specific measure of cost stickiness is applied in order to evaluate the 
impact of either sticky costs (i.e. costs respond less sensitive to activity 
decreases than to activity increases) or anti-sticky costs (i.e. costs 
respond more sensitive to activity decreases than to activity increases) 
on the average cost-to-sales ratio. This allows specifying not only the 
drivers of cost asymmetries, but also its economic feasibility if the 
retention of resources is intended by the management.  
 
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section 
explains the notion of asymmetric cost behavior and gives an introduction to 
the standard empirical model according to Anderson et al. (2003). In the 
following, the main assumptions in this field of research are discussed. Then, 
a literature review based on 28 selected articles is conducted that strongly 
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contribute to the research on asymmetric cost behavior.1 Findings are 
summarized by providing a graphical map of the theorized relationships in 
each study. The construction of the map follows the guidelines developed by 
Luft and Shields (2003) and serves as a basis to cluster the literature in 
different categories. Thereupon, the positioning of each paper within the 
frame of this dissertation is explained followed by an introduction to the 
theoretical approach as well as an explanation of data and methodological 
design. The last part of this synopsis discusses the main limitations of the 
dissertation and highlights areas of future research. Papers are enclosed as 
separate chapters in the following sections B, C and D of this document.  
2 The Notion of Asymmetric Cost Behavior 
2.1 Definition 
Asymmetric cost behavior arises when the magnitude of a change in costs for 
increases in activity is different than the magnitude of a change in costs from 
decreases in activity. It implies that the cost-to-activity relationship is not 
symmetrical for positive compared to negative fluctuations in activity. Such 
cost behavior can occur in two forms: sticky costs or anti-sticky costs. On the 
one hand, if costs decrease less for a decrease in activity than they increase 
for an equivalent increase in activity, they are found to be sticky (Anderson, 
Banker, and Janakiraman 2003). On the other hand, if costs decrease more 
for a decrease in activity than they increase for an equivalent increase in 
activity, they are found to be anti-sticky (Weiss 2010). Both forms extend the 
traditional cost model by distinguishing not only between fixed and variable 
costs (as extreme cases), but also by the direction of change in activity 
(Banker and Byzalov 2014).  
                                
1 Articles have been selected based on the number of citations since 2003, the impact factor 
of the journal in which they are published and relevance for this dissertation.  
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These differences are illustrated in Figure 1 in which the three main 
exemplary cost curves for either symmetrical (‘regular costs’) or asymmetric 
cost behavior (‘stickiness’ or ‘anti-stickiness’) are depicted corresponding to 
the change in activity. The middle graph illustrates the traditional 
mechanical cost function according to which costs move proportional to both 
a positive (from Y0 to YH) and negative (from Y0 to YL) variation in activity. 
However, if costs behave less sensitive to activity decreases than to activity 
increases, which is illustrated in the left graph, they will follow the solid cost 
line (‘sticky cost curve’) instead of the dotted one (‘regular cost curve’). The 
area ACC’ which spans across both slopes depicts the extent of cost 
stickiness. This implies a higher cost-to-sales ratio during revenue decreasing 
periods as comparably estimated with the application of traditional cost 
models. The opposite is the case for anti-sticky cost behavior which is shown 
in the very right graph of Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  Overview of different cost curves in relation to changes in activity 
 
Figure 1 depicts three different cost functions which illustrate asymmetric cost behavior 
with sticky costs (left graph) and anti-sticky costs (right graph) as well as symmetrical 
cost behavior (middle graph). The dashed cost function illustrates the regular cost curve 
without conditioning on the direction of activity changes. Y refers to the activity level of 
the company in a range from low (YL) to high (YH).  
Costs are sticky if they decrease less for decreases in activity than they increase for 
increases in activity. Thus, the cost function is flatter between Y0 and YL than between Y0 
and YH. Costs are anti-sticky if they decease more for decreases in activity than they 
increase for increases in activity. Thus the cost function is flatter between Y0 and YH than 
between Y0 and YL.. 
2.2 Empirical Estimation 
The empirical model according to Anderson et al. (2003) uses cross-sectional 
ordinary least squares regression in order to estimate cost behavior as a 
function of changes in sales. Sales are employed as a proxy for changes in 
activity. The statistical specification is as follows: 
  	
    	
  
	
, where 	
      	
 
 	
 and 
 capture the log-change between the current and 
the previous period in costs and sales respectively. 	
 is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one when sales decrease and zero otherwise.  captures 
the elasticity of costs for a one percent increase in sales, while    can be 
interpreted as the elasticity of cost for a one percent decrease in sales. Thus, 
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 is negative if costs are sticky (i.e. the change in costs for increases in sales 
is significantly greater than the change in costs for an equivalent decrease in 
sales).  
2.3 Important Assumptions 
The literature on asymmetric cost behavior makes several important 
assumptions in order to operationalize the theorized relationship.  
First, most studies imply that cost fluctuations reflect managers’ decisions on 
adapting resources in response to changes in demand. According to Anderson, 
Banker and Janakiraman (2003), cost stickiness arises because managers 
deliberately retain resources when a fall in demand is perceived to be only 
temporary. In this case adjustment costs can be avoided which arise as a 
consequence of cutting capacity when demand declines and adding capacity 
when demand rebounds. Those costs could be attributable, for instance, to 
the payment of severance packages as a consequence of dismissal of personnel 
or disposal costs of physical assets (Banker, Byzalov, and Chen 2013; Cooper 
and Haltiwanger 2006; Hamermesh and Pfann 1996).2 
Second, it is assumed that changes in companies’ activity occur as a response 
to changes in demand (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003). Because 
changes in activity are not directly observable, many researchers use sales as 
an imperfect proxy for changes in activity (Anderson, Banker, and 
Janakiraman 2003; Banker and Chen 2006; Banker et al. 2014; Banker and 
Byzalov 2014; Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis 2012; Kama and Weiss 2013; Weiss 
2010). However, this raises the concern that the estimated relationship is 
affected by selling price fluctuations (Anderson and Lanen 2009; Cannon 
2014). Even though studies that use actual activity measures (rather than 
                                
2 Next to the adjustment cost argument, some studies find that cost stickiness can also be 
ascribed to alternative explanations, such as empire building incentives (Chen, Lu, and 
Sougiannis 2012), managerial overconfidence (Chen, Gores, and Nasev 2013) or cultural 
differences between countries (Kitching, Mashruwala, and Pevzner 2016). 
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employing sales as an imperfect proxy of activity) also find evidence for 
asymmetric cost behavior (Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom 2004; 
Cannon 2014; Dierynck, Landsman, and Renders 2012), results should be 
interpreted with caution if the model does not control for price changes. 
Third, many studies examine the asymmetric behavior of selling, general and 
administrative costs (SG&A), because managerial discretion is expected to be 
high in managing components of this cost group (Anderson et al. 2007; 
Banker et al. 2013; Banker et al. 2014; Baumgarten, Bonenkamp, and 
Homburg 2010; Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis 2012). Contrary to the prevalent 
interpretation that understands a rise of the SG&A ratio as a negative signal 
about managers’ ability to control costs (Bernstein and Wild 1998; Lev and 
Thiagarajan 1993), the latter is ascribed to the stickiness of SG&A costs, 
which is likely to reflect deliberate managerial decision-making instead of 
costs getting out of control. Some researchers also observe sticky and anti-
sticky costs in other cost categories, such as total operating costs, labor costs 
or costs of goods sold (Balakrishnan and Gruca 2008; Banker and Byzalov 
2014; Holzhacker, Krishnan, and Mahlendorf 2015a; Weidenmier and 
Subramaniam 2016; Weiss 2010). 
2.4 Literature Overview 
2.4.1 Selection of Studies 
Although scholars recognized the cost stickiness phenomenon already in the 
20th century (Brasch 1927; Hasenack 1925; Noreen 1991; Noreen and 
Soderstrom 1994; Rumpf 1966; Strube 1936), the work by Anderson, Banker 
and Janakiraman in 2003 set the stimulus for the flourishing of research on 
asymmetric cost behavior until today. The majority of studies investigate 
drivers of asymmetric cost behavior or test identified empirical relationships 
in different institutional settings. A less explored stream of literature focuses 
on the effects of cost behavior on for instance firm profitability or earnings 
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forecast. To provide an overview of the main findings within the field, the 
following synopsis summarizes examined relationships in 28 studies. These are 
selected using the following criteria: number of citations since 2003, impact 
factor of the journal and relevance for this dissertation. All of the chosen 
scientific articles have contributed to the empirical understanding of 
asymmetric cost behavior and are published in one of the journals listed 
below:  
 The Accounting Review (7) 
 Journal of Management Accounting Research (5) 
 Contemporary Accounting Research (3) 
 Journal of Accounting Research (2) 
 Journal of Accounting and Economics (2) 
 Management Accounting Research (2)  
 Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance (2) 
 Other journals (5) 
 
Selected studies are listed in Table 1. In the following, these studies are 
summarized in a structured framework that serves as basis to outline the 
positioning of this dissertation in the literature.  
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Table 1: Overview of Selected Studies 
1 Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman 
(2003) 
15 Cannon (2014) 
2 Anderson et al. (2007) 16 Chen, Lu and Sougiannis (2012) 
3 Balakrishnan and Gruca (2008) 17 Ciftci, Mashruwala and Weiss (2016) 
4 Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom 
(2014) 
18 Dalla Via and Perego (2014) 
5 Balakrishnan, Petersen and Soderstrom 
(2004) 
19 Dierynck, Landsman and Renders 
(2012) 
6 Banker and Chen (2006) 20 He, Teruya and Shimizu (2010) 
7 Banker et al. (2016) 21 Holzhacker, Krishnan and Mahlendorf 
(2015b) 
8 Banker and Byzalov (2014) 22 Holzhacker, Krishnan and Mahlendorf 
(2015a) 
9 Banker, Byzalov and Chen (2013) 23 Kama and Weiss (2013) 
10 Banker et al. (2014) 24 Kitching, Mashruwala and Pevzner 
(2016) 
11 Banker, Byzalov and Plehn-Dujowich 
(2014) 
25 Shust and Weiss (2014) 
12 Banker, Fang and Metha (2013) 26 Venieris, Naoum and Vlismas (2015) 
13 Baumgarten, Bonenkamp and Homburg 
(2010) 
27 Weidenmier and Subramaniam (2016) 
14 Calleja, Stelarios and Thomas (2006) 28 Weiss (2010) 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the literature used to construct the map in Figure 2. 
 
2.4.2 Graphical Representation of Cause-And-Effect Relationships 
Authors of academic articles select a set of operational variables in order to 
test the research question of the paper. The selection of variables is 
determined by the theoretical construct based on which the research question 
is examined. Nevertheless, depending on the research design and the available 
dataset, scholars may choose different variables even though the theorized 
relationships are similar (Evans et al. 2015). This can lead to contradictory 
interpretations and aggravates the comparison of findings. To address this 
issue, Figure 2 provides a graphical map of the theorized relationships within 
each of the selected articles. The construction of the map follows the 
guidelines developed by Luft and Shields (2003) and serves as a basis for the 
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deduction of hypotheses which are tested within the frame of this 
dissertation.3 
The objective underlying the portrayed relationships in Figure 2 is to give a 
graphical overview of the proposed treatises within current asymmetric cost 
behavior literature. The letter combinations in the map refer to the main 
research question of the respective paper as the answer to the question on 
“what the study is about”. Table 2 provides the full definition of each letter 
combination. They do not necessarily represent the actual operationalization 
within the applied model itself, but rather refer to the underlying theoretical 
constructs. By following this approach it is possible to identify the cause-and-
effect relationships of each study, even though different instruments and 
measures are used to empirically test the implied relationship. It moreover 
facilitates the identification of gaps, overlaps and possible inconsistencies and 
serves as a framework to position the individual papers of this dissertation. 
Each number represents one of the selected studies which are listed in Table 
1. Only core linkages between theoretical constructs are shown in the map; 
excluding control variables in certain empirical models or robustness checks 
that do not inherently support the theoretical and empirical contribution of 
the paper. However, if the authors highlight new influencing factors and 
elaborate on the individual analysis of each, then the specific element is 
                                
3 With the publication of the paper “Mapping Management Accounting: Graphics and 
Guidelines for Theory-Consistent Empirical Research” in Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, Luft and Shields (2003) introduce a structured approach on how to analyze 
research studies in Management Accounting. The authors review 275 articles from various 
journals and examine the theories and methods employed as well as the underlying cause 
and effect relationships studied. In doing so, they focus on the following three main 
questions: First, they specify what is being researched according to the set of variables 
employed. Second, the direction and shape of the explanatory links are determined and 
third, they examine the level of analysis of each of the publications. Based on the previous 
exploration, the paper then provides a graphical illustration in form of a relational map of 
the causes and effects of Management Accounting research as referred to in each of the 
cited studies. The authors construct nine maps that provide a compact graphical summary 
of a specific area in Management Accounting and the applied theory. The latter most 
frequently relates to conceptualizations in the field of economics, organization, 
contingency, sociology or psychology. 
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embedded in the graphic. Furthermore, cause-end-effect relationships are 
illustrated with a dotted arrow in case of a negative impact of the 
independent on the dependent variable or if a moderator is included in the 
model according to which the associated link could be either negative or 
positive. The latter is displayed by a straight-line arrow in simple unilateral 
causal relations. In rare cases, a theorization of no causal relationship is 
indicated with a semi-dotted arrow between two letter combinations. A 
legend is also provided at the bottom right of Figure 2. 
Notably, the displayed associations are not mutually exclusive. Several 
articles for instance predict a relationship between the magnitude of 
adjustment costs and asymmetric cost behavior. Nevertheless, the effect can 
be theorized on the firm-level as well as on the country level. Accordingly, 
some studies measure adjustment costs by using employee intensity (number 
of employees to sales) or asset intensity (total assets to sales), while other 
studies focus on national differences. Thus, the same letter combination can 
occur more than once on the map. 
As can be seen on the left side of Figure 2, the map is divided into four 
different levels based on which theoretical linkages are displayed. The levels 
refer to the investigation of (1) external effects beyond the organization, (2) 
firm-specific effects within the organization, (3) effects on the sub-unit level of 
the organization, and (4) effects that arise on the individual level. Although 
most of the articles focus on one single level of analysis, there are few cross-
level models which examine a causal relationship either top-down, e.g., from 
the macroeconomic level to the organizational level or bottom-up, e.g., from 
the individual level to the organizational level. 
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2.4.3 Description of Explanatory Links 
In their seminal study (#1), Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003) 
estimate the magnitude of cost stickiness by using a regression model that 
captures a one percent change in costs relative to a one percent change in 
activity conditional on the direction of change in activity (see section 2.2 for a 
description of the empirical model). Figure 2 illustrates this relationship with 
bold capital letters. A refers to the level of activity, C represents the cost 
category applied (e.g., SG&A costs) and D denotes the direction of change 
depending on whether activity increased or decreased. Because D is used as a 
moderator, the arrow pointing from D to the connection between A and C is 
dotted. The majority of successive studies follow this approach and measure 
asymmetric cost behavior as the difference in the percentage change in costs 
(dependent variable) for decreasing compared to increasing activity 
(independent variable).  
The following paragraphs briefly summarize the current literature. Studies on 
the organizational level are discussed first, as they represent the bulk of 
papers. Next, papers that examine external factors beyond the organization 
are laid out, followed by research on the subunit and individual level.  
2.4.3.1 Level of Analysis: Organization 
With progressing research on asymmetric cost behavior, scientists have 
focused on the various firm-specific factors that can explain the magnitude of 
cost stickiness or anti-stickiness on the organizational level. Those variables 
are generally included as additional moderators which interact with the 
degree of cost decreases during periods of falling demand. Dierynck, 
Landsman and Renders (2012) for instance show that managers of firms that 
meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark adjust to activity decreases by 
laying off employees instead of managing earnings (EM) through accrual 
adjustments (ACC). Similarly, Kama and Weiss (2013) find that earnings 
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management reduces asymmetric cost behavior when executives are 
incentivized to meet earnings targets. Moreover, Chen, Lu and Sougiannis 
(2012) document that cost stickiness is more pronounced when corporate 
governance (CG) is low which entices managers to engage in empire building 
activities (EB) for their own benefits. Additionally, Banker et al. (2014) 
suggest that costs are stickier if decision-makers are very pessimistic (P) with 
respect to future sales due to low order backlog (ORD) or prior period sales 
decreases (SSD). On the contrary, the authors argue that managers are more 
optimistic if prior period sales increased (SSI) which results in a higher level 
of cost stickiness (Banker et al. 2014). Drawing on the adjustment cost 
literature (Cooper and Haltiwanger 2006; Hamermesh 1989; Hamermesh and 
Pfann 1996; Pfann and Palm 1993; Rothschild 1971), some studies estimate 
the effect of different magnitudes of adjustment costs (AC) on asymmetric 
cost behavior. Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003) for instance use 
proxies such as employee intensity (ratio of total number of employees to 
revenue) and asset intensity (ratio of total assets to revenue) to measure the 
impact of adjustment costs on asymmetric cost behavior. In agreement with 
other studies (Anderson et al. 2007; Banker et al. 2013; Banker and Byzalov 
2014; Banker et al. 2014), they find that an increase in adjustment costs leads 
to an increase in cost stickiness. Likewise, Cannon (2014) provides evidence 
for the influence of selling price changes (SP) on asymmetric cost behavior. 
He identifies three mechanisms which give rise to sticky costs. First, he 
confirms prior research which shows that costs are sticky because managers 
retain idle capacity as demand falls and add capacity as demand rises. 
Second, he ascribes sticky costs to managers lowering selling prices to utilize 
existing capacity when demand falls but adding capacity (rather than 
increasing prices) when demand rises. Third, he documents the 
counterintuitive result indicating that costs are sticky because firms incur 
more costs when they build up resources as demand rises than they incur 
costs when they build up resources as demand falls.  
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Another research field that conceptualizes relationships on the organizational 
level focuses on the consequences of asymmetric cost behavior. In this respect 
it differs from previously discussed approaches. While the majority of studies 
follows Anderson, Banker and Janarikaman (2003) and examine moderators 
that affect the relationship between changes in activity on changes in costs, 
this stream of literature focuses on the impact of asymmetric cost behavior 
itself. Thus, instead of applying a unidirectional model which specifies cost 
behavior as the dependent variable, these researchers use a firm-specific 
(instead of a cross-sectional) measure of asymmetric cost behavior. This 
allows making actual predictions on the effect of sticky and anti-sticky costs 
on e.g., earnings forecasts (EF) or contemporaneous annual stock returns 
(RET). Banker et al. (2016) for instance argue that cost stickiness is an 
important alternative explanation for the piecewise linear relation between 
earnings and stock returns. While conservatism research usually ascribes this 
phenomenon to the asymmetric timeliness of earnings (recognizing bad news 
more quickly than good news), the authors show that a significant portion is 
actually driven by cost stickiness. Moreover, Weiss (2010) distinguishes 
between sticky cost firms (CS) and anti-sticky cost firms (AS) and finds that 
analysts’ earnings forecast is less accurate for companies with greater cost 
stickiness. In addition, the author documents that cost stickiness is associated 
with lower analyst coverage (COV) and a lower market response (CAR) to 
earnings surprises (ES). Also Banker and Chen (2006) and Baumgarten, 
Bonenkamp and Homburg (2010) investigate the association between 
asymmetric cost behavior and earnings forecast (EF). Findings show that an 
intended increase (ICS) in the SG&A ratio (S) due to cost stickiness leads to 
an increase in future earnings (Baumgarten, Bonenkamp, and Homburg 
2010),4 while the earnings forecast error (EFE) is substantially reduced using 
                                
4 An increase in the SG&A ratio is regarded as intended if the company’s past SG&A ratio 
was below its industry average, representing efficiency in SG&A cost management 
(Baumgarten, Bonenkamp, and Homburg 2010). 
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models that incorporate information about cost variability as well as cost 
stickiness (Banker and Chen 2006).5 Based on the latter result, Ciftci, 
Mashruwala and Weiss (2016) investigate whether analysts in fact incorporate 
information on cost stickiness when predicting earnings. By modeling the 
process of earnings prediction as a forecast of sales (SF), the authors find that 
analysts incorporate cost variability and cost stickiness on average. This, 
however, induces a systematic bias in predicting earnings which is stronger 
when sales miss expectations than if sales beat expectations.  
In addition to the consequences of asymmetric cost behavior, Balakrishnan, 
Petersen and Soderstrom (2004) examine the interplay between different 
levels of capacity utilization and the magnitude of asymmetric cost behavior. 
Using a data from physical therapy clinics in the US, capacity utilization is 
measured as the average staff time available per patient visit. Results show 
that cost stickiness is more pronounced if capacity utilization (CU) is 
strained, and less pronounced if the company operates with excess capacity. 
The authors find no significant association when the firm’s capacity 
utilization is at ‘normal’ levels. Next to capacity utilization, Balakrishnan, 
Petersen and Soderstrom (2004) examine the influence of the magnitude of 
activity changes. In agreement with findings reported by Dalla Via and 
Perego (2014), results indicate that cost behavior is asymmetric for moderate 
and large changes in activity, but not for small changes in activity. However, 
other research shows that the effect of the magnitude of activity changes on 
asymmetric cost behavior strongly depends on the industry and the country 
in which the company is operating in (Calleja, Steliaros, and Thomas 2006; 
Weidenmier and Subramaniam 2016).  
                                
5 Cost variability refers to the proportion of total costs that are variable. The latter relates 
to the so called traditional cost behavior model which does not distinguish between 
increases and decreases in activity (Banker and Chen 2006) 
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2.4.3.2 Level of Analysis: Beyond Organization 
The investigation of drivers of cost stickiness on the organizational level is 
extended by studies that examine asymmetric cost behavior from a broader 
perspective outside the boundaries of one company (external factors beyond 
the organization). Some studies for instance investigate firms’ cost behavior 
during the economic crisis (EC) or as a function of macroeconomic growth 
(G) (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Banker, Fang, and Metha 
2013; Banker and Byzalov 2014; He, Teruya, and Shimizu 2010), while others 
explore differences between countries (CO). Specifically, Calleja, Steliaros and 
Thomas (2006) find that operating costs of French and German companies 
are stickier than operating costs of UK and US companies. The authors claim 
differences in corporate governance and managerial oversight to cause 
variations in cost stickiness between countries. The common-law system of 
corporate governance in the US and UK puts more emphasis on shareholder 
value maximization, whereas the corporate governance system in Germany 
and France encompasses also other internal and external stakeholder 
interests. Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2016) moreover document that 
costs stickiness differs significantly among industries due to differences in 
production, operational and economic environments, e.g., the level of fixed 
assets and inventory. Results show that costs are most sticky in the 
manufacturing industry and least sticky in the merchandising industry. 
Additionally, Banker, Byzalov and Chen (2013) show how asymmetric cost 
behavior varies by the strictness of employee protection laws (EPL) between 
countries. Drawing on the adjustment cost argument, the authors posit that 
strong employee protection laws make it more difficult for companies to 
dismiss personnel when demand is decreasing. As a result, costs are stickier in 
countries where employee protection laws are relatively strict. Additionally, 
Kitching, Mashruwala and Pevzner (2016) examine whether culture (C) 
affects cost behavior. Findings suggest that cost stickiness is more pronounced 
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in countries with low uncertainty avoidance, femininity and short-term 
orientation. Also Holzhacker, Krishnan and Mahlendorf (2015a) focus on 
factors that impact cost behavior from outside the organization. Their study 
shows that a change in regulation (R) as well as ownership structure (OWN) 
impacts cost behavior. The authors examine the German health sector and 
document that hospitals reduce the degree of cost stickiness after the 
introduction of a fixed-price reimbursement for diagnosis services; whereas the 
effect is stronger in for-profit hospitals compared to nonprofit hospitals. 
Holzhacker, Krishnan and Mahlendorf (2015a) argue that a fixed 
reimbursement restricts hospitals discretion over revenue generation which 
prompts administrators to bolster cost elasticity. Consequently, hospitals can 
react more flexible to a decrease in volume which then leads to a reduction of 
cost stickiness.  
2.4.3.3 Level of Analysis: Subunit 
Next to papers that investigate research questions on the level beyond the 
organization or within the organization, one of the selected studies 
particularly examines cause-and-effect relationships originating from the 
subunit level. Using data from hospitals in Ontario/US, Balakrishnan and 
Gruca (2008) hypothized that hospital managers are less willing to cut costs 
in departments that perform the hospital’s core activities. In contrast to 
support services, these departments are critical for the hospital’s mission and 
the adjustment of their resources yield higher adjustment costs. Finding 
support the authors’ hypothesis and show that costs are stickier in core 
functions (CF) than in ancillary and support functions.  
2.4.3.4 Level of Analysis: Individual 
Studies that are depicted on the lowest level of Figure 2, investigate effects 
arising from individuals which usually refers to the manager of the 
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organization. In this respect it is argued that managers’ expectations about 
future demand influences their willingness to adjust resources. According to 
Banker et al. (2014), a manager is optimistic (O) that demand will increase in 
the future if the company experienced rising sales already in the prior period. 
Vice versa, managers are rather pessimistic if prior period sales decreased. 
Kama and Weiss (2013) use the two-period model introduced by Banker et al. 
(2014) to further investigate how managerial optimism affects managers’ 
willingness to manage earnings. Also Verniers, Naoum and Vlismas (2015) 
build on this proposition and argue that the level of intangible assets of a 
company is an indicator of positive management expectations. Their study 
shows that companies with high intangible assets exhibit a stronger degree of 
cost stickiness. Other researchers find comparable results in line with the 
‘managerial expectation’ argument, (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 
2003; Banker and Byzalov 2014; He, Teruya, and Shimizu 2010). 
Additionally, firm-specific cost behavior can be affected by managers’ 
incentive to engage in empire building (EB). Because Chen, Lu and 
Sougiannis (2012) conceptualize the effect of empire building on firm-specific 
cost behavior on the organizational level as well as on the individual level, 
both links are depicted in the map.   
Notably, the literature on asymmetric cost behavior is strongly related to the 
literate on cost elasticity. Cost elasticity captures the percentage change of 
costs for each percentage change in activity. Thus, it focuses on the link 
between A and C without conditioning the effect on the direction of change in 
activity (D). As such, a change in cost elasticity is most likely associated with 
a change in the magnitude of cost stickiness or anti-stickiness. Specifically, 
Banker and Byazlov (2014) provide evidence for the impact of demand 
uncertainty on cost elasticity, while Holzhacker, Krishnan and Mahlendorf 
(2015b) explain which mechanisms firms use to increase cost elasticity in 
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response to financial risk and demand uncertainty. To indicate the link 
between the literature on asymmetric cost behavior and the literature on cost 
elasticity, these two studies are additionally incorporated in Figure 2. 
Overall, the map in Figure 2 reveals a pattern according to which the 
literature can be clustered in seven categories. Depending on the theoretical 
constructs used and the level of analysis, studies focus on: (a) external 
factors, (b) firm-specific factors, (c) current capacity utilization, (d) earnings 
forecast and fundamental analysis, (e) selling price changes, (f) managerial 
incentives and personal characteristics or (g) managerial expectations about 
future demand. To illustrate, Figure 3 shows the grouping of cause-and effect-
relationships according to these seven categories (each category is highlighted 
using italic letters in the previous paragraphs). 
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2.4.4 Criticism to the Literature 
The literature on asymmetric cost behavior also faces some criticism. 
Specifically, Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom (2014) claim that because of 
the logarithmic specification of the empirical model, asymmetric cost behavior 
is more likely to arise due to (a) diseconomies of scale and (b) firm-specific 
cost structure, instead of deliberate managerial decision-making.  
To provide evidence for their first argument, the authors examine the 
standard empirical model introduced by Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman 
(2003) (see section 2.2) and show how long-run decisions in fixed capacity 
influence the magnitude of stickiness. In doing so, they transform the 
standard log-log model in a linear specification by assuming a cost function 
that consists of fixed (FC) and variable costs (VC). Thus, total costs (TC) 
are equivalent to      !". If the elasticity of costs is similar across 
companies in the sample, then the linear model specification should produce 
the same cost elasticity estimate as the logarithmic model specification. 
However, Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom (2014) show that the estimate 
depends on the growth rate in sales that is likely to be different for every 
firm. Collectively, this suggests that the empirical estimation of cost stickiness 
based on a logarithmic model can be driven by diseconomies of scale if the 
proportion of fixed costs to total costs varies across the sample. 
With respect to their second argument, Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom 
(2014) claim that the logarithmic specification induces cost stickiness due to 
differences in firms’ cost structure. Because the likelihood of sales increases is 
higher for bigger companies than for smaller companies (measured by sales 
revenue), the empirical estimate of cost stickiness is more pronounced if the 
sample is dominated by big firms. This is oftentimes the case if researchers 
work with Compustat data which provides financial information on public 
companies. Larger organizations have higher absolute fixed costs that are 
captured by the intercept in the standard regression model. Thus, if the 
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intercept is held constant across firms, then the effect of cost structure on the 
empirical estimate of cost stickiness is stronger for companies with relatively 
higher sales. 
To avoid spurious findings of cost stickiness due to the logarithmic 
specification of the empirical model, Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom 
(2014) therefore suggest researchers to consider the following aspects (section 
3.3 and section 3.4 discuss how these points are acknowledged within the 
frame of this dissertation): 
 Application of linear Fama-Macbeth type regressions 
 Focus on a narrowly defined industry 
 Usage of control variables as fixed effects and as moderators 
In the same issue of the Journal of Management Accounting Research, 
Banker and Byzalov (2014) respond to the previously described criticism by 
stating that “[…] these claims are unfounded both theoretically and 
empirically” (p. 60). Specifically, the authors argue that the usage of a cost 
function that distinguishes between fixed and variable cost is in line with the 
traditional mechanical cost model, but not with the perception of asymmetric 
cost behavior. The latter implies that even though some resources might be 
classified as variable, their adjustment is associated with significant 
adjustment costs that can be managed by the decision-maker. In support of 
this argument, Banker and Byalov (2014) use a flexible version of the 
traditional cost function in the form of     #   !"$. The elements 
are: fixed costs (FC), variable cost ratio (v) and a positive parameter that 
determines the curvature of the cost function (y). Drawing on the alternative 
functional form, Banker and Byzalov (2014) show that irrespective of whether 
a linear or a logarithmic model is applied, both forms would imply a lower 
cost response for sales decreases than for sales increases. This contradicts the 
argumentation by Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom (2014) who claim that 
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cost stickiness arises because of the logarithmic specification of the empirical 
model. Additionally, Banker and Byzalov (2014) emphasize that even if the 
criticism would be valid, Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom’s (2014) 
argumentation does not explain anti-stickiness which is an equally important 
aspect of asymmetric cost behavior.  
In their article, Banker and Byzalov (2014) moreover address another issue 
which is raised in an unpublished paper by Anderson and Lanen (2009). The 
authors claim that cost stickiness can be ascribed to what they call “unusual 
observations” which occur if costs and sales move in the opposite direction. 
Banker and Byzalov (2014) object that by excluding these observations, only 
one tail of the sample is discarded while the influence of very strong increases 
in costs in accordance with increasing sales and very strong decreases in costs 
in accordance with decreasing sales becomes stronger. An exclusion of these 
observations is therefore not feasible. Furthermore, Banker and Byzalov 
(2014) argue that the opposite movement of costs to sales does not necessarily 
reflects unusual behavior. Rather, costs can for instance decrease when 
managers pre-adjust resources in anticipation to a decline in demand although 
current sales are rising.  
3 The Dissertation 
3.1 Positioning 
The three papers which represent the body of this dissertation are all framed 
within the asymmetric cost behavior literature. Nevertheless, each paper 
focuses on different aspects that either explain contradictory findings or fill 
gaps in the theoretical development of the scientific field. To illustrate, Figure 
4 shows the positioning of each paper within the present research of 
asymmetric cost behavior. 
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Figure 4: Positioning of the Papers in the Literature 
Beyond Organization 
External Factors 
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Figure 4 illustrates how the papers of this dissertation are positioned within the literature 
on asymmetric cost behavior. The numbers refer to the first, second and third paper 
respectively.  
 
The first paper investigates the research question “What are the economic 
consequences of asymmetric cost behavior?”. To do so, an index is constructed 
which captures factors that other researchers identified to drive the deliberate 
retention of resources. These factors are derived from firm-specific 
characteristics, such as employee intensity or asset intensity. Thus, this part 
of the paper is strongly related to the category ‘Firm-Specific Factors’. In a 
next step, the index is incorporated in an empirical model that predicts the 
economic consequences of both sticky costs as well as anti-sticky costs. This 
approach follows the literature related to the category ‘Earnings Forecast and 
Fundamental Analysis’. By using a firm-specific measure of cost stickiness 
according to Weiss (2010) it is possible to investigate the economic 
consequences on the average SG&A ratio between the current period and the 
next period. The incorporation of the index moreover facilitates the 
differentiation between intended cost stickiness, with the objective to generate 
future value for the firm, and unintended cost stickiness which reflects costs 
  
1 
2 
2 3 
3 
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getting out of control. Overall, results show that even though cost stickiness 
induces a temporary increase in the costs-to-sales ratio, the deliberate 
retention of resources is economically feasible if adjustment costs can be 
avoided and demand recovers quickly. Accordingly, paper one is positioned 
between the two categories ‘Firm-Specific Factors’ and ‘Earnings Forecast and 
Fundamental Analysis’ on the organizational level.  
The second paper investigates the research question “Do labor supply 
shortages affect asymmetric cost behavior?”. In this respect it is the first 
study that examines the impact of variations in supply on managers’ resource 
adjustment decisions. As labor supply constitutes an external factor that is 
not controllable by the company, the paper is positioned on the upper level of 
Figure 4. Thus, it relates to the literature category that focuses on ‘External 
Factors’. In addition to the impact of restricted labor supply, the paper 
examines whether the magnitude of cost stickiness varies by geographical 
region. A significant difference is ascribed to diverging magnitudes of labor 
adjustment costs. The latter represents another external factor which so far 
has only been considered on the national level, but not across different regions 
in one country. Results show that cost stickiness is lower if labor supply is 
scarce and the company operates in rural areas. The effect decreases with the 
length of the supply shock. 
The paper further investigates which mechanisms managers use in response to 
labor supply shortages. Findings suggest that companies react to restricted 
labor supply by leveraging current capacity and expecting more effort from 
their employees. This increases labor productivity and reduces cost stickiness. 
The effect is amplified if companies also increase selling prices. Because the 
latter does not represent the core analysis of this study the positioning of the 
second paper in Figure 4 is indicated with a dotted border within the 
category ‘Selling Price Changes’.    
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The third paper investigates the research question “How do managers adjust 
resources and prices in accordance with their expectations about future 
demand?”. Because managers form their expectations prior to a change in 
demand, the ex-post accuracy of their expectations determines how closely 
aligned resource and price adjustments are with the actual path of demand. 
As such, the paper relates to the literature that focuses on ‘Managerial 
Expectations about Future Demand’ as well as ‘Selling Price Changes’. 
Findings show that the accuracy of managerial expectations is positively 
related to the symmetry of cost behavior. Hence, the more accurate mangers 
predict future demand, the lower the magnitude of cost stickiness. Results 
reveal that the reduction of cost stickiness is realized by decreasing selling 
prices and downsizing resources. While managers who did not foresee a drop 
in demand do not change prices and adjust resources to a lesser extent than 
those companies that expected demand to fall. 
Notably, only one other study specifically investigates how changes in selling 
prices affect firm-specific cost behavior (Cannon 2014). By focusing on the 
interplay between selling price changes, resource adjustment decisions and 
managerial expectations this paper therefore provides valuable insights on the 
causes of asymmetric cost behavior and identifies promising ideas for future 
research.   
3.2 Theoretical Approach 
Although a common consensus of what theory is, seems to be troublesome to 
develop (Sutton and Staw 1995), most social scientists agree upon theory as 
means to providing answers to why certain cause and effect relationships exist 
(Malmi and Granlund 2009). In order to explain such associations, cost 
stickiness researchers frequently embrace economic theory to underpin their 
hypotheses.  
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Economic theory represents an important ground for Management 
Accounting research. Mensah, Hwang and Wu (2004) estimate that nearly 
every second article published in Accounting journals between 1986 and 2000 
is related to economic theory. Robbins (1945) draws back on Cannan (1914) 
and Marshall (1890) and defines economics as “[…] the science that studies 
human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses”. This definition encompasses an important interest in 
Management Accounting that is related to the valuation of alternatives by 
weighing opportunity costs of unrealized benefits. In contrast to micro-
economic theory which explains how markets obtain equilibriums, 
Management Accounting research focuses on the optimal allocation of input 
bundles usually implying perfect and complete competition (Bromwich 2007). 
In this sense, firm-specific (endogenous) solutions to profit-maximization 
problems are generally determined by referring to the underlying cost 
function of a company. A cost function defines the relation between input 
prices and output according to the limitation of the available technology. As 
such, cost models describe the economic structure of a firm and are the 
starting point for analyzing the “economic consequences of resource 
consumption in an organization” (Christensen and Hemmer 2006).  
Economic theory is oftentimes criticized for its key assumptions with respect 
to: decision-making by rational and profit-maximizing individuals, limited 
uncertainty and freely available information (Bromwich 2007; Smith 2015).6 
But if researchers are aware of the main assumptions and important 
limitations, economic theory serves as a useful framework to explain empirical 
relationships. Hodgson (2012) goes so far as to write: 
                                
6 Loomes (1998) for instance argues that “[…] much of the effort that has gone into 
developing formal decision models to explain individual decision making under risk and 
uncertainty may to some (possibly considerable) extent have been misdirected” (p. 477). 
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“[…] the mainstream theory is not wrong because it is empirically 
inaccurate. It is not unrealistic in the sense that it fails to fit the data. 
Any data can be fitted into it. Hence no data can refute the theory. It 
cannot be displaced simply by an appeal to the evidence. The 
experimental evidence of preference reversals and other choice 
‘anomalies’ may lead us to search for a different and better theory, but 
it does not in principle refute the old version based on utility and 
rational choice” (p. 103). 
Similarly, Bromwich (2007) concludes that the positivistic perspective of 
economic theory satisfies the fundamental objective of organizations. It seeks 
output bundles that maximize overall efficiency and thereby secures long-term 
sustainability. Allowedly, it does not provide satisfactory results for e.g., 
distribution or ethical issues, but economic theory facilitates many decision-
making problems which are difficult to solve using normative approaches.  
Following this line of reasoning, the three papers of this dissertation are 
framed in the light of economic theory. Thus, results provide valuable insights 
for economic decision-making and can be used to direct future research using 
alternative theories that are not underlying the discussed constraints.  
3.3 Data 
This dissertation is based on data from three different sources. The following 
table provides an overview of the main information: 
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Table 3: Overview of Data Sources  
Dataset Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat 
Orbis Danish business survey 
(conducted as part of 
an EU survey 
program) 
Source Wharton Research 
Data Services  
Bureau Van Djik Denmark Statistics 
https://wrds-
web.wharton.upenn. 
edu/wrds/ 
http://www.bvdinfo.co
m/en-gb/our-
products/company-
information/internatio
nal-products/orbis) 
http://www.dst.dk/en
/Statistik/emner?subje
ct=07 
Access Access through CBS  
library data services 
Access through CBS  
library data services 
Access through server 
of Denmark Statistics 
(purchased) 
Coverage North American and 
Canadian companies 
Danish companies Danish companies 
Aggregation Annual Annual Monthly 
Used 
Information 
- SG&A costs 
- Operating costs 
- Sales 
- Number of employees 
- Total assets 
- Operating cash flow 
- Dividends 
- Firm market value 
- Net income 
- Operating costs 
- Costs of goods sold 
- Sales 
- Number of employees 
- Total assets 
- Personnel expenses 
- Operating profit 
- Depreciation 
- Region 
- Geographical regions 
- Order backlog in 
months 
- Managerial 
expectations 
- Limiting factors 
- Selling price 
development 
Deployment Paper I Paper II 
Paper III 
Paper II 
Paper III 
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the different data sources which are used in each of the 
papers. The row ‘used information’ does not refer to the general data availability of the 
data base, but refers to the main items that are processed within the frame of each paper 
of this dissertation. 
 
The first paper uses Standard and Poor’s Compustat data obtained from 
Wharton Research Data Services for public US and Canadian companies. The 
second and the third paper use a merged dataset from two sources: financial 
statement information from Orbis and survey results from a Danish business 
survey. In contrast to S&P Compustat data, the latter covers mainly private 
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companies that are significantly smaller in total number of employees as well 
as sales. As costs are sticky on average in all of the three papers, this rules 
out the argument raised by Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom (2014) who 
claim that cost stickiness is mainly driven by the prevalence of large 
companies in the sample.  
A potential concern of using a cross-sectional dataset is that accounting 
choices are not uniform across different industries and countries or are 
adapted over time. This complicates the comparison of findings and can 
mislead conclusions. To address this issue, industry fixed effects and slopes 
are included in all of the empirical models (except for paper two which only 
focuses on one industry). Moreover, a clustering by firm and year according 
to Petersen (2009) is performed which mitigates a potential correlation of 
residuals. To restrict biases due to different company sizes all independent 
variables are scaled by total sales while the logarithmic specification 
additionally alleviates heteroscedasticity (Anderson, Banker, and 
Janakiraman 2003). 
In line with previous studies (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; 
Anderson et al. 2007; Banker et al. 2014; Chen, Ni, and Wu 2014) all of the 
papers investigate the behavior of SG&A costs as the dependent variable. 
SG&A costs are calculated without including depreciation expenses which 
could otherwise lead to spurious findings of asymmetric cost behavior (Shust 
and Weiss 2014). The Standard and Poor’s Compustat data base provides 
information on the amount of SG&A costs specifically which are standardized 
to ensure the comparability between similar types of data items across firms 
(Standard & Poor’s 2011). However, SG&A costs are not provided as separate 
line items in the Orbis database. They are therefore calculated indirectly from 
the available information by subtracting operating income, depreciation and 
costs of goods sold (for non-service firms) from operating sales per company. 
Because companies can aggregate indirect costs differently (i.e. allocation to 
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direct costs or reporting as SG&A), robustness checks are moreover 
performed using total operating costs instead of SG&A costs. Results remain 
unchanged. Thus, potential concerns with respect to the internal validity of 
findings are mitigated, while external validity is high due to the large sample 
size (Evans et al. 2015; Johnson and Wichern 2014).  
Also the reliability which requires an overall consistency of research 
instruments does not seem to be a concern in this dissertation. All of the 
models use established instruments in the literature and yield sufficiently high 
coefficients of determination which indicates that a vast proportion of the 
variance of the dependent variable is explained by the predictors. Sample 
selection procedures are consistent throughout the dissertation and 
correspond to the approach used in most other studies (Anderson, Banker, 
and Janakiraman 2003; Banker and Byzalov 2014).  
Furthermore, the usage of survey data from Denmark statistics in paper two 
and three allows to incorporate selling price changes as endogenous variable 
and does not require specifying proxies for managerial demand expectations or 
price changes. Consequently, construct validity, i.e. the degree to which the 
study actually measures what it intends to measure, is strongly improved 
compared to other work that aims to investigate the asymmetric behavior of 
costs (Smith 2015).  
The combination of the (longitudinal) survey data together with the archival 
data obtained from Bureau Van Djik and Wharton Research Data Services 
has two more advantages. First, it allows testing the standard cost stickiness 
model introduced by Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003) and 
therewith facilitates a comparison of empirical estimates with other studies. 
The latter requires a lot of information on one company at different times 
(e.g., current and prior year sales changes, current and prior year cost 
changes) which is only available using a relatively large dataset that covers a 
longer time-frame. Second, it facilitates the comparison of sub-groups that are 
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generated based on the merged survey information and ensures that statistical 
relevance is maintained.     
3.4 Methodological Approach 
Pursuing a quantitative approach, all hypotheses are tested based on 
longitudinal panel data using multiple linear regressions. Because cost 
behavior is determined by many more factors than only the direction of sales, 
multiple linear regression allows to incorporate several predictors while 
maintaining the interpretability of results.7 This approach moreover helps to 
identify interrelations between independent variables which are especially 
important when examining trade-offs between e.g., labor supply shortages and 
the degree of cost increases during periods of rising demand. Specifically, the 
hypothized relationships are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions 
by minimizing the sum of squared residuals under the following assumptions: 
strict exogeneity (residuals have a mean of zero), no correlation among 
predictors or residuals, homoscedasticity (residuals have a constant variance), 
no autocorrelation and normal distribution of residuals. For each regression, 
these assumptions are tested and imposed by e.g., computing the variance 
inflation factor according to Belsley (1980) to spot potential multicollinearity, 
clustering the residuals according to Petersen (2009) to reduce potential 
autocorrelation and homoscedasticity, and trimming the top and bottom 
values of the sample to reduce the influence of outliers (Chen and Dixon 
1972).8 Because the empirical tests within the frame of the first paper include 
many interactions among continuous predictors, variables are furthermore 
                                
7 It is of course possible to do similar analyses using crosstab tables with categorical data 
to split the sample. This approach however has strong practical limitation related to the 
interpretation of the tables with increasing number of variables (Lee and McKinney 2013). 
8 Because the sample of companies is different for each of the three papers of this 
dissertation, the treatment of outliers varies accordingly. While for instance in the first 
paper extreme observations at the 0.5 percent bottom and top of the distribution are 
deleted, the cut off is set at two percent for the third paper. Mahalanobis distance and 
distribution plots are used to detect outliers and specify where to trim the data.  
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mean-centered prior to the computation of the product to mitigate 
multicollinearity (Aiken and West 1991). 
Overall, the chosen methodological approach has several advantages of which 
some are listed below (Lee and McKinney 2013): 
 It is possible to determine the combined effect of all predictor variables 
in explaining the variance of the dependent variable. The statistical 
outcome is captured with the (adjusted) coefficient of determination. 
 It is possible to determine the individual effect of one predictor variable 
by controlling for other influencing factors (holding them constant). The 
statistical outcome is captured with the estimated regression 
coefficients.  
 It is possible to determine the relative importance of each predictor 
variable and comparing them between each other. The statistical 
outcome is captured with the standardized regression coefficient. 
 It is possible to determine the relationship among predictor variables by 
identifying moderating or mediating effects. The statistical outcome is 
usually captured by incorporating interactions in the regression model.   
 
In line with the standard cost stickiness model introduced by Anderson, 
Banker and Janakiraman (2003), all of the applied regression models use 
dependent variables that capture the change in costs and not the absolute 
level of costs. Notably, using a change model instead of a level model 
aggravates the discovery of significant effects. In case of an absolute model 
specification, the regression coefficient captures either an increase or a 
decrease in the dependent variable (e.g., a one percent increase of sales leads 
to a 0.2 percent increase of costs). In case of a change model, a regression 
coefficient is only significant if it predicts how the independent variable 
influences the change of the dependent variable (i.e. a one percent increase of 
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sales leads to a 0.2 percent increase in the percentage change of the 
dependent variable between the current period and the prior period). Hence, 
the change specification strongly improves the robustness of the model and is 
most suitable to investigate short-run cost behavior (Banker, Byzalov, and 
Plehn-Dujowich 2014; Noreen and Soderstrom 1994). As such, it estimates the 
change in the variability of costs rather than merely estimating the change in 
the level of costs.  
The implied relationships are tested using a logarithmic specification. The 
latter has two main advantages over the linear model (as suggested by 
Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom (2014); see section 2.4.4): First, the log-
transformation alleviates heteroscedasticity and makes variables more 
comparable across firms. Second, the logarithm facilitates an interpretation of 
the regression coefficients as elasticities so that the relationship between costs 
and sales can be described in percentages.  
To control for differences between industries, all regression models moreover 
include industry-specific intercepts (i.e. fixed effects) as well as slopes. 
3.5 Limitations and Future Research 
This dissertation starts by investigating the consequences of cost stickiness 
and anti-stickiness. Specifically, the first paper analyzes whether the average 
SG&A cost-to-sales ratio between the current period and the previous period 
is smaller for sticky cost companies than for anti-sticky cost companies. The 
intuition is based on the argumentation by Anderson, Banker and 
Janakiraman (2003) who claim that managers deliberately retain resources 
when demand is temporarily declining to avoid adjustment costs incurred in 
the adaption of resources. Thus, if adjustment costs are higher than the costs 
of maintaining slack capacity and demand recovers quickly, then cost 
stickiness is economically justifiable. This is an important finding for the 
academic world as well as for practitioners who are oftentimes heavily 
pressured to maintain cost control without considering long-term 
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consequences (Deloitte 2016; McKinsey & Company 2005). It also highlights 
how additional research can contribute to the understanding of cost behavior 
in line with Whatts and Zimmerman (1986) who contend that one crucial 
criterion for a theory’s success is the value of the theory to its applicants. 
Nevertheless, the paper uses a firm-specific measure of asymmetric cost 
behavior that distinguishes between sticky costs and anti-sticky costs, but 
does not consider fairly low parameter values as regular costs. Instead, small 
values of the measure are ascribed to either sticky costs or anti-sticky costs 
even though resource adjustments are likely to differ for firms that exhibit 
relatively symmetrical cost behavior. Hence, future research could look into 
alternative ways to split the sample with less aggregation of costs as 
dependent variable. 
Knowing that the consideration of adjustment costs can yield economic 
benefits leads over to the question of what determines their magnitude and 
how adjustment costs become manifested in the form of cost stickiness. Figure 
3 shows that the existing stream of literature predominately investigates the 
drivers of asymmetric cost behavior on the organizational level, but rarely 
incorporates external factors from outside the organization. To fill this gap, 
paper two focuses on the important aspect of labor supply shortages and their 
impact on managers’ resource adjustment decisions. Information on labor 
supply shortages are obtained from the Danish business survey described in 
section 3.3 which are merged with quantitative data from financial statements 
from the same companies. One potential concern in this respect is that even 
though the survey is conducted in a professional and standardized 
environment, it can be subject to response or conformity bias (Lee and 
McKinney 2013). It could for instance be the case that respondents did not 
accurately answer the survey questions (response bias) or aligned their 
answers over time to achieve high conformity between e.g., demand 
expectations and actual demand development (conformity bias). To address 
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this issue, extreme observations or observations with relatively low variability 
over time are identified and if necessary excluded from the sample. On this 
basis, paper two generates meaningful knowledge on the effect of labor supply 
shortages and describes how it can lead to an increase in labor productivity. 
Understanding the extent to which the interplay between supply and demand 
dynamics on managers’ resource adjustment decisions varies across countries 
and between industries is a promising avenue for future research.  
The last paper of this dissertation focuses on the individual level by 
investigating the relationship between the accuracy of managerial demand 
expectations and their resource and price adjustments. Just as the second 
paper, this perspective is less explored in the current state of literature but 
yields important insights. One of the reasons for an underrepresentation of 
studies that investigate factors on the individual level is the limited 
availability of data. However, the importance of managerial demand 
expectations with respect to resources adjustment decisions is acknowledged 
in many articles (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Banker et al. 
2014; Chen, Kama, and Lehavy 2015). As such, the third paper contributes 
by showing that managers adjust resources differently in response to expected 
compared to unexpected changes in demand. If a drop in demand is 
anticipated, mangers will cut resources and lower selling prices to avoid a 
decrease of profitability. Consequently, cost stickiness is less pronounced 
compared to companies where managers did not foresee a change in demand.  
At first glance it seems that the intuition behind these findings contradicts 
the main argument of the first paper of this dissertation. The latter provides 
evidence that cost stickiness can be economically viable if demand recovers 
quickly. Nevertheless, two aspects help to reconcile the discrepancy. First, a 
proactive adjustment of resources implies that executives actually make 
adaptions prior to the actual shock. In that way, the company has time to 
prepare and will be able to compensate either a fall or a rise in demand. 
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However, if the shock is unexpected and the firm did not pre-adjust, then it 
proves to be better to avoid high adjustment costs associated with a rapid 
adaption of resources by maintaining the current level and allowing for cost 
stickiness. Thus, the time-frame of the underlying decision-making process is 
crucial in evaluating the consequences as well as the drivers of asymmetric 
cost behavior. Second, it is possible that some companies react to an 
anticipated fall in demand by merely lowering selling prices instead of cutting 
resources. Because resources are maintained, these companies will exhibit cost 
stickiness which is expected to pay off in the next period if demand 
recuperates. This implies that the disentangling of price effects and resource-
adjustment decisions is essential when examining asymmetric cost behavior. It 
is left to future research to examine not only the direction, but also the 
relative timing of mangers’ pricing decisions and resource adjustments 
according to their expectations about future demand. 
In summary, the collection of papers in this dissertation contributes to the 
literature by, first, measuring the economic consequences of asymmetric cost 
behavior, second, evaluating the impact of labor supply shortages and, third, 
showing which mechanisms firms use to respond to expected or unexpected 
changes in demand. These findings do not only add to the empirical 
knowledge about asymmetric cost behavior from an academic perspective, but 
can also help executives when taking decisions on resource and price 
adjustments. However, the generalizability of results and application in the 
organizational context is limited due to the high level of cost aggregation. 
Even though large archival datasets render many statistical analyses possible, 
it is difficult to outline practical solutions for the adaption of specific cost 
items. Future research can help to overcome this limitation by for instance 
conducting case studies together with a more granular analysis of the 
behavior of individual components of SG&A costs. Ideally, the latter would 
be complemented by measuring real output instead of using sales as an 
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imperfect proxy. In this regard, it suggests itself to investigate the interplay 
between supply dynamics and resource and price adjustments in an empirical 
setting that not only determines the magnitude, but also the consequences of 
asymmetric cost behavior. This addresses the request directed towards 
Management Accounting researchers as to attach more importance to the 
performance implications of various practices and strengthens the practical 
implications of findings which are derived from economic theory (Bromwich 
2007; Malmi and Granlund 2009). 
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B PAPER I 
 
Is Deliberate Cost Stickiness Economically 
Justifiable in the Presence of Adjustment Costs? 
 
Abstract: 
If costs fall with a decrease in demand to a lesser degree than with an 
equivalent increase in demand, they are considered to be sticky. Stickiness 
can lead to a rise in the ratio of cost-to-sales which is oftentimes interpreted 
as a negative signal about future profitability. However, there exist 
contrasting explanations for this phenomenon. On the one side, managerial 
overconfidence or empire building might lead to sticky costs, on the other 
side, many researchers attribute cost stickiness to deliberate decision making 
in an attempt to avoid potential adjustment costs if the decline in demand is 
expected to be temporary. Only in the latter case, stickiness can be 
economically justifiable for profit-maximizing companies.  
To test whether cost stickiness is driven by economic considerations or 
behavioral characteristics, this study analyzes firm-specific effects of 
asymmetric cost behavior on scaled selling, general, and administrative costs. 
All analyses are performed using ANCOVA and multivariate regression. 
Findings provide support for the economic theory of sticky costs. Results 
show that an under proportional adjustment of resources, either during a 
demand decline or during a demand increase, may be economically viable if 
managers consider adjustment costs in conjunction with expected future 
demand when adapting resources.  
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1 Introduction 
An increase in the ratio of selling, general, and administrative costs (SG&A) 
to sales is frequently interpreted by fundamental analysts as a negative 
indicator of future economic performance. In periods of declining activity, this 
may be either due to the fixed proportion of SG&A costs which is distributed 
across a smaller sales volume or caused by decreases in operating efficiencies 
indicating managers’ inability to control costs (e.g. Bernstein and Wild 1998; 
Lev and Thiagarajan 1993). However, recent evidence shows that a temporary 
rise in the SG&A ratio (SG&A costs divided by sales) during a fall in demand 
can be positively related to prospective profitability (Anderson et al. 2007). In 
this case, findings suggest that managers deliberately trade off costs 
associated with retained resources against potential adjustment costs. 
Consequently, a higher SG&A ratio during short-term decreases in sales may 
be economically viable, provided that a cutback and ramp-up of resources 
bears adjustment costs that can be avoided if demand recovers quickly. This 
proposition builds on recent studies which recognize that in fact SG&A costs 
fall to a lesser extent with a decrease in activity than compared to an 
equivalent increase in activity, which is referred to as cost stickiness. 
Specifically, costs are considered to be sticky if “the magnitude of the increase 
in costs associated with an increase in volume is greater than the magnitude 
of the decrease in costs associated with an equivalent decrease in volume” 
(Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003, p. 48) (hereafter, ABJ 2003). 
According to this line of reasoning, cost stickiness may be economically 
justifiable if resource levels are kept stable during a short-term fall in activity, 
and the potential cost of the adjustment of those resources is eluded. 
However, in contrast to the economic explanation, other researchers find that 
sticky costs are also driven by behavioral aspects, such as managerial 
overconfidence or empire building incentives (Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis 2012; 
Chen, Gores, and Nasev 2013).  
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Many analyses focus on extending the existing literature on the potential 
causes of cost stickiness without testing the actual consequences of either of 
the two main explanations. This study therefore investigates firm-specific 
effects of asymmetric cost behavior on the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio using an 
alternative empirical approach, which has so far not been applied in existing 
studies. By doing so, this paper incorporates both the aspect of managerial 
intent and monetary consequences of asymmetric cost behavior. It moreover 
acknowledges recent findings according to which cost stickiness arises 
conditional on a prior sales increase, but anti-stickiness conditional on a prior 
sales decrease (Banker et al. 2014). The latter builds on the conceptualization 
by Weiss (2010, p. 1442) who terms costs as anti-sticky if “they increase less 
when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent 
amount”. Accordingly, the subsequent analysis incorporates both forms, 
addressing the important question of whether asymmetric cost behavior, from 
either sticky or anti-stickiness, may in fact contradict or reinforce the 
prevalent proposition that a higher SG&A ratio during demand decreases 
necessarily always reflects a lack of cost control, which leads to an increase in 
the SG&A ratio on average.  
To test the research question, this study uses a longitudinal dataset covering 
4,911 US and Canadian companies from 1998 to 2012. Operationally, 
economic consequences of firm-specific cost asymmetry are estimated 
constructing a two-year average ratio of SG&A cost-to-sales as the dependent 
variable. By doing so, the projected relationship covers both the effect of 
adjustment costs as well as costs of retained resources between the current 
and forthcoming period. Within the frame of the following analysis, the term 
“SG&A cost-to-sales ratio” is used to describe the dependent variable in the 
empirical models of this study which is calculated as the log-ratio of SG&A 
costs in t plus t+1 divided by sales in t plus t+1. The empirical examination 
is facilitated by a composite measure of managerial intention when adjusting, 
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or rather not adjusting, resources as opposed to unintended cost stickiness 
which might reflect cost escalation beyond managerial control (Baumgarten, 
Bonenkamp, and Homburg 2010).  
To render comparisons possible, all analyses in this study focus solely on 
SG&A costs as this cost category is predominantly employed in related 
research. Because asymmetric cost behavior is caused by deliberate decision-
making, it is feasible to focus on non-production costs where managerial 
discretion is assumed to be high (Bernstein and Wild 1998; Lev and 
Thiagarajan 1993).  
Drawing on the concept of adjustment cost, findings are consistent with 
expectations showing a negative effect of cost stickiness on the SG&A cost-to-
sales ratio if stickiness arises as a consequence of deliberate managerial 
decision-making during a temporary decline in demand. The SG&A cost-to-
sales ratio is significantly smaller for sticky cost firms compared to anti-sticky 
cost firms. However, if activity decreases over two consecutive periods, the 
effects are strongly mitigated and yield no significant difference in the SG&A 
cost-to-sales ratio between both groups. Moreover, the results indicate that 
the positive economic consequence of avoiding adjustment costs during a 
temporary decline in demand diminishes with an increasing level of firm-
specific cost stickiness. The effect is significant for moderate levels of cost 
stickiness but almost zero for highly sticky SG&A costs. Findings complement 
the work of Anderson et al. (2007) who find a general association between 
cost stickiness and future earnings, but neither compare sticky and anti-sticky 
cost companies nor estimate the direct effect of a percentage change in cost 
asymmetry on the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio.  
This study contributes by demonstrating that, contrary to prevalent 
interpretations that consider a rise in the SG&A ratio as a negative signal 
with respect to future profitability, asymmetric cost behavior can be 
positively related to a decrease in the mean level of SG&A costs if adjustment 
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costs are avoided. Because SG&A costs represent a significant proportion of 
sales, amounting to 27 percent on average in this sample, these findings are 
particularly important to researchers, analysts, and practitioners for the 
evaluation of alternatives in the event of demand variations.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides 
a literature review on central articles related to the cost stickiness 
phenomenon. Section three elaborates on the theoretical foundation with 
respect to the economic rationale of sticky costs and the adjustment cost 
theory from which the main hypotheses are derived. Section four introduces 
the empirical models and a measure used in the analysis, and describes 
sample characteristics. Empirical results and additional robustness tests are 
presented in section five, and the last part of this study concludes the main 
findings.  
2 Prior Research 
Already in the 1920s, researchers had observed unusual patterns of cost 
behavior in relation to changes in activity (Brasch 1927; Hasenack 1925). In 
this respect, the term “cost remanence” has been introduced in German 
literature, which relates to the English meaning of sticky costs. A first 
analysis of potential reasons and characteristics of cost stickiness has been 
undertaken by Strube (1936), who examined cost behavior in six companies 
from the year 1933 to the year 1936 and was followed by other researchers 
such as Rumpf (1966), Malagoli (1985), and Noreen and Soderstrom (1994; 
1997). Over more than a decade scientific interest in this subject has gained 
increased attention in management accounting research with the introduction 
of an empirical model that facilitates the examination of cost stickiness on 
large-scale panel data conditioning on the direction of change in activity. 
Results reported by ABJ (2003) indicate that the rate of an increase in costs 
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with rising activity is greater compared to the rate of a decline in costs with 
an equivalent fall in activity.9 Thus, costs are said to move asymmetrical with 
respect to increasing and decreasing demand. In addition to cost stickiness 
itself, a limited number of researchers focus on the analysis of “anti-sticky” 
costs. In this case, costs increase less in response to a surge in activity than 
they decrease in response to dwindling activity (Weiss 2010). Anti-sticky cost 
behavior can be observed during periods of strong and persistent sales decline, 
such as during the economic crisis between the years 2007 and 2009, when a 
quick recovery of the market was unexpected (Banker, Fang, and Metha 
2013).  
Empirical evidence for both stickiness and anti-stickiness challenges the 
general assumption in traditional cost accounting models that posit a linear 
relationship between changes in costs and changes in volume, independent of 
whether activity decreases or increases (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 
2003; Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom 2004; Noreen 1991; Noreen and 
Soderstrom 1994; Noreen and Soderstrom 1997). In contrast to the traditional 
fixed/variable cost model, proponents of the cost stickiness theory argue that 
not only the current activity levels and the reversibility of resources 
determine the rate of adjustment but also deliberate managerial interventions 
(Banker and Byzalov 2014).10  
                                
9 Because changes in activity are usually not directly observable, many studies follow ABJ 
(2003) and use sales as an imperfect proxy for activity. Although this might agitate 
potential biases because of fluctuations in output selling prices, other studies applying 
alternative direct measures instead of sales find similar results (Balakrishnan, Petersen, 
and Soderstrom 2004; Balakrishnan and Gruca 2008). 
10 The traditional cost function can be deducted from the Cobb-Douglas production which 
holds the following form: %  &  '(  ) with %: total output, &: total factor 
productivity, ': total number of manual workers, : fixed capital, j, k: output elasticities 
(Douglas 1976). If * refers to the cost of capital and * refers to the cost of labor, then 
the cost minimization problem (ignoring fixed costs) under a given output level is +,-./
01  *    *  ' s.t. %2  %  &  '(  ). Deriving the first order conditions 30345 
and 
30346 for the corresponding Lagrangian '.*
 *,71 and solving for  and ' leads to the 
cost function (Schotter 2009). Let  be a function of *, *, & and 8
 9, then the cost 
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Growing empirical evidence contributes to the cost stickiness literature by 
examining the main drivers of variations in the degree of asymmetry. In 
particular, studies show that asymmetric cost behavior can be traced back to 
(1) the extent of resource adjustment costs in the form of country and 
industry-specific factors (Banker, Byzalov, and Chen 2013; Banker, Byzalov, 
and Threinen 2013; Calleja, Steliaros, and Thomas 2006), (2) managers 
expectations concerning future demand and demand uncertainty (Banker, 
Byzalov, and Plehn-Dujowich 2014; Banker et al. 2014; Holzhacker, Krishnan, 
and Mahlendorf 2015b), (3) current capacity utilization (Balakrishnan, 
Petersen, and Soderstrom 2004; Cannon 2014), and (4) managerial incentives 
and personal characteristics (Banker and Fang 2013; Chen, Lu, and 
Sougiannis 2012; Chen, Gores, and Nasev 2013; Dierynck, Landsman, and 
Renders 2012; Kama and Weiss 2013).11  
Several studies build on the proposition formulated by ABJ (2003) and 
analyze the former, which likely represents the most prominent explanation 
for asymmetric cost responses, that is, cost stickiness induced by the 
magnitude of adjustment costs. These costs could be, for instance, 
attributable to the payment of severance packages as a consequence of 
personnel dismissal or disposal costs of physical assets (Cooper and 
Haltiwanger 2006; Hamermesh and Pfann 1996). In such cases, decision 
makers deliberately accept a higher cost-to-sales ratio to avoid additional 
                                                                                                        
function is given by: .%2 1=   %2 5:;<. If 8  = > 9, constant returns to scale are assumed. 
Taking the log and using growth values between t-1 and t yields:  ?@ A /B/BC5D  E  E  ?@ A FBFBC5D   with EG   ?@ A HBHBC5D and E  (I, which corresponds to the traditional cost 
model implying that the log-change in variable cost is independent from the direction of 
log-change in output (Varian 1992). The cost stickiness model, therefore, extends the 
standard cost function by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if %J K % and zero 
otherwise. 
11 Cost stickiness is likely to be mistaken with conditional conservatism (i.e., asymmetric 
timeliness of bad news compared to good news in earnings recognition). Therefore, 
researchers suggest controlling for the effect of sticky costs when estimating conservatism 
(e.g. Banker et al. 2016; Homburg and Nasev 2008). 
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costs for the readjustment of resources when demand recuperates from a 
temporary decline. Banker, Byzalov, and Chen (2013) refer to this 
explanation as the “economic theory of sticky costs,” which emphasizes 
managers’ role in evaluating the trade-off between short-term retention of 
resources and monetary adjustment costs. These might be determined by 
firm-specific factors incorporated into the type of resources, as well as 
structural factors due to industry or country differences. Some studies show, 
for instance, that cost stickiness exists on average but varies considerably 
across different components of SG&A costs (e.g. Anderson, Banker, and 
Janakiraman 2003; Weidenmier and Subramaniam 2016; Weiss 2010). 
Scholars analyzing data from the healthcare sector moreover document 
significant cost asymmetry for operating costs, therapists’ hours, and total 
cost (Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom 2004; Balakrishnan and Gruca 
2008; Holzhacker, Krishnan, and Mahlendorf 2015a). Next to firm-specific 
parameters, a related field of research concentrates on contextual factors 
determining the degree of stickiness as a consequence of managers’ ambition 
to avoid adjustment costs. Calleja, Steliaros, and Thomas (2006) document 
that stronger corporate governance mechanisms and external managerial 
oversight impede French and German managers’ possibilities to cut resources 
in periods of falling sales compared to British and American decision makers. 
Additionally, national differences arise from employment protection legislation 
provisions that partially determine the extent of labor adjustment costs 
(Banker, Byzalov, and Chen 2013). Several other studies similarly examine 
the effect using country-specific data (e.g. De Medeiros and De Souza Costa 
2004; He, Teruya, and Shimizu 2010; Nassirzadeh et al. 2013; Pervan and 
Pervan 2012; Uy 2011; Yuekcue and Oezkaza 2011), whereas Banker et al. 
(2013; 2014) show that cost stickiness is also a global phenomenon.  
Another important driver of cost stickiness is related to managers’ 
expectations about future sales. Although ABJ (2004) argue that cost 
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stickiness prevails on average, Banker et al. (2014) document two opposing 
processes conditional on prior period sales changes. The authors assume that 
managers are more optimistic about a forthcoming increase in demand if sales 
in the previous year increased. This positively affects their willingness to 
acquire additional resources when current sales rise and negatively affects 
their willingness to cut resources when current demand declines. However, 
managers might fear a forthcoming fall in demand if they already experienced 
a downturn in the last period. This leads to the opposite effect in the form of 
anti-stickiness. Therefore, Banker et al. (2014) suggest a model that 
acknowledges the moderating effect of prior period sales changes when 
drawing conclusions on asymmetric cost behavior.  
Some studies focus on the relevance of current capacity levels on the extent of 
cost stickiness. Based on a sample of physical therapy clinics in the US, 
Balakrishnan et al. (2004) show that excess capacity lowers the level of cost 
stickiness, whereas strained capacity increases cost stickiness. Yet, Banker et 
al. (2014) note that the maximum acceptable slack for managers of companies 
where sales are far below capacity depends on their expectations concerning 
future demand as well as downward and upward resource adjustment costs. 
Complementing this line of research, which draws on the economic reasoning 
of cost stickiness, a less explored stream of literature conjectures managerial 
incentives as an enforcing factor of asymmetric cost behavior. Chen, Lu, and 
Sougiannis (2012) build on the principal agency theory, which focuses on the 
elaboration of optimal control mechanisms in the context of information 
asymmetry and presumably conflicting interests between managers (agents) 
and shareholders (principals) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The authors’ 
results indicate a significantly positive relationship between managerial 
empire building and SG&A cost asymmetry (Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis 2012). 
Further studies show that real earnings management incentives likewise 
moderate the extent of cost stickiness (Banker and Fang 2013; Dierynck, 
Landsman, and Renders 2012; Kama and Weiss 2013).  
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In addition to the drivers of asymmetric cost behavior in response to a 
decrease and increase in activity, some studies examine its consequences for 
the application of empirical models that so far have ignored the prevalence of 
cost stickiness. Banker and Chen (2006) find that acknowledging asymmetric 
cost behavior in predicting future return on equity yields significantly lower 
forecast errors compared to alternative models based on cash flow or income 
statement line items. These results are extended by Weiss (2010) who 
incorporates a firm-specific measure of cost stickiness. His results indicate 
that analysts’ absolute consensus earnings forecasts are, on average, 25 
percent less accurate if firms exhibit sticky costs. A publication by Cannon 
(2014) moreover finds evidence that asymmetric cost behavior arises because 
of retained idle capacity when demand falls but also because managers 
asymmetrically adjust selling prices in response to demand fluctuations. Using 
data from the US Air Transportation industry, the author shows that 
managers stimulate sales volume by lowering selling prices when demand falls. 
However, managers increase capacity (instead of selling prices) when demand 
rises.  
3 Theory and Hypothesis 
3.1 Adjustment Cost Theory  
Central to the cost stickiness theory is the proposition modeled in the 
dynamic factor demand literature, which assumes that changing resource 
levels involve adjustment costs (Eisner and Strotz 1963; Lucas 1967; 
Treadway 1969). In this respect various researchers have studied optimal 
labor adjustment and capital investment decisions depending on the average 
magnitude of adjustment costs as well as the shape of the underlying cost 
function. The standard model introduced by Holt et al. (1960) has been 
frequently viewed as a quadratic symmetrical function for deviations in input 
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factors implying strict convexity. From this, it follows that large and rapid 
changes of input factors are rather expensive because adjustment costs 
increase over proportional with activity changes (Hamermesh and Pfann 
1996). Managers might therefore deliberately retain unused capacity 
associated with decreasing demand to avoid adjustment costs and therewith 
induce cost stickiness.  
There are two influencing factors that reinforce the implied relationship. 
First, optimistic expectations for future sales might fortify managers’ 
reluctance to reduce resources if a rapid recovery in demand is anticipated 
(Banker et al. 2014). Second, if resource adjustments are not equally costly 
for upward and downward changes, managers might be less willing to adjust. 
The latter factor is supported by a variety of researchers who have found 
evidence of asymmetric adjustment cost functions.12 Although adjustment 
costs might also take alternative functional forms, such as piecewise linear 
(Nickell 1978; Nickell 1986), fixed (Hamermesh 1989), or any combination of 
these forms, the underlying intuition is similar. In addition to their functional 
shape, adjustment costs are likely to vary differently depending on the type of 
resource, such as the broad division between labor and capital (Caballero, 
Engel, and Haltiwanger 1995). Drawing on this proposition, while recognizing 
that adjustment costs are not directly observable, some studies attempt to 
examine this relationship based on a model that links measurable proxies of 
adjustment costs to their consequences in the form of cost stickiness. 
Anderson et al. (2003) document that both employee intensity (ratio of total 
number of employees to sales) and asset intensity (ratio of total assets to 
sales) increase the degree of sticky costs while Anderson and Lanen (2009) 
emphasize that labor costs might be sticky on average but the physical 
number of employees is not. Extending these findings, Balakrishnan and 
Gruca (2008) build on the presumed influence of adjustment costs on the 
                                
12 Also Holt et al. (1960, p. 53) note, “It is not required that these costs be symmetrical.” 
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hierarchical form of the organization by Wernerfelt (1997) and document a 
higher level of cost stickiness in departments that represent core competencies 
in firms with frequent, but uncertain activities.  
3.2 Hypothesis Development  
The cost stickiness literature predominately relates to the adjustment cost 
theory and sales expectations conjecturing economic incentives as one of the 
core reasons for an under proportional adaption of resources if demand falls 
compared to the corresponding change if demand rises. This implies that a 
relatively higher cost-to-sales ratio during periods of declining sales is 
economically beneficial if average adjustment costs in the current .L1 and 
forthcoming year .L  =1 are higher than steady costs from the retention of 
resources. Consequently, the amount of sticky costs must be smaller than 
average adjustment costs in L andL  =, provided that demand recovers to a 
level not less than the original. Certainly, its economic feasibility depends on 
the magnitude of adjustment costs (slope of adjustment cost function) and 
decision makers’ expectations towards subsequent sales development. 
According to the dynamic factor demand literature, an optimizing manager 
will cut resources as long as the marginal resource costs more to retain it than 
to reduce it. In the case of labor, personnel are laid off if the net present value 
of a worker’s marginal sales minus her wages and costs of dismissal exceed 
firing costs (Bentolila and Bertola 1990). Similarly, in the case of capital, 
resources will be reduced if the net present value of the marginal sales of 
capital minus the costs of capital (e.g., interest expenses, physical 
depreciation) and net transaction costs is negative (Abel and Eberly 1996). 
When deciding on whether to adjust resources during a decline in demand, 
rational decision-makers will therefore take into consideration the shape of the 
underlying adjustment cost function as well as expected future sales. Thus, 
the economic theory of sticky costs implies the following predictions: On the 
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one hand, if an anticipated quick recovery of sales in the next period .L  =1 
is realized, managers taking into account unused capacity during a temporary 
demand decline in the current period .L1 yield a lower SG&A cost-to-sales 
ratio across both years compared to organizations with anti-sticky costs. In 
this case, allowing for cost stickiness is economically beneficial. On the other 
hand, if sales unexpectedly continue to decrease in the next period .L  =1, 
companies with sticky costs during the current period .L1 yield a higher cost-
to-sales ratio across both years compared to organizations that proportionally 
adjust resource levels. Consequently, an accurate forecast of future sales will 
determine if cost stickiness leads to increasing or decreasing total SG&A costs 
in the long run. Of particular interest, however, is the comparison between 
companies that exhibit sticky costs and companies that are characterized by 
anti-sticky cost behavior. If managers who are optimistic about future sales 
will retain unused capacity during a sales decrease, pessimistic managers are 
likely to allow for under capacity during a sales increase (Banker et al. 2014). 
A lower cost-to-sales ratio of the former subsample will be expected if 
asymmetric cost behavior is predominantly driven by managers’ expectations 
for future demand and positive long-term sales development.13 Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H1:  If sales increase in period t + 1following a decline in demand in period 
t, the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio across both periods is lower for sticky 
cost firms than for anti-sticky cost firms. 
 
Reverse effects are projected if sales continue to decrease in the following 
period, contrary to managers’ expectations. 
                                
13 It is assumed that adjustment costs actually occur within the time frame of two periods. 
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H2:  If sales decrease in period t +1following a decline in demand in period 
t, the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio across both periods is higher for sticky 
cost firms than for anti-sticky cost firms. 
However, the described relationship between the level of cost stickiness and 
the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio across two periods does not necessarily follow a 
linear functional form. Instead, it is expected that, up to a certain limit, 
managers will use idle time and assign employees to catch up on less 
prioritized tasks (Holt and others 1960). Workers and production machines 
are thus used efficiently. Yet, with an increasing degree of slack undesirable 
side effects, such as employee demotivation or a higher error rate, can occur. 
Resource use is then beyond its optimal range leading to decreasing returns to 
scale of cost stickiness. Because the modeled relationship builds on the 
conglomerate of SG&A costs and not on particular components, non-linearity 
in the effect of cost stickiness is likely to be observed. Accordingly, cost 
stickiness might yield a lower SG&A cost-to-sales ratio on average, but the 
effect is expected to diminish if the extent of cost asymmetry is too high. This 
leads to the third hypothesis: 
 
H3:  The negative relationship between the level of cost stickiness in period t 
and the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio across period t and t +1 diminishes 
after reaching a certain optimum.  
4 Model Design and Data Characteristics 
4.1 Model Components 
To test previous hypotheses, a firm-specific measure of asymmetric cost 
behavior (MNO	
) and the extent to which managers deliberately allow for 
asymmetric cost behavior (M-L!-L,?-	
,) are incorporated within the 
subsequent empirical models. To facilitate the interpretation, the following 
section therefore, first, explains the calculation of the two measures MNO	
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and M-L!-L,?-	
 and, second, describes the regression models in which both 
measures are used as explanatory variables. The last part of this section 
provides an overview of the sample selection and descriptive statistics. 
4.1.1 Firm-specific Measure of Asymmetric Cost Behavior  
The majority of studies in the field of cost stickiness apply a longitudinal 
regression model that determines the factors influencing the level of cost 
asymmetry. Within this context, the magnitude and direction of sales changes 
serve as independent variables that predict the associated percentage 
variation in costs (dependent variable) and measure the level of cost 
asymmetry, that is, the elasticity of the cost response (Anderson, Banker, and 
Janakiraman 2003). However, to test the hypotheses which center on the 
economic consequences of maintaining resource levels in the presence of a 
negative demand shock, cost stickiness itself is employed as an explanatory 
variable. Therefore, a firm-specific measure of cost stickiness according to 
Weiss (2010) is applied that approximates the variable percentage of total 
SG&A costs by determining the change in costs over the change in activity, 
both from a high activity level to a low activity level. This implies the 
following analytical form in which MNO	
 refers to the level of cost 
asymmetry of company i in period t with PQ	
  PQ	
 > PQ	
J and  !"	
   !"	
 >  !"	
J. 
MNO	
 = ?@ RA STUSVWXYDB
ZA STUSVWXYDB
Z[,  \
 \ ] ^L
 _ 
 L > `a 
 \ represents the most recent of the last four quarters with a decrease in sales b !"	
J c  !"	
d
 and \ is the most recent of the last four quarters with 
an increase in sales b !"	
J e  !"	
d. If costs change less with a sales 
decline compared to an increase in activity of the same extent, then MNO	
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is negative. To differentiate between sticky cost companies and anti-sticky 
cost companies, a dummy variable 	
 is used, which takes the value of one 
if MNO	
 e f and zero otherwise. For the subsequent analysis, quarterly 
estimates of MNO	
 are transformed into a median capturing firm-specific 
cost asymmetry for each fiscal year across all companies with non-missing 
observations. This measure is then incorporated as an explanatory variable in 
a regression model that acknowledges the moderating effect of both the level 
of firm-specific cost stickiness .MNO	
1 and managerial deliberateness 
(M-L!-L,?-	
1 with respect to cost retention. A detailed description of the 
measurement and assumptions underlying the M-L!-L,?-	
 index is provided 
in the next section.  
4.1.2 Firm-specific Measure of Managerial Intention  
The current state of research is acknowledged in the following empirical 
models according to which there exists two broad streams of literature that 
attribute sticky costs to either intended or unintended managerial decision-
making. As described previously, intended cost stickiness can either be a 
result of economic factors, such as a trade-off against potential adjustment 
costs, or short-term non-economic reasons, such as an attempt to avoid 
negative effects on corporate culture or reputation. Additionally, a higher 
level of unused capacity might be unintended if it is ascribed to empire 
building motivations or real earnings management. The applied econometric 
model includes therefore an index variable M-L!-L,?-	
, which draws on the 
existing studies that find significant influencing factors with respect to the 
level of rationally motivated cost stickiness. Thus, M-L!-L,?-	
 is based on the 
following five components: 
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gM	
 = log-ratio of the number of employees to current sales 
according to Anderson et al. (2003). QM	
 = log-ratio of total assets to current sales according to 
Anderson et al. (2003). PQ > hL,?	
 = ratio of SG&A cost-to-sales in the previous period 
compared to the industry average,14 according to 
Baumgarten et al. (2010). PQ > hL,?	
Lakes the value of 
one if SG&A cost-to-sales werebelow the industry mean in 
t - 1 and zero otherwise. P% = percentage growth in real gross domestic product in the 
actual year, according to Anderson et al. (2003).15 M-ij!"!	
J = prior period sales change according to Banker et al. 
(2014). Takes the value of one if  !"	
J K  !"	
J 
and the value of 0 otherwise.  
The M-L!-L,?-	
 index is constructed as a combination of the five input 
factors above using multiple linear regression and weighted based on the 
estimated coefficients, each of which are theoretically ascribed to economically 
motivated asymmetric cost behavior. Because the individual analysis of the 
variables with respect to cost stickiness is not the focus of this study, the 
particular advantage of this approach is that both parsimonious modeling and 
best-fit aspects are considered. The resulting M-L!-L,?-	
index serves as a 
composite measure capturing the information of the five variables explained 
above, without an unnecessary extension of models (2) and (3).  
The applied regression model (1) is based on the econometric specification 
introduced by ABJ (2003) in which cost stickiness is measured as the 
percentage change of SG&A costs with a one percent change in sales in 
periods of declining activity compared to increasing activity. The above 
variables are included as moderators in the following linear regression: 
                                
14 All SIC codes have been classified in 49 industry groups according to Fama and French.  
15 GDP growth rates are obtained from Penn World Tables (WRDS), World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
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 ?@ k PQ	
PQ	
Jl  
 
 m  n  o   ?@ k  !"	
 !"	
Jl  p  !ij!"!qrsst	
 u   ?@ v wnxyz{
Bwnxyz{
BC5|  !ij!"!q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  	
  
 
(1) 
Where: 
 n    !ij!"!qrsst	
     ?@ v wnxyz{
Bwnxyz{
BC5|  }  gM	
  ~  QM	
   P%    PQ > hL,?	
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J  o 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    QM	
    P%    PQ > hL,?	
   M-iqrsst	
J  
 p  }   ?@ v wnxyz{
Bwnxyz{
BC5| ~  gM	
    QM	
    P%    PQ >hL,?	
    M-iqrsst	
J  u    gM	
    QM	
    P%    PQ > hL,?	
  } M-iqrsst	
J  
 !ij!"!qrsst	
 is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if  !"	
J c  !"	
 and zero otherwise. If the regression coefficient of one of 
the three-way interaction terms (u1 is negative, then the respective variable 
contributes to an increase in cost stickiness by negatively affecting the 
relative change in SG&A costs with a one percent drop in activity. Relating 
to the correlation between the resulting M-L!-L,?-	
 index and the firm-
specific measure for cost asymmetrybMNO	
d, the sign of the association is 
expected to be negative. The underlying rationale is such that an increasing 
level of MNO	
 implies increasing anti-stickiness for anti-sticky cost 
companies and a decreasing level of stickiness for sticky cost companies bMNO	
  -L, > "L,i8,-!"" 
 i?"L"L,i8,-!"" d. 
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To address concerns due to potentially omitted variables, model (1) contains 
all first and second order effects between the explanatory variables. However, 
only the regression coefficients of u are used as weights to construct the M-L!-L,?-	
 index, because these three-way-interactions capture the 
magnitude of asymmetric cost behavior (i.e. the significant difference in the 
change of SG&A costs between increasing and decreasing activity).16 
Accordingly, the following signs of the regression coefficients of u  are 
predicted:  
With respect to employee intensity bgM	
d and asset intensity bQM	
d, findings 
by ABJ (2003) suggest that a higher degree of both ratios may imply greater 
adjustment costs that lead to greater asymmetric cost behavior in periods of 
declining activity. Consequently,  and  should be negative. Similarly, 
the degree of stickiness is expected to be greater in periods of high economic 
growth .P%1 during which a fall in demand is perceived to be only 
temporary. This implies  e f Baumgarten et al. (2010) furthermore 
hypothesize that cost stickiness is intended if the firm-specific SG&A ratio bPQ > hL,?	
d in the previous period was below the industry mean, which 
indicates managers’ ability to control costs. Accordingly, the sign of the 
regression coefficient  should be negative. The last component of the 
econometric model refers to the change in sales between L > = and L > , 
where M-iqrsst	
J  = reflects manager optimism towards future 
demand. If this is the case, manager willingness to retain unused resources 
increases, which would be reflected in } e f (Banker et al. 2014). Based on 
                                
16 ncaptures the fixed effects for sales increases, o captures the percentage increase in 
costs per one percent increase in sales, p captures the fixed effects for sales decreases, u 
captures the percentage decrease in costs per one percent decrease in sales (i.e. the 
magnitude of cost stickiness if regression coefficient is negative). 
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model (1), the M-L!-L,?-	
 index is constructed as the weighted sum of all 
negative significant .m  ff1 components.17 
4.2 Description of Empirical Models 
To test H1, the relationship between asymmetric costs (either sticky or anti-
sticky costs) and the average SG&A cost-to-sales ratio is conceptualized in 
the following functional form: 
 ?@  PQ	
  PQ	
I !"	
   !"	
I  
 
 m   	
    MNO	
 } M-L!-L,?-	
  ~  	
  MNO	
   	
 M-L!-L,?-	
    MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
     	
  MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
    	
+    %g	
    Pj?*L	
  L@--L	
   ~ M-r"Ljt	

  	
  
 
(2) 
The dependent variable is measured as the average SG&A cost-to-sales ratio 
across the current and subsequent year, which refers to the total amount of 
SG&A costs in both periods relative to the sales volume in each year. Possible 
adjustment costs from an adaption of resources in the case of declining sales 
are contained in this measure. The difference between the SG&A cost-to-sales 
ratio for sticky costs compared to anti-sticky cost firms is then reflected by a 
significant regression estimate for  which is negative if the SG&A cost-to-
sales ratio is smaller for sticky cost companies than for anti-sticky cost 
companies. Thus, H1 implies that  e f (see Figure 1 below). Additionally, 
it is assumed that the difference of the average SG&A cost-to-sales ratio 
between sticky cost and anti-sticky cost firms increases with increasing cost 
                                
17 Regression coefficients are transformed to absolute values to facilitate interpretability. 
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stickiness and increasing deliberateness of managers’ resource adjustment 
decisions. Accordingly, ~ e f
  e f  and  e f. The direction of effects for 
anti-sticky cost firms .
 }
1 are not predicted as they are assumed to 
countervail each other in one period with decreasing sales followed by one 
period with increasing sales (conditions of H1). 
 
Figure 1: The difference of the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio between sticky cost 
firms and anti-sticky cost firms (H1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the expected signs of the regression coefficients. A significant  would 
capture the difference in the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio at the mean value of STICKY. A 
significant ~ corresponds to the change in the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio with increasing 
cost stickiness.  
H1 implies that the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio is smaller for sticky cost firms .	
=1) than 
for anti-sticky cost firms .	
=0). Thus,  e f. If this effect is additionally moderated by 
the level of STICKY then ~ e f. The effect would be even stronger if the intention index 
is associated with a further reduction of the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio which implies that 
also  e f. 
All of the models are tested based on a specification with and without control 
variables. Results for both are shown in separate columns within each table. 
 ?@  PQ	
  PQ	
I !"	
   !"	
I 
MNO	
 
	
=0 	
=1 
 ~ 
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To control for cost stickiness that is presumably not attributable to deliberate 
managerial decisions but to opportunistic behavior (e.g., empire building), the 
variable 	
 is additionally included in all of the econometric models. 
According to Chen et al. (2012), high levels of free cash flow incentivize 
managers to delay cuts in SG&A costs as a response to declining activity and 
therewith induce cost stickiness which is not economically justifiable. Thus, 
by incorporating 	
 as control variable the effect of potential opportunistic 
managerial behavior cannot influence the predicted relationship between 
economically intended cost stickiness and the average SG&A cost-to-sales 
ratio. 	
 is calculated as the cash flow from operating activities minus 
common and preferred dividends scaled by total assets and measures 
managers’ empire building incentives.  
To control for deviating future growth prospects of each company, all 
regression models include a dummy variable %g	
. It takes the value of one if 
the price-to-earnings ratio is greater than zero and zero otherwise. The price-
to-earnings ratio is defined as the market value of the company at the end of 
the fiscal year divided by net income for the most recent 12-month period 
(Lynch 2000).  
Moreover, the following hypotheses are tested considering implications from 
life cycle theory. This frame of literature suggests that accounting 
performance measures differ across organizational life cycle stages positing 
that growth and capital expenditure strategies are partially determined by a 
company’s development phase (Rappaport 1981; Richardson and Gordon 
1980). For the subsequent analysis, firms are classified according to their life 
cycle stage using the median of the last three years of sales growth, consistent 
with Anthony and Ramesh (1992). First, firm-specific sales growth (P1 is 
computed as follows: P  Ab !"	
 >  !"	
Jd !"	
JD  =ff. The 
median value of the past three periods in sales growth is calculated from this 
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figure in the second step. Third, for each firm, the individual distribution of 
the median sales growth development is derived. Prior to testing H1, H2 and 
H3 a company is assigned to the early life cycle stage (growth) if the indicator 
is in the highest third of its firm-specific sales growth distribution. It is 
assigned to the mature stage if the median three-year sales growth lies in the 
middle third of its distribution and to the stagnant stage if it is in the lowest 
third. A dummy variable for the two extremes Pj?*L	
 and L@--L	
 is 
used in all of the regression models while companies classified as mature serve 
as the control group. Furthermore, all of the regression models control for 
industry fixed-effects according to the classification by Fama and French. A 
detailed description of all variables is provided in Table 11 in the appendix. 
H2 predicts that the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio is higher for sticky cost firms 
than for anti-sticky cost firms if sales decrease in the current and in the next 
period. This implies that  K f. Also, the effect is assumed to be stronger 
with increasing cost stickiness and increasing managerial intention. Hence, ~ K f
  K f and  K f. As before, the direction of effects for anti-sticky 
cost firms are not predicted .
 }
1 These companies would cut resources 
in accordance with a drop in demand which does not necessarily induce a 
change in the average SG&A cost-to-sales ratio. 
To test H3, the effect of diverging magnitudes of cost stickiness requires the 
adaption of model (2). Operationally, the effect of increasing levels of cost 
stickiness is captured by portioning the measure for firm-specific cost 
symmetry into three groups: one group for a symmetry ratio greater than 65 
percent (LOW), one group with levels of stickiness between 65 percent and 32 
percent (MODERATE), and one group for high asymmetry at the boundary 
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of 32 percent (HIGH).18 Companies with anti-sticky costs serve as the control 
group. Intending to achieve equal group sizes, the sampling is performed 
according to the 33rd and 67th percentiles of the distribution of the MNO	
 
estimator. Dummy variables for each group are incorporated both in the 
interaction terms, as well as single effects in regression model (3):  
 ?@  w{
BIw{
B;5wnxyz{
BIwnxyz{
B;5   
 
 m   '	
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   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    %g	
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 L@--L	
    ~ M-r"Ljt	

  	
   
                                
18 The level of cost symmetry refers to the ratio of changes in cost to changes in sales for 
decreasing activity compared to increasing activity. That is, the STICKY measure without 
logarithmic transformation. 
(3) 
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H3 implies that the slopes for the three groups decrease in effect size as the 
level of firm-specific cost stickiness increases b'	
  +ghQg	
 MP	
d. Conditional upon the mean level of M-L!-L,?-	
, this leads to the 
following expectations with respect to the total effect of cost stickiness at low, 
moderate, and high levels. Where .w/1 denotes the total effect of MNO	
 on the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio bOd.19 
 
 '	
bw/ ¡¢y¢£G¢¤
B¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¦d  .~      1 +ghQg	
bw/ ¡¢y¢£G¢¤
B¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¦d  .~      1 
 MP	
bw/ ¡¢y¢£G¢¤
B¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¦d  .~    }  1 
 
Where .~      1 e .~      1 K .~    }  1, 
i.e.  e  K }, with 
 
   f at the mean level of M-L!-L,?-	
(M-L!-L,?-	
  f after mean-centering). This implies an increase 
in the conditional effect from low to moderate levels of cost stickiness and a 
decrease of the conditional effect from moderate to high cost stickiness among 
companies with managers taking deliberate resource-adjustment decisions.  
A log-log specification rather than a (semi)-linear form of model (1), (2), and 
(3) is employed that facilitates the economic interpretation of regression 
results and alleviates potential heteroscedasticity. Because of the cross-
sectional nature of the data across a variety of industries, the ratio form of 
the dependent variable furthermore improves comparability between firms. 
Moreover, because the White test (1980) and the Durbin t-test (1950; 1951) 
                                
19'	
bw/ ¡¢y¢£G¢¤
B¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¦d is interpreted as the effect of STICKY on the average 
SG&A cost-to-sales ratio conditional on the mean level of intention. 
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for lagged dependent variables indicate potential autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity of the residuals, a clustering by firm and year is performed 
as suggested by Petersen (2009). Moreover, multicollinearity diagnostic tests 
according to Belsley (1980) are conducted. Because the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for all of the independent variables is far below the 
recommended threshold of 10 with a tolerance (1/VIF) higher than 0.1, 
multicollinearity is not a significant concern in regression models. Regression 
models (2) and (3) are estimated using ordinary least squares after 
winsorizing the top and bottom 0.5 percent of each of the variables to 
alleviate potential biases caused by outliers (Chen and Dixon 1972). 
Additionally, continuous predictors included in the interaction terms are 
mean-centered prior to the computation of the product (Aiken and West 
1991). For the purpose of further analyses, the comparison of total effects and 
means between the two clusters is conducted using multivariate regression 
complemented by ANCOVA. This approach has two advantages. First, the 
Johnson-Neyman technique can be applied, which does not require a 
homogeneity of regression slopes between sticky cost and anti-sticky cost 
firms (Johnson and Neyman 1936). Second, potential arbitrariness is avoided 
when the sample is separated into different groups according to 
predetermined boundaries along the continuum of MNO	
 and M-L!-L,?-	
. 
Rather, mean differences and transaction levels for significance can be 
conducted for the entire sample instead of creating separate subgroups (Hayes 
2013). 
4.3 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat Data as provided by Wharton Research Data 
Services is used for the following analysis. The dataset includes 4,911 US and 
Canadian companies from the year 1998 to the year 2012. Cases from the 
years 2008 and 2009 are excluded from the study because companies’ 
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operational behavior might have been affected during the financial crisis. The 
dataset includes annual figures of non-financial industries while all monetary 
values are converted to real 2010 US dollars to control for inflation.20 
Additionally, observations are deleted if either SG&A costs or sales in the 
current or subsequent financial period are missing, or if SG&A costs exceed 
sales. Acknowledging the objection by Anderson and Lanen (2009), “unusual” 
observations that prevail when sales and costs move in opposite directions are 
excluded from the sample. The total number of remaining observations is 
18,636 with an average of 3.8 observations per firm. Further adjustments to 
the dataset because of the specific requirements to test the respective 
hypotheses are reported in the subsequent section.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the dataset (panel A) and an 
overview of periodic negative (panel B) and positive sales and costs 
development (panel C). The average company generates sales of 
approximately three billion US dollars and 600 million US dollars in SG&A 
costs. However, the standard deviation for both sales and costs is relatively 
high, which shows heterogeneity across firms. With respect to the percentage 
of SG&A costs to sales, there is only a marginal difference of 0.93 percentage 
points compared to reported results by ABJ (2003).  
Panel B provides an overview on annual cost and sales changes between two 
periods. Because “unusual observations” have been eliminated to acknowledge 
the objections by Anderson and Lanen (2009), descriptive statistics on cost 
and sales fluctuations display similar patterns with nearly 34 percent of the 
observations representing decreasing costs and sales. The mean (median) 
value of sales decreases is 12 percent (ten percent) while the mean negative 
                                
20 Due to differences in interpreting income statements in the financial and insurance 
industry, observations with SIC codes (Standard Industrial Classification) from 6000 to 
6999 were deleted. The consumer price index (2010 = 1) provided by St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Bank is used for the conversion of nominal to real monetary values. 
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change in SG&A costs is 11 percent (nine percent). Panel C shows 
complementary figures for increasing sales. 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Distribution of sales and SG&A costs 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Lower 
quartile 
(25%) 
Upper 
quartile 
(75%) 
Sales 3,068.51 13,733.05 402.09 87.01 1,563.70 
SG&A costs 600.15 2,535.30 78.13 20.60 304.10 
SG&A costs as 
percentage of sales  
27.34% 17.57% 23.92% 14.06% 36.51% 
Panel B: Periodic decrease in sales and SG&A costs 
 % firms 
with 
negative 
change 
from 
previous 
period 
Mean 
percentage 
decrease 
across 
periods 
Standard 
deviation 
of 
percentage 
decrease 
across 
periods  
Median 
percentage 
decrease 
across 
periods 
Lower 
quartile 
(25%) of 
percentage 
decrease 
across 
periods 
Upper 
quartile 
(75%) of 
percentage 
decrease 
across 
periods 
Sales 33.83% 12.06% 42.23% 10.01% 22.25% 3.70% 
SG&A 
costs 33.83% 10.72% 29.10% 9.14% 19.50% 3.20% 
       
Panel C: Periodic increase in sales and SG&A costs 
 
% firms 
with 
positive 
change 
from 
previous 
period 
Mean 
percentage 
increase 
across 
periods 
Standard 
deviation 
of 
percentage 
increase 
across 
periods  
Median 
percentage 
increase 
across 
periods 
Lower 
quartile 
(25%) of 
percentage 
increase 
across 
periods 
Upper 
quartile 
(75%) of 
percentage 
increase 
across 
periods 
Sales 66.17% 27.65% 96.61% 12.76% 5.52% 27.81% 
SG&A 
costs 66.17% 26.32% 139.00% 11.96% 5.20% 24.59% 
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All reported numbers are in millions of 2010 US dollars. The distribution of sales and 
SG&A costs is for a population of 18,636 firm-year observations from 4,911 firms in the 
dataset that satisfy the following selection criteria: no missing, zero, or negative values of 
sales or SG&A costs for the current and preceding year, no firm-years in which SG&A 
costs exceeded sales or sales, SG&A costs move in opposite directions, and non-missing 
values for all other variables are included in models (1), (2), and (3). 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Results of Estimating STICKY 
A simple regression model to test for the prevalence of cost stickiness is 
performed based on the cleansed dataset, which is described in the previous 
section following the specification by ABJ (2003). In doing so, extreme 
observations of the top and bottom 0.5 percent tail of the distribution were 
eliminated (Chen and Dixon 1972) resulting in a further reduction of the 
dataset by 307 observations. As expected, SG&A cost behavior in the 
underlying data is asymmetric with 7.04 percent stickiness.21 Specifically, 
SG&A costs rise by 0.75 percent in the event of a one percent sales increase 
but decrease only 0.69 percent per one percent decrease in sales. Compared to 
ABJ (2003), who estimate a degree of SG&A cost asymmetry of 35 percent, 
the respective results are relatively low. However, when the regression is 
repeated based on a sample that disregards adjustments according to 
Anderson and Lanen (2009) and the deletion of missing observations of 
additional predictors, then the level of SG&A cost asymmetry in the dataset 
amounts to 13 percent. The specific time frame and additional data 
                                
21 ABJ (2003) apply a regression model of the following form:  ?@ v w{
Bw{
BC5|  m    ?@ v wnxyz{
Bwnxyz{
BC5|    !iqrsst	
   ?@ v wnxyz{
Bwnxyz{
BC5|  	
, where the dichotomous dummy 
variable takes the value of one for sales decrease and zero otherwise. The degree of cost 
symmetry can then be calculated by dividing the slope for a one percent sales decrease by 
the slope for a one percent sales increase A§5;¨6§5 D 
109 
 
requirements help to reconcile the remaining difference. Next to the 
examination of whether SG&A costs are remanent based on the standard 
regression model introduced by ABJ (2003), cost stickiness is also evident 
according to the MNO	
 measure by Weiss (2010). The average value is 
significantly different from zero at -0.02 across all companies.22 Table 2 shows 
the descriptive statistics of the measure for firm-specific cost stickiness. 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Specific Cost Stickiness 
 
 Percent Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median Lower 
quartile 
(25%) 
Upper 
quartile 
(75%) MNO	
  -0.02 0.70 -0.02 -0.33 0.28 
Sticky cost firms: MNO	
 e f 52.48% -0.45 0.56 -0.31 -0.60 -0.13 
Anti-sticky cost 
firms: MNO	
 c f 47.52% 0.45 0.52 0.31 0.13 0.62 
 MNO	
 =  ?@ RA STUSVWXYDB
ZA STUSVWXYDB
Z[, \
 \©^L
 _ 
 L > `a, where \is the most recent quarter with a 
sales decrease and \ is the most recent of the last four quarters with a sales increase. 
5.2 Results of Estimating INTENTION 
To evaluate the tendency of managers to deliberately allow for a higher cost 
level instead of cutting resources during a temporary sales decline, a 
corresponding index is constructed composed of five explanatory variables. 
Individual components are derived from previous research and weighted based 
on the regression coefficients 
 
  and } in model (3). Four out of 
five interaction terms have a significant negative effect on the change in 
                                
22 The annual average according to Weiss (2010) is deducted as the median from the 
quarterly estimations of cost stickiness for each company, which corrects for extreme 
observations. 
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SG&A costs, indicating a stronger SG&A cost asymmetry. Consistent with 
the findings reported by ABJ (2003), the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between labor intensity and changes in SG&A costs during activity decreases 
can be rejected .  >f=1. Also, the effect of asset intensity is highly 
significant .  >f=ª1. However, cost asymmetry is not influenced by 
stronger macroeconomic growth. The effect is insignificant .  ff`
 « f=`=1. Macroeconomic growth is therefore not used in the final computation 
of the index, which is calculated in the following way (based on the regression 
results depicted in table 3): M-L!-L,?-	
  f=  gM	
  f=ª  QM	
  f=`  PQ > hL,?	
  ff  M-iqrsst	
J 
Consistent with the model assumptions, the resulting variable correlates 
significantly negatively with the firm-specific measure of cost asymmetry for 
sticky cost firms (r = -0.08, « ¬ fff=) while the association for anti-sticky 
cost firms is positive (r = 0.04, « ¬ fff=). Thus, an increase in the index 
value of M-L!-L,?-	
 indicates increasing deliberate firm-specific cost stickiness 
(MNO	
 1.  
 
Table 3:  Regression Coefficients for Index Construction of Managerial 
Intention   
 
 
Model (1):  ?@ k PQ	
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Table 3 continued: 
  
Where: 
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   P%    PQ > hL,?	
    M-iqrsst	
J  
 o    gM	
    QM	
    P%    PQ > hL,?	
   M-iqrsst	
J  
 
 p  }   ?@ v wnxyz{
Bwnxyz{
BC5| ~  gM	
    QM	
    P%    PQ >hL,?	
    M-iqrsst	
J  
 u    gM	
    QM	
    P%    PQ > hL,?	
  } M-iqrsst	
J  
  
 
   
Model (1) 
Coeff. Variable Pred. Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) m Intercept ­ 0.00 (-0.02)  !iqrsst	
 ­ -0.02* (-1.69)   !"	
 ­ 0.91*** (9.39) } gM	
 ­ -0.01*** (-2.63) ~ QM	
 ­ 0.02*** (5.10)  P%	
 ­ 0.00 (-0.47)  PQ > hL,?	
 ­ 0.00** (2.09)  M-iqrsst	
J ­ 0.00 (0.79)   !"	
  gM	
 + 0.16*** (4.25)   !"	
  QM	
 + 0.00 (0.08) 
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Table 3 continued: 
 
   Model (1) 
  !"	
  P%	
 + 0.01 (0.83) 
  !"	
  PQ > hL,?	
 + 0.07** (2.56)   !"	
  M-iqrsst	
J + 0.08** (2.4) } !iqrsst	
   !"	
 - -0.33** (-2.25) ~ !iqrsst	
  gM	
 ­ 0.01*** (3.13)  !iqrsst	
  QM	
 ­ -0.03*** (-5.12)  !iqrsst	
  P%	
 ­ 0.00* (1.68)  !iqrsst	
  PQ > hL,?	
 ­ 0.00 (1.31)  !iqrsst	
  M-iqrsst	
J ­ 0.00 (0.8) ®¯° ±²³´µ¶
·  ¸´¹q¸º»»¼¶
·  ½¾¶
· - -0.15*** (-2.64) ®¿À ±²³´µ¶
·  ¸´¹q¸º»»¼¶
·  Á¾¶
· - -0.19*** (-2.64) ®¿¯ ±²³´µ¶
·  ¸´¹q¸º»»¼¶
·  Â¸Ã¶
· - 0.03 (1.51) ®¿¿ ±²³´µ¶
·  ¸´¹q¸º»»¼¶
·  ±ÂÁ > Ä²· Å¶
· - -0.13*** (-3.16) ®¿Æ ±²³´µ¶
·  ¸´¹q¸º»»¼¶
  ¾Ç¹q¸º»»¼¶
·J¯ - -0.20** (-4.49) 
n  
 
13,725 
Adj. R2   0.71 
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels respectively. The 
numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics calculated based on time- and firm-clustered 
standard errors (Petersen 2009). To obtain unbiased estimates in finite samples, the 
clustered standard errors are adjusted by .È > =1.È > %1  P.P > =1, where N is the 
sample size, P is the number of independent variables, and G is the number of clusters 
(Ma 2014). 
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5.3 Results for H1 
Table 4 shows the regression results based on model (1)The difference 
between the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio for sticky cost firms compared to anti-
sticky cost firms is significant with   >ff among companies with an 
average asymmetry in SG&A costs. The dependent variable is approximately 
two percent lower for sticky cost firms than for anti-sticky cost firms. This 
indicates preliminary support for H1. Moreover, the difference between sticky 
cost firms and anti-sticky cost firms is not affected by the level of cost 
asymmetry itself among those companies that have an average intention when 
adjusting resources. ~ as well as  are insignificant (p = 0.12, p = 0.23). 
Consequently, neither managerial intention nor the level of cost asymmetry 
moderate the difference in the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio between sticky cost 
and anti-sticky cost firms. Following the recommendations by Aiken and 
West (1991), the three-way interaction between 	

 MNO	
 and M-L!-L,?-	
 is still retained in the forthcoming analysis to facilitate a 
comparison of regression results for all of the tested hypotheses.  
To strengthen the conclusion, factorial ANCOVA is additionally applied, 
first, to the average level of MNO	
 and, second, to MNO	
  ­one 
standard deviation. To do so, MNO	
 is transformed to its absolute values 
with mean bMNO	
d  fÉÉ. Consistent with H1, the difference in the 
SG&A cost-to-sales ratio between the two groups is statistically significant at 
the mean level of MNO	
 with p = 0.05 as well as for MNO	
  ­= 
with p = 0.05 (see Table 5). 
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Table 4:  Regression Results for Hypothesis 1 
 
Model (2):  ?@  PQ	
  PQ	
I !"	
   !"	
I  
 m   	
    MNO	
 } M-L!-L,?-	
  ~  	
  MNO	
   	
 M-L!-L,?-	
    MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
   	
  MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
    	
   %g	
    Pj?*L	
  L@--L	
   ~ M-r"Ljt	

  	
 
   Model (2) 
   
Without control  
variables 
With control 
 variables 
Coeff. Variable Pred. Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) m Intercept ­ -0.55*** (-10.90) -0.55*** (-11.10) 
®¯ Ê±¶
· - -0.02* (-1.53) -0.02** (-1.65) ®¿ ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· ­ -0.01 (-0.66) -0.02 (-1.31) ®Æ ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· ­ -0.19*** (-3.55) -0.18*** (-3.46) ®Î Ê±¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· - 0.01 (0.44) 0.03 (1.2) ®Ï Ê±¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -0.06 (-0.83) -0.06 (-0.8) ®Ð ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· ­ -0.26*** (-3.06) -0.23*** (-2.75) ®Ñ Ê±¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - 0.12 (0.99) 0.09 (0.74)  	
 ­  -0.37*** (-8.25)  %g	
 ­  -0.05*** (-4.11)  Pj?*L	
 ­  0.00 (0.11)  L@--L	
 ­  0.00 (-0.33) 
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Ò ~  Industry fixed effects  yes yes 
n   2,540 2,540 
Adj. R2   0.35 0.36 
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided and one-sided significance (corresponding to the predicted sign 
of the effect) at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the 
t-statistics calculated based on time- and firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). 
To obtain unbiased estimates in finite samples, the clustered standard errors are adjusted 
by .È > =1.È > %1  P.P > =1, where N is the sample size, P is the number of 
independent variables, and G is the number of clusters (Ma 2014). 
Regression is based on the condition that  !"	
J c  !"	
 e  !"	
I. 
All variables are calculated as defined in Table 11. 
 
 
Table 5: Factorial ANCOVA (Hypothesis 1) 
Panel A: Factorial ANOVA for ÓÔÕÖ×
  ØÙÚ 
 
SG&A cost-to-
sales ratio 
Pr K  · , H0: 
LSMean 1 = 
LSMean2  
Difference in 
mean SG&A 
cost-to-sales 
ratio  
Sticky cost firms:  MNO	
 e f 21.82% 0.05 -5.28% 
Anti-Sticky cost firms: MNO	
 c f 23.03% 
Panel B: Factorial ANCOVA for ÓÔÕÖ×
  ØÙÚ ­ =ÓÛ  
 SG&A cost-to-
sales ratio 
Pr K  · , H0:  
LS Mean1 = 
LSMean2  
Difference in 
mean SG&A 
cost-to-sales 
ratio 
Sticky cost firms:  MNO	
 e f 21.52% 
0.05 -3.76% 
Anti-Sticky cost firms: MNO	
 c f 22.36% 
 
n = 2,540.  
P-values represent one-sided level of significance. 
Factorial ANCOVA is based on the condition that  !"	
J c  !"	
 e  !"	
I. 
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5.4 Results for H2 
With respect to the assumptions underlying the previous section, testing H2 
requires adapting the main conditions prior to the estimation of model (2). In 
this case, a higher SG&A cost-to-sales ratio for sticky cost companies is 
expected if sales decline in the current and also in the next period. The strong 
decrease in the regression coefficient of  from -0.02 (Table 4) to 0.00 (Table 
6) provides initial support for this expectation. However, group differences in 
the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio across the current and subsequent periods are 
insignificant (  fff
p = 0.42) if the extent to which managers 
deliberately take resource adaption decisions based on economic 
considerations is not considered (  >f
 «  ff1. ANCOVA results 
depicted in Table 7 as well as regression estimates in Table 6 show a 
significant interaction between 	

 MNO	
, and M-L!-L,?-	
.23 To identify 
the critical level of managerial intention between which no significant 
differences in the dependent variable can be ascribed to either one of the 
samples, the Johnson-Neyman technique is applied (Bauer and Curran 2005; 
Johnson and Neyman 1936).24 From this it follows that at either very low 
values of the index bM-L!-L,?-	
 ¬ >ffd or at very high values of the index bM-L!-L,?-	
 c fÜfd, there is a significant difference in the SG&A cost-to-
sales ratio between sticky cost companies and anti-sticky cost companies. 
Particularly, the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio is significantly lower for sticky cost 
companies if managerial intention is low and significantly higher if managerial 
                                
23 Type III SS b	
  MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
d: 0.2797, p = 0.0235. 
24 To ascertain at which values of M-L!-L,?-	
 the three-way-interaction becomes 
insignificant, an inferential test is conducted that tests the null hypotheses of no 
independent variable effect (MNO	
) on the dependent variable at CS = 1. This is 
processed by calculating the ratio of the total slope of the conditional effect w/{
B b  ~  	
    M-L!-L,?-	
    	
  M-L!-L,?-	
d  MNO	
 to its standard error 
(Aiken and West 1991; Preacher, Curran, and Bauer 2006).  
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intention is high. This implies that if managers of sticky cost companies 
incorrectly anticipate future demand (instead of an expected increase in sales, 
sales are actually decreasing), then the increase in the SG&A cost-to-sales 
ratio is exacerbated if the managers deliberately decide not to adapt resources 
because of high adjustment costs. Because only ten percent of all firm-year 
observations fall into the second category with a high level of managerial 
intention, H2 is not supported. 
 
Table 6: Regression Results Hypothesis 2 
 
Model (2):  ?@  w{
BIw{
B;5wnxyz{
BIwnxyz{
B;5   m   	
    MNO	
 } M-L!-L,?-	
  ~  	
  MNO	
   	
 M-L!-L,?-	
    MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
   	
  MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
    	
   %g	
    Pj?*L{
B  L@--L	
   ~ M-r"Ljt	

  	
 
   Model (2) 
   
Without control 
variables 
With control 
variables 
Coeff. Variable Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) m Intercept ­ -0.58*** (-13.95) -0.59*** (-14.46) 
®¯ Ê±¶
·  + 0.00 (-0.29) 0.00 (-0.21) 
®¿ ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· ­ 0.01 (0.37) 0.00 (0.28) 
 ®Æ ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· ­ -0.40*** (-6.90) -0.38*** (-6.63) ®Î Ê±¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· + -0.01 (-0.49) 0.00 (0.03) ®Ï Ê±¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· + 0.08 (1.03) 0.07 (0.91) ®Ð ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· ­ 0.05 (0.57) 0.06 (0.63) 
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Table 6 continued: 
 
  
   Model (2) 
   
Without control 
variables 
With control 
variables 
®Ñ Ê±¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· + -0.24** (-1.92) -0.25** (-2.11)  	
 ­  -0.35*** (-9.35)  %g	
 ­  -0.04*** (-4.03)  Pj?*L	
 ­  0.02 (1.52)  L@--L	
 ­  -0.02 (-1.58) 
Ò ~  Industry fixed effects  yes yes 
n   2,966 2,966 
Adj. R2   0.36 0.39 
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided and one-sided significance (corresponding to the predicted sign 
of the effect) at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the 
t-statistics calculated based on time- and firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). 
To obtain unbiased estimates in finite samples, the clustered standard errors are adjusted 
by .È > =1.È > %1  P.P > =1, where N is the sample size, P is the number of 
independent variables, and G is the number of clusters (Ma 2014). 
Regression is based on the condition that  !"	
J c  !"	
 c  !"	
I. 
All variables are calculated as defined in Table 11. 
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Table 7:  Factorial ANCOVA (Hypothesis 2) 
Panel A: Factorial ANCOVA for ÓÔÕÖ×
  ØÙÚ 
 
SG&A cost-to-
sales ratio 
Pr K  · , H0: 
LSMean 1 = 
LSMean2  
Difference in 
mean SG&A 
cost-to-sales 
ratio  
Sticky cost firms:  MNO	
 e f 23.70% 0.39 -0.86% 
Anti-Sticky cost firms: MNO	
 c f 23.91% 
 
Panel B: Factorial ANCOVA for ÓÔÕÖ×
  ØÙÚ ­ =ÓÛ  
 SG&A cost-to-
sales ratio 
Pr K  · , H0:  
LS Mean1 = 
LSMean2  
Difference in 
mean SG&A 
cost-to-sales 
ratio 
Sticky cost firms:  MNO	
 e f 23.86% 
0.32 -1.04% 
Anti-Sticky cost firms: MNO	
 c f 24.11% 
 
N = 2,540.  
P-values represent one-sided level of significance. 
Factorial ANCOVA based on the condition that  !"	
J c  !"	
 c  !"	
I. 
5.5 Results for H3 
Table 8 reports the estimated regression coefficients based on model (3) which 
operationalize the effect of different levels of firm-specific cost stickiness and 
incorporate indicator variables splitting the sample into three groups. Panel A 
shows corresponding descriptive statistics for sticky cost companies, which 
represent 48 percent of all firms. As with H1, observations that do not exhibit 
a current decrease in activity.L1 followed by an increase in the next year .L  =1 are excluded from the sample. Findings documented in panel B 
support H3. The parameter estimates for  and  increase with rising levels 
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of cost stickiness.'?*  +?!jL!1, which indicates increasing differences 
between the control group (anti-sticky cost firms) and the subgroups. 
Moreover, the slopes at the mean level of M-L!-L,?-	
are consistent with 
predictions and take a positive value of 0.18.~      1 for companies 
in the lowest group, 0.26 .~      1 for moderate cost stickiness 
firms and 0.03.~    }  1for high levels of firm-specific cost 
stickiness.25 Consequently, if SG&A cost stickiness remains at a moderate 
level, there is a significantly positive effect on the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio (p 
= 0.04).26 The findings are consistent with previous reasoning, for example, 
Banker and Byzalov (2014, p. 46), who note that “the maximum acceptable 
slack depends on expectations about whether sales will increase in the future 
to absorb the slack, and also on the downward and upward adjustment costs.” 
 
Table 8:  Descriptive Statistics and Regression Results for Hypothesis 3  
Panel A: Distribution of firm-specific cost stickiness for ÓÔÕÖ×
 e f 
 N % of sticky  
cost firms 
Symmetry – 
Ratio (%) 
Low 543 33.01 90.70 
Moderate  560 34.04 70.44 
High 542 32.95 39.57 
    
 
 
 
                                
25 Because MNO	
 is included as continuous variable and not only as dummy variable 
(such as	
 previously), the effect is here positive for all three groups, i.e. an increasing 
level of MNO	
 reflects a decreasing level of cost stickiness which induces a higher SG&A 
ratio. 
26 The test for whether the slope differs from zero has been obtained by dividing the value 
of the slopeb~    M-L!-L,?-	
    +ghQg	
    +ghQg	
  M-L!-L,?-	
d MNO	
 by its standard error with (n-k-1) degrees of freedom, where n is the number of 
cases, and k is the number of predictors (Aiken and West 1991). 
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Table 8 continued: 
 
Panel B: Regression results H3: 
  ?@  w{
BIw{
B;5wnxyz{
BIwnxyz{
B;5   
 
 m   '	
    +ghQg	
  }  MP	
   ~  MNO	
   M-L!-L,?-	
    MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
   
 
“LOW” Interactions   '	
  MNO	
    '	
  M-L!-L,?-	
+  '	
 MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
+ 
 
“MODERATE” Interactions   +ghQg	
  MNO	
   +ghQg	
  M-L!-L,?-	
   +ghQg	
  MNO	
+  
 
“HIGH” Interactions }  MP	
  MNO	
 ~  MP	
  M-L!-L,?-	
    MP	
 MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
   
 
Controls and Residual   	
    %g	
    Pj?*L	
  L@--L	
   ~ M-r"Ljt	

  	
  
   
Model (3) 
   
Without control  
variables 
With control 
variables 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) m Intercept ­ -0.56*** 
(-11.10) 
-0.56*** 
(-11.29)  '	
 - 0.00 (-0.01) 0.00 (-0.03)  +ghQg	
 - 0.08* (1.51) 0.07* (1.38) } MP	
 - -0.02 (-0.65) -0.01 (-0.46) ~ MNO	
 ­ -0.01 (-0.66) -0.02 (-1.33)  M-L!-L,?-	
 ­ -0.19*** (-3.56) -0.18*** (-3.47)  MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
 - -0.26*** (-3.07) -0.23*** (-2.76)  MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
 - -0.26*** (-3.07) -0.23*** (-2.76) 
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Table 8 continued: 
   
   Model (3) 
   Without control  variables 
With control 
variables ®Ñ ÝÞß¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· - 0.14 (0.68) 0.20 (1.00) ®à ÝÞß¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -0.36** (-2.29) -0.34** (-2.25) ®° ÝÞß¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -2.41** (-2.09) -2.37** (-2.13) ®¯À áÞ¸½ÄÁË½¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· - 0.28** (2.01) 0.28** (2.13) ®¯¯ áÞ¸½ÄÁË½¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -0.88*** (-2.46) -0.85*** (-2.53) ®¯¿ áÞ¸½ÄÁË½¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -2.01** (-2.28) -2.00*** (-2.40) ®¯Æ â¾Ââ  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· + 0.03 (0.69) 0.05 (1.17) ®¯Î â¾Ââ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· + 0.06 (0.37) 0.04 (0.26) ®¯Ï â¾Ââ¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· + 0.24* (1.41) 0.18 (1.14)  	
 ­  -0.36*** (-8.05)  %g	
 ­  -0.05*** (-4.28)  Pj?*L	
 ­  0.00 (0.17)  L@--L	
 ­  -0.01 (-0.49) 
Ò ~ Industry fixed effects ­ yes yes 
n 
 
 2,540 2,540 
Adj. R2   0.35 0.38 
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided and one-sided significance (corresponding to the predicted sign 
of the effect) at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the 
t-statistics calculated based on time- and firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). 
To obtain unbiased estimates in finite samples, the clustered standard errors are adjusted 
by .È > =1.È > %1  P.P > =1, where N is the sample size, P is the number of 
independent variables, and G is the number of clusters (Ma 2014). 
Regression is based on the condition that  !"	
J c  !"	
 e  !"	
I 
All variables are calculated as defined in Table 11. 
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5.6 Robustness Checks 
Acknowledging the objections of Balakrishnan, Labro, and Soderstrom (2014), 
who note the potential influence of cost structure effects on sticky cost 
findings, hypotheses tests have been replicated for H1 and H3 using Fama-
Macbeth regressions. Following the suggestions, regression coefficients and 
significance levels were obtained based on robust standard errors after 
grouping all firms in five industry clusters according to Fama and French 
(consumer products, manufacturing, high tech, health, other).27  
The data in Table 9 show that using Fama-Macbeth regressions do not alter 
previous findings. The significant coefficient  in panel A supports the 
original results of H1 indicating a higher SG&A cost-to-sales ratio for sticky 
cost companies compared to anti-sticky cost companies. Moreover, the 
diminishing returns to scale reflected in H3 according to increasing levels of 
cost stickiness are supported. Nevertheless, the optimal level of cost stickiness 
is smaller with a turning point already in the moderate group. The slope 
reflecting the effect of MNO	
 on the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio for low, 
moderate, and high cost stickiness transits from 0.57 to 0.17 to 0.14, 
respectively (panel B). 
  
                                
27 Replicating the analysis with a more detailed industry cluster based on Fama-French 17 
or 38 industry portfolio induces in some cases a transition from significant to insignificant 
results because of the high standard deviations in SG&A costs and sales. However, the 
direction of effects is not effected.  
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Table 9:  Fama-Macbeth Regressions28  
Panel A:  Fama-MacBeth Regression based on Conditions for Hypothesis 1 
   Model (2) 
   
Without control 
variables 
With control  
variables 
Coeff. Variable Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) m Intercept ­ -0.62*** 
(-7.72) 
-0.59*** 
(-7.39) ®¯ Ê±¶
· - -0.03** (-1.71) -0.04** (-1.89) ®¿ ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· ­ -0.01 (-0.40) -0.03** (-2.29) ®Æ ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· ­ -0.17 (-1.57) -0.17 (-1.58) ®Î Ê±¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· - 0.01 (0.30) 0.04* (1.29) ®Ï Ê±¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -0.06 (-0.52) -0.02 (-0.18) ®Ð ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· ­ -0.45** (-2.18) -0.39** (-2.29) ®Ñ Ê±¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - 0.41* (1.35) 0.37 (1.28)  	
 ­  -0.39*** (-4.59)  %g	
 ­  -0.04** (-2.42)  Pj?*L	
 ­  0.00 (-0.18)  L@--L	
 ­  0.00 (-0.26) 
n   2,540 2,540 
Adj. R2   0.08 0.13 
 
 
                                
28 Regression results represent the Fama-MacBeth estimates by conducting the average of 
individual regressions for each industry. Separate industry fixed effects are therefore not 
necessary. 
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Table 9 continued: 
 
Panel B:  Fama-MacBeth Regression based on Conditions for Hypothesis 3  
   
Model (3) 
   Without control  
variables 
With control  
variables 
Coeff. Variable Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) m Intercept ­ -0.62*** 
(-7.72) 
-0.59*** 
(-7.46)  '	
 - 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.45)  +ghQg	
 - 0.03 (0.65) 0.02 (0.44) } MP	
 - 0.09 (0.98) 0.08 (0.87) ~ MNO	
 ­ -0.01 (-0.40) -0.03** (-2.31)  M-L!-L,?-	
 ­ -0.17 (-1.57) -0.18 (-1.60)  MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
 ­ -0.45** (-2.18) -0.39** (-2.29) ®Ñ ÝÞß¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· - 0.50* (1.94) 0.60** (2.11) ®à ÝÞß¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -0.38** (-2.46) -0.33** (-2.01) ®° ÝÞß¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -2.25 (-1.33) -2.25 (-1.31) ®¯À áÞ¸½ÄÁË½¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· - 0.19** (2.24) 0.21*** (2.61) ®¯¯ áÞ¸½ÄÁË½¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -0.48 (-0.71) -0.52 (-0.82) ®¯¿ áÞ¸½ÄÁË½¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -0.90 (-0.49) -1.15 (-0.68) ®¯Æ â¾Ââ  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· + 0.15* (1.77) 0.17* (1.82) ®¯Î â¾Ââ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· + 0.20 (0.48) 0.27 (0.66) ®¯Ï â¾Ââ¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· + 0.71 (1.12) 0.72 (1.15)  	
 ­  -0.39*** (-4.85) 
126 
 
Table 9 continued:  
  
   Model (3) 
   Without control  variables 
With control  
variables  %g	
 ­  -0.04** (-2.07)  Pj?*L	
 ­  0.00 (-0.11)  L@--L	
 ­  0.00 (-0.27) 
n 
 
 2,540 2,540 
Adj. R2 
 
 0.11 0.16 
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided and one-sided significance (corresponding to the predicted sign 
of the effect) at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the 
t-statistics calculated based on time- and firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). 
To obtain unbiased estimates in finite samples, the clustered standard errors are adjusted 
by .È > =1.È > %1  P.P > =1, where N is the sample size, P is the number of 
independent variables, and G is the number of clusters (Ma 2014). 
Panel A regression (H1) and panel B regression (H3) are based on the condition that  !"	
J c  !"	
 e  !"	
I.  
All variables are calculated as defined in Table 11. 
 
However, it is likely that not only the life cycle stage, as captured by the 
control variables Pj?*L	 and L@--L	, affect the estimated empirical 
associations but also previous sales fluctuations in particular. The robustness 
of the implications drawn from the regression results under H1 and H3 are 
therefore, further investigated based on the particular sales development for 
each company. Thus, each of the regressions under the different conditional 
requirements for the three hypotheses is replicated separately for companies 
identified as either “sales growth” firms or “sales decline” firms. Companies are 
allocated to each group based on the median sales increase of the past three 
years prior to the fulfillment of all conditions under H1 and H3. If the 
respective indicator is above zero, firms are assigned to the “sales growth” 
subsample and the “sales decline” subsample otherwise. Table 10 shows 
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respective regression results for both groups under the conditions of H1 (panel 
A) and H3 (panel B). Sticky cost companies in the “sales decline” group of 
panel A have a four percent lower SG&A cost-to-sales ratio compared to anti-
sticky cost companies in the same group if managers are average in their 
intentions concerning resource adjustment decisions.  is significant and 
negative. For companies in the “sales growth” group, the effect is moderated 
by the level of M-L!-L,?-	
. As indicated by the insignificant coefficient   >ff= (p = 0.41) and the significant coefficient   fÉ` (p = 0.03), 
only if managerial intention is above average is there a significant difference 
in the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio between sticky cost companies and anti-sticky 
cost companies. Consequently, H1 results are robust for companies with 
declining sales in the past, whereas for companies with increasing sales, the 
results are only supported when M-L!-L,?-	
 and MNO	
 is high.   
The robustness test for H3 endorses no deviating results from previous 
findings. According to expectations  e  K } for companies in the “sales 
growth” and “sales decline” group. However, the magnitude and significance of 
effects differs heavily between both groups. 
 
Overall, additional tests show that previous findings are robust to alternative 
specifications of the statistical models employed in this study. However, the 
degree to which managers deliberately consider adjustment costs matters if 
effects are estimated under different settings of prior firm-specific sales 
development.  
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Table 10: Regression Results for “Sales Growth” and “Sales Decline” 
Companies 
Panel A:  Sales growth/decline regression based on conditions for 
Hypothesis 1 
 
  Model (2) 
  
“Sales growth”  
companies 
 
“Sales decline”  
companies 
   
Without 
control 
variables 
With control 
variables 
 
Without 
control 
variables 
With control 
variables 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) m Intercept ­ -0.66*** (-6.27) -0.64*** (-6.07)  -0.51*** (-9.16) -0.54*** (-10.03) ®¯ Ê±¶
· - 0.00 (-0.02) -0.01 (-0.22)  -0.04** (-2.18) -0.04** (-2.1) ®¿ ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· ­ -0.05* (-1.77) -0.07** (-2.15)  0.00 (-0.02) -0.01 (-0.72) ®Æ ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· ­ -0.08 (-0.68) -0.07 (-0.6)  -0.18*** (-2.78) -0.18*** (-3.08) ®Î Ê±¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· - 0.09** (1.96) 0.11** (2.32)  -0.02 (-0.53) 0.00 (-0.1) ®Ï Ê±¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -0.20* (-1.4) -0.21* (-1.47)  -0.10 (-0.89) -0.07 (-0.68) ®Ð ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· ­ -0.65*** (-3.94) -0.64*** (-3.86)  -0.17** (-1.92) -0.12* (-1.35) ®Ñ Ê±¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - 0.43** (1.89) 0.43** (1.92)  -0.01 (-0.03) -0.07 (-0.45)  	
 ­  -0.19** (-2.09)   -0.42*** (-8.25)  %g	
 ­  -0.03 (-1.64)   -0.05*** (-3.89) 
Ò ~  Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
n   
1,121 1,121  1,658 1,658 
Adj. R2   
0.39 0.40  0.34 0.38 
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Panel B:  Sales growth/ decline regression based on conditions for  
Hypothesis 3 
   Model (3) 
   
“Sales growth” companies 
 
“Sales decline” companies 
   
Without control 
variables 
With control 
variables 
 
Without control 
variables 
With control 
variables 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) m Intercept ­ -0.67*** 
(-6.33) 
-0.65*** 
(-6.10) 
 
-0.52*** 
(-9.51) 
-0.53*** 
(-10.19)  '	
 - 0.02 (0.41) 0.02 (0.37)  -0.04 (-0.85) -0.04 (-0.84)  +ghQg	
 - 0.15** (1.87) 0.13** (1.68)  0.04 (0.72) 0.04 (0.68) } MP	
 - -0.02 (-0.4) -0.02 (-0.54)  -0.03 (-0.81) -0.02 (-0.42) ~ MNO	
 ­ -0.05* (-1.76) -0.07** (-2.13)  0.00 (-0.02) -0.01 (-0.41)  M-L!-L,?-	
 ­ -0.08 (-0.72) -0.08 (-0.63)  -0.18*** (-2.82) -0.18*** (-3.11)  MNO	
  M-L!-L,?-	
 ­ -0.02 (-0.07) -0.03 (-0.09)  0.23 (0.87) 0.32 (1.27) ®Ñ ÝÞß¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· - -0.13 (-0.56) -0.17 (-0.74)  -0.65*** (-2.47) -0.56** (-2.16) ®à ÝÞß¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· - -0.64*** (-3.91) -0.64*** (-3.84)  -0.17** (-1.92) -0.12* (-1.36) ®° ÝÞß¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
·  - 0.08 (0.05) -0.16 (-0.1)  -3.70** (-1.98) -3.36** (-1.85) ®¯À áÞ¸½ÄÁË½¶
· ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
·  - 0.54 (1.26) 0.54 (1.27)  -0.04 (-0.14) -0.12 (-0.42) ®¯¯ áÞ¸½ÄÁË½¶
· ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
·  - -0.36 (-0.48) -0.36 (-0.49)  -0.51 (-1.26) -0.52* (-1.3) 
®¯¿ áÞ¸½ÄÁË½¶
· ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
·  - -0.12 (-0.05) 0.01 (0.00) 
 
0.84 
(0.43) 
0.63 
(0.33) ®¯Æ â¾Ââ  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· + 0.13 (0.37) 0.16 (0.44)  -0.24 (-0.92) -0.32 (-1.26) ®¯Î â¾Ââ¶
·  ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· + -0.15 (-0.45) -0.12 (-0.36)  0.75*** (2.36) 0.63** (2.04) ®¯Ï â¾Ââ¶
·  ±Ë¾ÊÌÍ¶
· ¾Ç·´Ç·¶ÅÇ¶
· + 0.23 (0.15) 0.48 (0.31)  3.89** (2.07) 3.46** (1.89) 
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Table 10 continued:  
Model (3) 
   
“Sales growth” companies 
 
“Sales decline” companies 
   
Without 
control 
variables 
With control 
variables 
 Without 
control 
variables 
With 
control 
variables 
 	
 ­  -0.19** (-2.01)   -0.41*** (-8.01)  %g	
 ­  -0.03* (-1.66)   -0.05*** (-3.92) 
Ò ~ Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
n   1,121 1,121  1,658 1,658 
Adj. R2  0.39 0.39  0.35 0.39 
 
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided and one-sided significance (corresponding to the predicted sign 
of the effect) at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the 
t-statistics calculated based on time- and firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009). 
To obtain unbiased estimates in finite samples, the clustered standard errors are adjusted 
by .È > =1.È > %1  P.P > =1, where N is the sample size, P is the number of 
independent variables, and G is the number of clusters (Ma 2014). 
Panel A regression (H1) is based on the condition that  !"	
J c  !"	
 e  !"	
I. 
Panel B regression (H3) is based on the condition that  !"	
J c  !"	
 e  !"	
I 
All variables are calculated as defined in Table 11. 
6 Conclusion 
An increasing number of studies devote considerable attention to the cost 
stickiness phenomenon while the majority of analyses conjecture economic 
incentives as a core explanation for sticky costs. The underlying reasoning 
implies that managers deliberately take into account a short-term increase in 
the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio if a fall in demand is perceived to be only 
temporary. By doing so, potential adjustment costs are countervailed by 
higher relative resources costs, e.g., due to an increase in asset or employee 
turnover. Nevertheless, the particular economic consequences of asymmetric 
cost behavior have so far not been tested, and the implied positive 
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relationship concerning average cost levels remains unfathomed. To fill this 
gap, this study proposes an econometric model which allows examining the 
research question in focus while particularly considering the effects of cost 
stickiness as well as anti-stickiness. The latter relates to an under 
proportional adjustment of resources with an increase in activity compared to 
an equivalent decrease in activity (Weiss 2010).  
Findings indicate that cost stickiness may be economically viable if a fall in 
demand is temporary. Because of the avoidance of adjustment costs during a 
decline in demand, sticky cost firms yield a significantly lower SG&A cost-to-
sales ratio compared to organizations with anti-sticky costs. Does this 
generally imply that managers of sticky cost firms are better decision-makers? 
Future research could make this contribution.  
In this respect it should be considered that the conclusions suggested by this 
study are notwithstanding subject to limitations. Particularly it is important 
to acknowledge that the separation of sticky cost and anti-sticky cost 
companies according to the firm-specific measure suggested by Weiss (2010) 
potentially assigns firms with an almost regular cost function in either one of 
the groups (firms with very low values for MNO	). This aggravates the 
comparison of economic consequences between companies with asymmetric 
and symmetrical costs. Moreover, a first attempt has been made to 
differentiate between economically intended and economically unintended cost 
stickiness that might be ascribed to empire building incentives. However, the 
resulting index is restricted by its operational feasibility to capture all 
possible influencing factors that might occur. Finally, the generalizability of 
the presented findings is limited by the aggregate focus on SG&A costs in 
total, although the effects of individual components of SG&A costs are likely 
to differ. 
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Table 11: Variable Description 
Variable Name 
 
Description Calculation 
 !"	
 Log-change in sales 
between t and t-1.  ?@   !"	
 !"	
J 
QM	
 Log-ratio of total assets 
to sales.  ?@ ?L Q""!L"	
 !"	
  
	 Dummy variable 
indicating cost stickiness. 
 
ã=,äMNO	 e ff,äMNO	 c f 
!iqrsst	
J Indicator for sales 
decreases between t-1 and 
t. 
ã=,ä !"	
 e  !"	
Jf,ä !"	
 ¬  !"	
J 
gM	
 Log-ratio of total number 
of employees to sales.  ?@ Èrs&!j?ägs« ?t!!"	
 !"	
  
	 Free cash flow as a 
measure of managerial 
empire building 
incentives. 
 
«!jL,-@" ?*	 > ?ss?-å%j!ä!jj!,#,!-"	?L Q""!L"	  
P%	
 Growth in real gross 
domestic product. 
æynxçFBæynxçFBC5; 
Pj?*L	 Indicator for a firm’s life 
cycle stage calculated for 
each firm-year as the 
median values of sales 
growth based on the last 
three years sales 
distribution. 
(pct=percentile) 
 
è =,äé c ÜêL«iLf,ä``L«iL K é e ÜêLf,äé ¬ ``L«iL «iL 
 é  +!,  !"	J !"	J !"	J 	JJ
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M-iqrsst	
J Indicator for sales 
increases between t-2 and 
t-1. 
=,ä !"	
J K  !"	
Jf,ä !"	
J ¬  !"	
J 
M-r"Ljt Fama French 49 industry 
portfolios. Excluding 
banking (45), insurance 
(46), real estate (47), and 
trading (48). 
 
M-L!-L,?-	 Index that captures the 
level of managerial 
intention when taking 
resource adjustment 
decisions. 
 
f=ë=  QM	 ffêÉª  PQ > hL,?	 f=``  M-iqrsst	J 
+Lrj!	 Indicator for a firm’s life 
cycle stage calculated for 
each firm-year as the 
median values of sales 
growth based on the last 
three years sales 
distribution. 
(pct=percentile) 
 
è f,äé c ÜêL«iL=,ä``L«iL K é e ÜêL«iL=,äé ¬ ``L«iL  
 é  +!,-  !"	J !"	J !"	J 	JJ
 %g  Indicator applied to 
price-earnings ratio %g	  ã=,ä%g > hL,? K =f,ä%g > hL,? e f 
PQ > hL,?	
 Ratio of SG&A costs to 
sales 
ìíî
íï=,ä PQ	
J !"	
J e  PQ	
J !"	
Jw/f,ä PQ	
J !"	
J c  PQ	
J !"	
Jw/
 
MNO	 Magnitude of firm-specific 
cost asymmetry, where \is the most recent 
quarter with sales 
decrease and \ the most 
recent of the last four 
quarters with an increase 
in sales. 
log RA STUSVWXYDBZA STUSVWXYDBZ[ \ \©^L _  L > `a 
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L@--L	 Indicator for a firm’s life 
cycle stage calculated for 
each firm-year as the 
median values of sales 
growth based on the last 
three years sales 
distribution.   
(pct=percentile) 
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C PAPER II 
 
The Effect of Labor Supply Shortages on 
Asymmetric Cost Behavior 
 
Abstract: 
This study examines the effect of shortages in labor supply on asymmetric 
cost behavior. Building on the labor demand literature, it is argued that labor 
supply shortages increase adjustment costs for hiring new employees. 
Consistent with this explanation, results provide evidence that companies 
facing restrictions in labor supply increase costs (and resources) less than 
companies operating with sufficient access to additional personnel. This leads 
to a more symmetrical cost behavior for increasing activity compared to 
decreasing activity. Additional analyses show that shortages in labor supply 
induce firms to increase selling prices but also to temporarily expect more 
effort from their current employees. The effect decreases with the length of 
the labor supply shock and is more pronounced for companies located in less 
populated regions. Results are robust to alternative explanations, such as 
prior period slack creation or pessimistic managerial expectations with respect 
to future demand. 
 
 
Keywords:  Labor Supply, Asymmetric Cost Behavior, Selling Prices, 
Management Expectations. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: D24; M41; J23; J24. 
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1 Introduction 
This study contributes to the understanding of asymmetric cost behavior in 
the presence of increasing adjustment costs. Different to most other 
approaches, it is assumed that adjustment costs are not constant and 
particularly determined by the availability of resources for each firm. Building 
on the dynamic labor demand literature (Akram and Nymoen 2006; 
Hamermesh and Pfann 1996; Hamermesh 1993; Pfann and Palm 1993), this 
paper predicts that if the supply of resources is scarce, it will be more difficult 
for companies to build up capacity which reflects an increase in adjustment 
costs and in turn affects firm-specific cost behavior. 
Advocates of the economic theory of asymmetric cost behavior ascribe a rise 
in the cost-to-sales ratio to deliberate managerial decision-making instead of 
costs getting out of control. It is argued that if a decrease in demand 
associated with a decrease in a firm’s output volume is perceived to be only 
temporary, managers deliberately choose to retain excess capacity to avoid 
adjustment costs related to the adaption of the company’s recourses 
(Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003). Those costs could be 
attributable, for instance, to the payment of severance packages as a 
consequence of dismissal of personnel or disposal costs of physical assets 
(Cooper and Haltiwanger 2006; Hamermesh and Pfann 1996). In this stream 
of literature, costs are considered to be sticky if a change in costs is less for a 
decrease in activity compared with an equivalent increase in activity 
(Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003). Vice versa, costs are said to be 
anti-sticky if a change in costs is greater for a decrease in activity compared 
with an equivalent increase in activity (Weiss 2010). Both forms depict 
asymmetric cost behavior in response to fluctuations in demand (Banker and 
Byzalov 2014). 
There are several factors that affect asymmetric cost behavior: (a) managerial 
expectations about future demand and demand uncertainty (Banker, Byzalov, 
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and Plehn-Dujowich 2014; Banker et al. 2014; Holzhacker, Krishnan, and 
Mahlendorf 2015b), (b) current capacity levels (Balakrishnan, Petersen, and 
Soderstrom 2004; Cannon 2014), (c) management incentives and personal 
characteristics (Banker and Fang 2013; Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis 2012; Chen, 
Gores, and Nasev 2013; Dierynck, Landsman, and Renders 2012; Kama and 
Weiss 2013), and (d) country or industry-specific factors (Banker, Byzalov, 
and Chen 2013; Banker, Byzalov, and Threinen 2013; Calleja, Steliaros, and 
Thomas 2006). Other research investigates the effects of asymmetric cost 
behavior on e.g., firm profitability (Anderson et al. 2007; Baumgarten, 
Bonenkamp, and Homburg 2010) or earnings forecasts (Ciftci, Mashruwala, 
and Weiss 2016; Weiss 2010). 
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether asymmetric cost 
behavior is affected by supply shortages in addition to variations in demand. 
To do so, this paper uses data from firms operating in the construction 
industry. The importance of the construction industry for the overall economy 
and the high pressure for cost efficiency make this setting particularly suitable 
for studying asymmetric cost behavior (Popescu, Phaobunjong, and Ovararin 
2003). By focusing on one industry in one country, the validity of findings is 
moreover corroborated by accounting for cost structure and growth 
differences (Balakrishnan, Labro, and Soderstrom 2014).  
All empirical tests are based on data from two sources. Quantitative 
information is obtained from the annual financial statement of private and 
public companies provided by Bureau Van Dijk. This dataset is merged with 
survey results from a long-term study which is part of an EU initiative to 
measure business trends (European Commission 2014). The latter contains 
information on managers’ assessment on factors that limits business activity, 
future sales expectation and changes in selling prices. Notably, none of these 
datasets alone would allow for the research question to be studied, because 
resource adjustments in response to variations in demand are driven not only 
by company-specific requirements underlying the production function but also 
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by the overall market supply as well as the current level of capacity 
utilization in each firm. Consequently, some firms may report limits in labor 
supply and others do not, even though macroeconomic climate and industry 
affiliation is equal. 
The impact of labor supply shortages on cost behavior within the 
construction industry is examined using selling, general and administrative 
(SG&A) costs. Labor-related costs represent a large proportion of SG&A 
costs (Popescu, Phaobunjong, and Ovararin 2003), such as the salary for 
project managers, experts and administrative staff. The hiring and firing of 
skilled employees is generally more difficult and costly than for less qualified 
personnel (Banker, Byzalov, and Chen 2013; Dierynck, Landsman, and 
Renders 2012; Hamermesh 1989; Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli 
1993; Oi 1962). Thus, SG&A cost behavior represents an important category 
to study the impact of shortages in labor supply, while facilitating the 
comparability to other studies which also focus on SG&A costs (Anderson, 
Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Anderson et al. 2007; Banker et al. 2014; 
Weidenmier and Subramaniam 2016). Following prior research, a change in 
SG&A costs is assumed to reflect resource adjustment decisions.  
By investigating the effect of adjustment costs with respect to changes in the 
company’s total workforce, this study builds on the labor hoarding concept. It 
describes a less than proportional decrease in hours per employee in response 
to a fall in demand compared with a rise in demand (Hamermesh 1993). 
Embedded in this concept is the assumption that firms have two measures for 
varying their effective labor input: (observed) employment and (unobserved) 
labor effort. The notion was first formalized in 1962 by Walter Oi, who 
developed a model of labor demand considering costs of hiring and training 
employees. These costs represent labor adjustment costs that make it optimal 
for employers facing a temporary negative demand shock to retain more 
workers than actually necessary. Because companies have previously invested 
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in their firm-specific human capital, employees are kept on the payroll and 
are assigned to maintenance or similar tasks irrespective of short-run 
decreases in real output productivity. Consequently, investments in hiring 
and training represent quasi-fixed employment costs that form a buffer 
absorbing temporary variations in the marginal product of labor. This 
situation leads to a short-term rise in the cost ratio during decreasing activity 
and, hence, induces cost stickiness. Only if the decrease in demand is 
sufficiently large will resources be cut by an optimizing manager (Bentolila 
and Bertola 1990). However, adjustment costs not only prevent firms from 
dismissing employees in response to decreases in demand. They may also 
explain a lower level of cost stickiness if the ramp up of resources is more 
costly than the marginal monetary benefit generated by hiring an additional 
employee. In this case, firms may decide to delay the expansion of the 
workforce and instead temporarily expect greater effort from their current 
employees (Hamermesh and Pfann 1996; Pfann and Verspagen 1989; Pfann 
and Palm 1993).  
To test the association between shortages in labor supply and firm-specific 
cost behavior, the analysis is conducted in four steps:  
The first part of the paper distinguishes between demand and supply side 
effects by assessing differences in cost behavior between firms that do and do 
not report limits in labor availability. Following the empirical tests proposed 
by Anderson et al. (2003), cost behavior is examined by regressing the change 
in costs on the change in sales between the current and last period, while 
controlling for known influencing factors. As expected, results show that labor 
supply shortages are associated with a strong decrease in cost stickiness.  
The second part of the analysis examines the underlying mechanisms that 
describe how cost stickiness is reduced for companies operating in tight labor 
markets. In this respect, four explanations are investigated. On the one hand, 
costs are less sticky if the percentage increase in costs relative to a one 
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percent increase in sales is reduced. The latter can be ascribed to (1) an 
increase in capacity utilization by reemploying slack resources after a period 
of declining demand, (2) an increase in selling prices,29 or (3) enhanced labor 
productivity. On the other hand, costs are also less sticky if the percentage 
decrease in costs relative to a one percent decrease in sales is amplified. The 
latter can occur if (4) managers initiate aggressive cost cutting actions 
because they expect a long-term decrease in demand. All four explanations 
are investigated separately. Collectivity, findings indicate that if labor supply 
is restricted, firms reduce cost stickiness by increasing selling prices and react 
to high demand by increasing work pressure and expecting more effort from 
their employees. Hence, employee effort is likely to decrease as a consequence 
of labor hoarding but also increases when demand is high and the availability 
of labor is scarce. This leads to an increase in labor productivity and 
therewith reduces cost stickiness.  
The third part of this study examines cost behavior after two consecutive 
periods during which labor supply is restricted. Results show that the effect 
reverses, which supports the hypothesis that it takes time for companies to 
set up work contracts and specify requirements before new employees are 
actually recruited. Thus, the difference in SG&A cost behavior between firms 
that face shortages in labor supply and firms that do not experience a lack of 
labor availability decreases with the length of the supply shock.       
The fourth part of this study investigates if the effect of limits in labor supply 
varies by geographical region. Because employee-firm matches are better and 
more likely in urban areas (Glaeser and Mare 2001; Helsley and Strange 
1990), it is less difficult for companies located in highly populated regions to 
find and hire suitable workers. Upward labor adjustment costs are therefore 
lower in urban areas where the labor market is tight. As a consequence, 
results show that the reduction of cost stickiness is stronger for companies 
                                
29 Because the behavior of costs is estimated as a function of sales, price increases lead to a 
reduction of the cost-to-sales ratio (irrespective of resource adjustments). 
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located in less populated regions where high adjustment costs prevent firms 
from hiring extra personnel when demand is rising. 
Overall, this study makes three major contributions. First, it identifies the 
factor “limited availability of labor” as a source of adjustment costs that 
reduces cost stickiness during periods of macroeconomic growth. These 
findings are consistent with adjustment cost theory but contrast with 
prevalent interpretations reported in the literature on asymmetric cost 
behavior. The latter predominately argues that managers cut costs to a larger 
extent when their future sales expectations are pessimistic or the company is 
characterized by a large amount of slack resources (e.g. Banker et al. 2014; 
Banker and Byzalov 2014; Chen, Kama, and Lehavy 2015). However, this 
paper provides evidence that costs can be less sticky even though managers 
are not very pessimistic and slack is low. Second, it is the first study in the 
context of asymmetric cost behavior that empirically discriminates between 
variations in demand and supply and analyzes how these effects vary by 
geographical region of firms within the same country. This shows that 
adjustment costs differ not only on a country or industry level but also 
specifically for each company. Third, the study provides robust results with 
respect to key variables that have been either ignored or imperfectly 
operationalized in the literature (i.e. price changes, managerial expectations, 
industry differences of cost structures) and documents that a significant 
reduction in cost stickiness can also arise when expectations are positive and 
slack is low. These conditions have been previously recognized to drive sticky 
instead of anti-sticky costs (Banker and Byzalov 2014; Banker et al. 2014).   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section three comprises an overview 
of the construction industry, descriptive statistics and an explanation of the 
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empirical models. Results are summarized in section four, followed by several 
robustness checks in section five. Section six concludes.  
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
Acknowledging that factors other than volume drive costs, scholars have 
dedicated considerable research to the analysis and identification of such, as 
well as their recognition in the management accounting literature (Banker 
and Johnston 2006). In particular, with respect to the development of 
activity-based-costing systems, the theoretical assumption frequently implied 
is based on a linear relationship between variable costs and their driver, 
independent of the direction of change in activity (Noreen 1991). However, 
cost stickiness research shows that variable costs do not respond equally 
proportionally for increases and decreases in activity.30 Instead, theory 
suggests that companies exhibit sticky costs when demand is decreasing, but 
resources are retained to avoid potential adjustment costs incurred in the act 
of cutting or adding resources. Because adjustment costs are distinct in 
indirect, non-production costs where managerial discretion is high, the cost 
stickiness phenomenon is most frequently studied by examining the behavior 
of SG&A costs (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Banker and 
Byzalov 2014; Banker et al. 2014). 
Given that labor costs represent a significant proportion of SG&A costs, the 
conditional effect of prior period sales changes on asymmetric SG&A cost 
behavior can be ascribed to the labor hoarding concept. Economists 
rationalize labor hoarding as the optimal response in the presence of costs of 
adjusting labor to changes in demand (Biddle 2014; Blanchard 2011; Oi 
1962). Because a firm invests in its labor force by offering training initiatives 
                                
30 Cost stickiness is distinct from conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of bad 
news as compared to good news in earnings recognition). However, standard proxies of 
conditional conservatism can be biased due to cost stickiness (Banker et al. 2016). 
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and hiring skilled employees, related monetary expenses represent fixed costs 
induced to improve a worker’s productivity. Such gains in productivity 
impose a wedge between labor costs and sales generated by one employee who 
entices firms to keep current employees rather than laying them off when 
demand is falling. Hence, a negative demand shock has to be sufficiently large 
and persistent to economically justify the dismissal of trained and highly 
productive employees.31  
While labor hoarding during periods of decreasing demand explains cost 
stickiness on average, the opposite effect arises when labor is scarce. In this 
case, firms that face limits in labor supply have to incur greater hiring costs 
of new personnel than those companies that operate without any labor 
constraints. As a consequence labor shortages raise employment adjustment 
costs and thereby influence how managers react to demand changes (Akram 
and Nymoen 2006).32 In this case, an optimizing manager is reluctant to 
                                
31 The seminal work by Oi (1962) builds on the dynamic labor demand literature and 
introduces the notion of labor as a quasi-fixed factor that comprises components of fixed 
and variable elements. If the total discounted costs of hiring an additional worker consist 
of the sum of the present value of expected wage payments (W), hiring costs (H) and 
training expenses (K), then a company will only employ an additional worker if her 
marginal product of labor (M) plus any productivity increases due to training (M) is 
above her marginal costs (C). With Y indicating the total discounted sales generated by 
the marginal worker, i representing the discount rate and T the expected period of 
employment, this implies     .=  j1J    N and O   .+  +1.=  ,1J . 
Profits are maximized if the total discounted cost of employing an additional worker is 
equal to the total discounted marginal sales. If R represents the period rent which must be 
earned by each worker to amortize the fixed employment costs (H+K) over the total 
period of employment (T), then the equilibrium condition can be reduced to +ð  +ð ð  h with R=.  N1   .=  j1J based on the firm’s expectations:   ð, +  +ð, +  +ð. Because for current employees the costs of hiring and training 
represent sunk costs, the company only dismisses personnel if +ð  +ð e ð. In 
contrast, the firm expands its total work force if  +ð  +ð K ð  h. 
32 The shape of the adjustment cost function determines a firm’s optimal reaction to 
positive or negative demand shocks. In the case of variable non-linear convex adjustment 
costs, the company would choose to increase its labor force gradually because average 
adjustment costs increase with the size of the adjustment. Consequently, changes are made 
slowly, lagging behind the shock in demand. In the case of lumpy fixed adjustment costs, 
labor capacity is adjusted in one step if the demand shock is sufficiently large (Hamermesh 
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expand the current workforce if the costs of recruiting and hiring an 
additional employee are higher than the marginal sales generated 
(Hamermesh and Pfann 1996). This reduces cost stickiness on average 
through a convergence of the magnitude of SG&A cost increases to the 
magnitude of SG&A cost decreases. Accordingly, H1 is formulated as follows: 
H1:  Restrictions in labor supply moderate SG&A cost behavior. SG&A costs 
are less sticky for companies facing restricted labor supply than for 
companies facing unrestricted labor supply. 
To understand through which mechanisms labor supply shortages induce a 
reduction of cost stickiness, the following paragraphs elaborate on different 
explanations that are framed in hypotheses H1a to H1d.  
First, if the economic trend is positive, companies that report labor shortages 
are likely to operate with higher capacity utilization than companies that do 
not report shortages in labor supply. Otherwise they would not require 
additional employees to cope with high demand. The higher level of capacity 
utilization is then reflected in a smaller ratio of cost-to-sales for those firms 
that report insufficient labor supply. This intuition follows Banker et al. 
(2014) who use prior period sales changes to investigate the conditional 
factors leading to cost stickiness or cost anti-stickiness. The authors show 
that the form of asymmetric cost behavior in the current year is determined 
by the direction of change in activity in the previous period. Because slack is 
carried over from one period to the next, retained resources during a previous 
year of declining activity can be used up in the following year if demand 
recuperates. Consequently, resources are adjusted less than proportional in 
response to a current increase in demand following a previous decrease in 
demand. This sequence of demand changes (demand decrease in t-1, demand 
                                                                                                        
1993). Realistically, labor adjustment costs are composed of both variable and fixed 
components.  
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increase in t) leads to observed anti-stickiness. SG&A costs are sticky in the 
opposite case (demand increase in t-1, demand decrease in t) when a current 
decrease in activity follows a preceding increase in activity. More moderate 
forms of stickiness and anti-stickiness are expected for corresponding mixed 
cases in a three-period setting. Although Banker et al. (2014) do not 
specifically discuss productivity implications of their theoretical model; the 
explanation makes only sense if one assumes that the firm is operating 
inefficiently during a fall in demand. Otherwise, sticky SG&A costs would 
imply that resources remain unchanged with which the firm generates a 
constant output determined by its production function. Instead, it is argued 
that the company chooses to accumulate slack when demand falls and 
produces less output as its available resources would allow. Accordingly, the 
percentage of SG&A costs relative to current activity is higher during periods 
of declining demand than during periods of increasing demand. Consistent 
with this line of reasoning, anti-sticky SG&A costs are associated with higher 
capacity utilization when resources are reemployed if activity increases after a 
previous decrease.33 Thus, if labor supply shortages reflect an increase in 
capacity utilization due to a previous decrease in demand, then cost stickiness 
is lower. In H1a this explanation is referred to as “Prior Period Sales 
Decrease”:  
H1a (“Prior Period Sales Decrease”):  For increases in demand, SG&A 
costs rise to a lower extent for 
companies facing restricted labor 
supply than for companies facing 
unrestricted labor supply due to a 
prior period sales decrease. 
                                
33 Notably, this increases output per employee-hour due to more efficient usage of current 
capacity and does not require increases in employees’ effort.   
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Second, managers of firms that face labor supply shortages are likely to raise 
selling prices in order to absorb market demand instead of hiring extra 
employees. This can affect the measurement of cost stickiness if SG&A cost 
behavior is estimated as a function of changes in sales instead of actual 
output volume. Because companies are not required to disclose information on 
output volume in financial statements, most studies do so and use sales as a 
proxy for drivers in SG&A costs.34 Cannon (2014) provides evidence that 
results can be driven by changes in selling prices irrespective of deliberate 
resources adjustment decisions. Specifically, if managers are optimistic, they 
reduce prices to stimulate demand during periods of macroeconomic decline 
but leave prices unchanged and increase capacity as demand rebounds. Vice 
versa, SG&A costs are found to be anti-sticky if prices are increased when 
demand grows (rather than building up capacity), but decision-makers leave 
prices unchanged and cut capacity when demand declines. Accordingly it is 
hypothized that a firm’s willingness to increase selling prices is higher when 
labor is scarce. Because the ratio of SG&A cost-to-sales decreases with 
increasing prices, the level of cost stickiness is then lower for firms with 
restricted labor supply than for firms with unrestricted labor supply. In H1b 
this explanation is referred to as “Price Increases”: 
H1b (“Price Increases”): For increases in demand, SG&A costs rise to a 
lower extent for companies facing restricted 
labor supply than for companies facing 
unrestricted labor supply due to an increase in 
selling prices.  
Third, costs increase at a lower level for companies reporting shortages in 
labor supply if labor productivity is rising. An increase in labor productivity 
                                
34 Exceptions include Balakrishnan et al. (2004), Balakrishnan and Gruca (2008), 
Holzhacker et al. (2015a) and Cannon (2014). 
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can result from employees exerting more effort when demand is high if firms 
are restricted in hiring additional employees. Thus, companies can 
temporarily increase sales per unit of SG&A costs by leveraging capacity and 
allocating more projects to available employees. Complementary to the labor 
hoarding concept, an increase in labor effort is associated with the notion of 
procyclical labor productivity. It describes a rising output per employee 
during macroeconomic growth periods and a falling output per employee 
during macroeconomic decline periods (Biddle 2014; Blanchard 2011). 
Procyclical labor productivity contradicts conventional neoclassical thinking 
(which posits countercyclical productivity) in three respects: First, it is 
argued that during recessions, average productivity would rise because firms 
dismiss the least productive worker. Second, the fear of losing a job if 
unemployment is high presumably induces employees to work harder in times 
of economic distress. Third, one expects that during periods of economic 
expansions, high working pressure and overtime causes fatigue and leads to a 
loss in quality (Biddle 2014). In line with the theory of procyclical labor 
productivity, H1c predicts a reduction in cost stickiness due to an increase in 
labor effort when labor is scarce and demand is high.  
H1c (“Labor Effort”): For increases in demand, SG&A costs rise to a lower 
extent for companies facing restricted labor supply 
than for companies facing unrestricted labor supply 
due to an increase in labor effort. 
Labor supply shortages do not impact cost behavior for demand increases 
only. Additionally, one would expect that the lack of skilled employees also 
affects firms during periods of declining demand. Without qualified project 
managers and firm executives, companies might not be able to acquire enough 
clients for future business activities. Hence, firms reporting limits in labor 
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supply are likely to lose tendering processes against competitors and are 
therefore more pessimistic with respect to future sales.  
Previous literature shows that expectations with respect to future demand 
significantly influence the extent to which decision-makers are willing to 
either retain or cut resources during economic downturns (Anderson, Banker, 
and Janakiraman 2003; Banker and Byzalov 2014; Banker et al. 2014; Chen, 
Kama, and Lehavy 2015). If managers are optimistic that demand will 
rebound in the future, they are more willing to keep unused resources during 
a short-term contraction of demand. Thus, it is possible to avoid current and 
future adjustment costs if their expectations are correct. Using proxies such 
as historical sales development, GDP, order backlog or analyst’s sales 
forecast, scholars document that cost stickiness is more pronounced if future 
sales expectations are high (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; 
Banker et al. 2014).35 Conversely, if managers are rather pessimistic with 
respect to their prospective business situation, Banker et al. (2013) find that 
cost stickiness diminishes. Such cost behavior is observed during periods of 
strong and persistent sales decline, like the economic crisis in the years 2007 
and 2008, when a quick recovery of the market was unexpected. Chen, Gores 
and Nasev (2013) extend the argument by focusing on managers’ personal 
characteristics, which likewise may influence their sales expectations. The 
authors build on the psychology literature and find that SG&A resources are 
sticky if managers are overconfident with respect to their ability to assess and 
                                
35 These studies use proxies based on archival data to operationalize managerial 
expectations with respect to future sales. However, such proxies may capture other effects 
that are unrelated to managers’ anticipation of future sales or are not equally applicable 
for all firms in the sample. Unsurprisingly, studies that use, for instance, GDP growth to 
operationalize sales expectations obtain inconclusive results with respect to the effect on 
cost behavior (Banker and Byzalov 2014). Likewise, order backlog can be a suitable proxy 
for sales expectations for companies in the durable goods or computer industry (Rajgopal, 
Shevlin, and Venkatachalam 2003) but might not be a good measure for firms with short-
term order contracts or different disclosure requirements. To overcome difficulties in 
finding suitable empirical proxies, this study uses a subset of data obtained from the 
Danish survey which includes direct information on managers’ personal assessment about 
future demand. 
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restore future demand during a current economic downturn. In addition, 
managers are likely to be more inclined to form optimistic sales expectations 
if their performance horizon is rather long-term oriented. In light of 
intellectual capital theory, Venieris et al. (2015) predict that firms with high 
organizational capital (defined as the unique organizational structure and 
processes that facilitate the combination of human skills and physical capital) 
have a rather long-term focus because their previous investments are strongly 
determined by intangible assets that capitalize over time. They are therefore 
more willing to maintain unutilized resources during short-term demand 
fluctuations to avoid adjustment costs.  
Following this explanation, H1d predicts that managers of firms reporting 
limits in labor supply are more pessimistic with respect to future sales. They 
are therefore more willing to cut SG&A costs during decreases in demand. 
Accordingly, H1d is formulated as follows: 
H1d (“Pessimistic Expectations”): For decreases in demand, SG&A 
costs fall to a stronger extent for 
companies facing restricted labor 
supply than for companies facing 
unrestricted labor supply due to 
pessimistic future sales expectations. 
Next to the mechanisms through which companies that report shortages in 
labor supply realize a lower level of SG&A cost stickiness, H2 and H3 focus 
on the magnitude of the effect. The magnitude of the effect is expected to be 
impacted by, first, the length of the supply shock and, second, by the specific 
regional location of the firm.  
Because managers cannot perfectly anticipate a shock to demand and it takes 
time to find and set up contractual arrangements with new hires, there is a 
lag between the actual decision to adjust resources and its realization. 
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Similarly to the observation made by Anderson et al. (2003), who document 
that stickiness reverses over time, it is therefore projected that the extent of 
SG&A cost anti-stickiness for companies facing shortages in the availability of 
labor decreases in the subsequent period. This argument leads to the second 
hypothesis:  
H2:  The difference in cost behavior between companies facing restricted 
labor supply and companies facing unrestricted labor supply decreases 
after two consecutive periods with labor shortages.  
Furthermore, research on local labor market characteristics document that 
firms operating in dense geographical areas are more likely to find suitable 
employees by exerting less effort than firms located in rural regions (Helsley 
and Strange 1990). They can partly offset employee adjustment costs by 
benefiting from better employee-firm matches compared with their 
competitors located in less populated areas. The quality of the employee-firm 
match improves with the number of agents in the market (Helsley and 
Strange 1990). Hence, thick labor markets facilitate the search for the most 
suitable person and enable a quick occupancy of vacancies, which is likely to 
be reflected in higher productivity and salaries (Glaeser and Mare 2001). 
Moreover, firms located in geographical concentrated regions are more willing 
to invest in new technologies because they expect to easily find specialized 
employees. At the same time, individuals invest in human capital because 
they anticipate an increasing rate of return as their skills are valued by a 
number of potential employers (Acemoglu 1996). Likewise, people acquire 
skills by interacting with each other, whereas the probability to do so is 
higher in more dense urban areas (Glaeser and Mare 2001).  
Collectively, these studies suggest that the magnitude of labor adjustment 
varies by geographical location and therefore moderates the degree of 
asymmetric SG&A cost behavior. Consistent with this line of reasoning, costs 
of recruiting and hiring additional employees when skilled labor is scarce are 
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expected to be lower for companies based in areas with a high population. 
Thus, the thickness of the local labor market plays a role in determining the 
extent of cost asymmetry. Accordingly, the third hypothesis is: 
H3:  The degree of SG&A cost stickiness for companies with restricted labor 
supply is lower in less populated geographical regions. 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Setting  
To examine the effect of upward biased adjustment costs on asymmetric 
SG&A cost behavior and its consequences for managerial decision-making, 
this study focuses on the Danish construction industry between 1998 and 
2013. At 60 percent on average, labor-related costs represent the highest 
proportion of general and administrative overhead in construction companies 
(Popescu, Phaobunjong, and Ovararin 2003). Without qualified employees, 
contractors may not be able to successfully bid against their competitors and 
will be forced out of business in the long run. Contractors therefore compete 
heavily in the market for skilled workers. Thus, the construction sector at the 
beginning of the 21st century serves as a particularly suitable setting for 
studying adjustment cost variations for labor because many companies had a 
high demand for additional employees to accommodate the strong increase in 
residential investments. Using data from one industry in one country 
moreover facilitates firms’ comparability with respect to cost structure and 
growth rates (Balakrishnan, Labro, and Soderstrom 2014) and rules out 
potential biases due to country-differences in labor laws or corporate 
governance (Banker, Byzalov, and Chen 2013; Calleja, Steliaros, and Thomas 
2006).  
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The Danish setting of this study provides an additional advantage. Compared 
to other European countries that are characterized by strong labor protection 
laws and labor union power (Banker, Byzalov, and Chen 2013), Denmark 
established a so called “Flexicurity” system.36 On the one side, the system 
provides employers with the flexibility to dismiss personnel if necessary. On 
the other side, the system safeguards a high level of unemployment benefits 
for people in need. As such, the Danish setting mitigates the objection that 
costs are sticky because labor protection laws do not allow firms to dismiss 
personnel if firms face economic problems.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This study is based on a merged dataset stemming from the Orbis database 
operated by Bureau Van Dijk and micro-data obtained from the Danish 
Statistical Institute (Statistics Denmark).37 The latter has been used within 
the framework of the Joint Harmonized EU Program of Business and 
Consumer Surveys with the objective to provide information for economic 
surveillance and business climate in the EU.  
Data collected from the construction industry are mostly qualitative and 
gathered on a monthly basis. Because private companies in Denmark are not 
required to disclose financial information more frequently than once a year, 
all observations from the business and consumer survey are aggregated based 
on their median per year for the subsequent cross-sectional regressions.38 
Following Anderson et al. (2003), firms are required to have valid sales data 
for the current and previous year as well as non-missing observations for 
components of SG&A costs, geographical region, managerial expectations, 
sales development and whether their labor availability is restricted. SG&A 
                                
36 See http://denmark.dk/en/society/welfare/flexicurity. 
37 In Denmark, a CVR number is assigned to each company; this number is used as the single identifier to 
merge both datasets.  
38 The median splits the sample in two halves each representing 50 percent of the 
distribution. Thus, the median is less skewed due to extreme values than for instance the 
arithmetic mean.  
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costs are calculated from operating sales less operating profit, costs of goods 
sold and depreciation. Additionally, observations for which SG&A costs 
exceed sales are deleted, and all financial variables are deflated to real 2000 
DKK. The final sample is winsorized at the top and bottom one percent to 
alleviate potential biases caused by outliers. 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  
As shown in Panel A, the average firm generates 172 million DKK in 
operating sales (22 million USD) and 20 million DKK in SG&A costs (two 
million USD). The mean ratio of SG&A cost-to-sales is 26 percent, and the 
ratio of SG&A costs to operating costs is 27 percent. Compared with other 
descriptive statistics from listed companies in the Compustat database, a firm 
in this sample is fairly small with 243 employees on average but only 60 
employees in median. The average construction firm in the underlying sample 
has contracted for approximately five months work at the time of the survey.  
Pearson correlations are tabulated in Panel B of Table 1. The strong 
correlation between SG&A costs and sales indicates that sales are a good 
predictor for cost behavior. Other correlations are also significant, but 
smaller. One exception is the ratio of total assets to sales. Asset intensity is 
not significantly correlated with the level of sales per company, but varies 
marginally with the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio and with the SG&A cost-to-
operating cost ratio.  
Panel C summarizes the mean differences conditional on whether the firm 
reports limits in labor supply. The pattern of significance indicates that labor 
markets are more likely to be tight during periods of strong economic growth. 
Accordingly, construction firms that find themselves restricted in labor supply 
have greater operating sales along with higher personnel expenses and a 
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stronger workforce.39 Nevertheless, labor profitability is not generally higher 
for firms limited in labor supply. The latter requires 0.0020 employees per one 
thousand DKK of operating sales, whereas the figure is slightly lower for 
construction firms that are not affected by a shortage of workers.  
Finally, Panel D provides an overview of the frequency of prospective sales 
expectations and price changes conditional on whether the company reported 
limits in labor supply. Because labor demand is likely to be higher during 
periods of macroeconomic growth, it is not surprising that the percentage of 
optimistic expectations is higher for firms reporting a shortage in labor 
supply. Moreover, the distribution of price changes shows that nearly 20 
percent of all firms in the sample decrease prices, whereas only a small 
fraction of three percent also report price increases. This pattern supports 
findings reported by Cannon (2014), who indicates that managers are more 
willing to decrease prices to stimulate current sales volume when demand falls 
but increase capacity (instead of prices) when demand rebounds.   
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics in Million DKK (Million 2000 USD) 
  
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Operating Sales [1] 
171.72 
(21.65) 
513.45 
(64.75) 
8.22 
(1.04) 
30.86 
(3.89) 
112.65 
(14.21) 
SG&A costs [2] 
19.68 
(2.48) 
53.61 
(6.76) 
1.79 
(0.23) 
4.74 
(0.60) 
14.22 
(1.79) 
Personnel expenses [3] 
45.56 
(5.74) 
133.30 
(16.81) 
2.83 
(0.36) 
9.35 
(1.18) 
27.06 
(3.41) 
SG&A costs/  
Operating Sales [4] 0.26 0.21 0.08 0.20 0.42 
SG&A costs/  
Operating Costs [5] 0.27 0.22 0.08 0.21 0.44 
                                
39 To rule out a potential self-selection bias of larger firms, hypothesis 1 is subjected to a 
robustness test based on a sample of firms that at least once reported limits in labor 
supply. All other observations are deleted from the sample. Results are robust to the 
alternative sampling. 
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Table 1 continued:       
       
Personnel expenses/ 
Operating Sales [6] 0.34 0.16 0.24 0.34 0.45 
# Employees per 1000 
DKK of Operating Sales [7] 
0.0024 
(0.0192) 
0.0015 
(0.0119) 
0.0014 
(0.0109) 
0.0021 
(0.0166) 
0.0032 
(0.0251) 
Total Assets/  
Operating Sales [8] 0.55 0.72 0.33 0.42 0.57 
Number of Employees [9] 243.27 634.24 24.00 60.00 152.00 
Order backlog  
in months [10] 5.23 4.90 2.00 4.00 6.00 
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
[1] 1.00          
[2] 0.49*** 1.00         
[3] 0.97*** 0.57*** 1.00        
[4] -0.23*** 0.07*** -0.19*** 1.00       
[5] -0.23*** 0.07*** -0.19*** 0.99*** 1.00      
[6] -0.17*** -0.02 -0.08*** 0.60*** 0.58*** 1.00     
[7] -0.22*** -0.14*** -0.19*** 0.51*** 0.49*** 0.62*** 1.00    
[8] -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.00 1.00   
[9] 0.90*** 0.57*** 0.90*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.01 1.00  
[10] 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.19*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.18*** -0.01 0.16*** 1.00 
 
*,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics Conditional on Labor Availability 
   
(Mean) 
No Limits in 
Labor 
Limits in  
Labor 
t-test for 
Difference 
Operating Sales 192.95 426.68 *** 
SG&A costs 23.02 32.27  
Personnel expenses 51.15 106.65 *** 
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Table 1 continued:    
 
No Limits in 
Labor 
Limits in  
Labor 
t-test for 
Difference 
SG&A costs/  
Operating Sales 0.23 0.21  
SG&A costs/  
Operating Costs 0.24 0.22  
Personnel expenses/  
Operating Sales 0.32 0.29 * 
# Employees per  
1000 DKK of Operating Sales 0.0018 0.0020 ** 
Total Assets/  
Operating Sales 0.52 0.51  
Number of Employees 224 513 *** 
Order backlog in months 5.61 5.73 
 
 
 
 
*,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Means are weighted by the number of sales increases per group. 
 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics for Sales Expectations and Price Changes 
   
(Percent) No Limits in Labor Limits in Labor All firms 
Optimistic Expectations 8.41 25.81 9.43 
Pessimistic Expectations 12.06 5.65 15.85 
Neutral Expectations 79.53 68.54 74.72 
    
(Percent) No Limits in Labor Limits in Labor All firms 
Price Increase 2.70 10.57 3.17 
Price Decrease 19.53 10.57 19.89 
Price Unchanged 77.77 78.86 76.94 
 
3.3 Empirical Models 
All of the hypotheses are tested based on empirical models derived from the 
general specification by Anderson et al. (2003):  
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(1a) 
ñ
 is the log-change in SG&A costs for firm i in year t relative to year 
t-1 and 
 is the equivalent of the log-change in operating sales. 	
 
is a dummy variable taking a value of one if sales in the current period 
decreased and zero otherwise. Cost stickiness prevails on average if  K f 
and  e f Because of the logarithmic specification, regression coefficients 
can be interpreted as the elasticity of costs in response to changes in sales. 
Thus,  indicates the percentage change in SG&A costs per one percent 
increase in sales and    the percentage change in SG&A costs per one 
percent decrease in sales. Sales are used as a proxy for changes in activity.  
As in most other analyses, the data underlying this study does not contain 
information on actual variations in output per firm. Nevertheless, with the 
objective of investigating the relationship between labor adjustment costs and 
firm-specific cost behavior, price changes are included as either main effects or 
as control variables in all empirical tests. This approach allows disentangling 
price effects from actual resource adjustment decisions. 
To estimate the effect of shortages in labor supply, model (1a) is refined by 
conditioning SG&A cost behavior on the perceived access to labor 
('M+M	
1. 'M+M	
 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
construction firms participating in the underlying survey reported restricted 
availability of labor.40 Model (1b) serves as the empirical specification to test 
H1 as well as the general test for H1a to H1d (more specific tests are 
explained subsequently).  
                                
40 See Table 9 for a more detailed description of the survey questions. 
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(1b) 
If SG&A costs are sticky on average, this would imply that  K f and  e f b'M+M	
  fd. However, in H1 it is hypothized that SG&A costs are less 
sticky if companies operate in tight labor markets b'M+M	
  =d. Hence, it 
is expected that    e     }  ~. In addition, H1a, H1b and H1c 
predict that the increase in SG&A costs for companies reporting shortages in 
labor supply is smaller than the increase in SG&A costs for companies that 
do not report shortages in labor supply. Accordingly,  K   }, i.e. } e =. 
H1d moreover posits that SG&A costs decrease more when firms face 
restrictions in labor supply because managers are pessimistic with respect to 
future sales. From this follows that  e   ~, i.e. ~ K f. Predicted effects 
are illustrated in Figure 1. All regressions are conducted controlling for price 
changes and managerial expectations,41 regional differences, and whether the 
company is listed or not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                
41 Price changes (%hMg¢p	

 %hMgçyp	
1 and managerial expectations 
(gò%gFGz	

 gò%góyô	
1 are indicator variables conducted within the framework of the 
Joint Harmonized EU Program of Business and Consumer Surveys. Because they have 
different effects depending on the direction of sales changes, they are interacted separately 
for increases and decreases in sales.  
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Figure 1: Illustration of Predicted Effects (model 1b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above figure illustrates predicted effects according to H1 and H1a to H1d.  captures 
the percentage increase in SG&A costs per one percent increase in activity. The slope of 
the cost function for activity decreases is estimated through the sum of  and . If costs 
are sticky on average, then  K   . According to H1, the degree of cost stickiness is less for 
companies operating with limited labor supply. This implies that    e     } ~ with 'M+M	
  =. If the increase in SG&A costs for increases in demand is less for 
companies facing limits in labor supply (H1a-c), then +} e . If also the decrease in 
SG&A costs for decreases in demand is greater for companies facing limits in labor supply 
(H1d) then  e   ~. 
To yield a better understanding of the mechanisms through which companies 
achieve a lower level of cost stickiness, H1a to H1d are furthermore tested 
individually.  
The following two-period model according to Banker et al. (2014) serves as 
the basis to test H1a after incorporating additional explanatory variables:   
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(2a) 
Banker et al. (2014) extend the empirical specification according to Anderson 
et al. (2003) by conditioning SG&A cost behavior on the development of sales 
SG&A 
Costs 
+ 
++}+~ 
+} 
 
	
=1 
Demand 
Increase 
Demand 
Decrease 	
=0 
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changes in the previous period. Correspondingly, M	
J .	
J1 is a dummy 
variable taking a value of one if sales in the previous period increased 
(decreased) and zero otherwise. 
On the one hand, if sales in the previous period increased bM	
J  =d, 
managers are expected to be rather optimistic about future sales and 
therefore more willing to keep slack resources when sales decrease in the 
current year; this leads to the observation of sticky SG&A costs in t, which is 
reflected in F¢p K f and F¢p e f.  
On the other hand, if sales in the previous period decreasedb	
J  =d, 
Banker et al. (2014) assume that executives are rather pessimistic and 
reluctant to employ more workers during a perceived temporary increase in 
demand. This implies that SG&A cost would be less sticky or even anti-sticky 
in t with Fçyp K f and Fçyp K f. If for a given magnitude of current sales 
increase costs rise more conditional on a prior period sales increase than 
conditional on a prior period sales decrease, then  F¢p K Fçyp. 
To test H1a, model (2a) is refined in the following manner to allow for the 
moderation by limits in labor supply: 
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(2b) 
H1a (“Prior Period Sales Decrease”) predicts that companies exhibit a lower 
magnitude of sales increases if sales in the prior period decreased. In this case 
companies can utilize existing capacity by reemploying free resources when 
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demand recuperates after a period of decline. This proposition is tested based 
on the two-period model specification according to Banker et al. (2014) which 
is adapted in the form of model (2b) to include the labor supply effect. 
According to H1a it is expected that F¢p  }F¢p K Fçyp  }Fçyp with }F¢p e f and }Fçyp e f. The predictions for all other regression coefficients 
follow Banker et al. (2014). Specifically, SG&A costs are sticky conditional on 
a prior period sales increase with F¢p K f and F¢p e f and anti-sticky 
conditional on a prior period sales decrease with Fçyp K f and Fçypõ K f. 
Because H1 posits that limits in labor supply .'M+M	
1 moderate the 
behavior of SG&A costs by reducing the magnitude of cost stickiness (or 
increasing the magnitude of anti-stickiness), it is expected that F¢p F¢p e F¢p  F¢p  }F¢p  ~F¢p (i.e. ~F¢p K f) and Fçyp  Fçyp e Fçyp  Fçyp  }Fçyp  ~Fçyp (i.e. ~Fçyp K f). The predicted signs of the 
regression coefficients in model (2b) are illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Illustration of Predicted Effects (model 2b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above figure illustrates predicted effects according to H1a separately for prior period 
sales increases (left panel) and prior period sales decreases (right panel). According to 
Banker et al. (2014), SG&A costs are sticky .F¢p+ F¢p e F¢p1 if sales in the previous 
period increased and anti-sticky .Fçyp+ Fçyp K Fçyp1 if sales in the previous period 
decreased. The variable LIMITS significantly reduces SG&A cost stickiness conditional on 
prior period sales increases if F¢p+ F¢p e F¢p+ F¢p+  }F¢p + ~F¢p and it 
significantly increases SG&A cost anti-stickiness if Fçyp+ Fçyp e Fçyp+ Fçyp+  }Fçyp 
+ ~Fçyp. H1a furthermore implies that the increase of SG&A costs is less following a prior 
period sales decrease and less for companies facing restrictions in labor supply. Thus, F¢p  }F¢p K Fçyp  }Fçyp. 
H1b (“Price Increases”) predicts that companies facing restrictions in labor 
supply are more likely to increase prices which induces a reduction in the 
ratio of SG&A cost-to-sales for increases in demand. To test this prediction 
model (1b) is estimated separately for increased selling prices, decreased 
selling prices and unchanged selling prices while controlling for management 
expectations. If a reduction in the SG&A ratio is realized by increasing selling 
prices as a consequence of perceived restrictions to extend labor capacity, } 
with 'M+M	
  = is expected to be significantly negative but insignificant 
for companies with no price changes or decreases in prices.  
SG&A 
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 Demand Decrease Demand Decrease 	

Prior Period Demand 
F¢
F¢p+}F¢p F¢p+F¢p 
F¢p+F¢p+ 
SG&A 
Costs 
	
 Demand  Decrease Demand Decrease 	

Fçyp 
Fçyp+}Fçyp Fçyp+Fçyp Fçyp+Fçyp+ 
Prior Period Demand 
}F¢p+~F¢p }Fçyp+~Fçyp 
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H1c (“Labor effort”) predicts that companies facing restrictions in labor 
supply increase labor productivity by allocating more projects to available 
employees and leveraging current capacity. Analogue to H1b, this decreases 
the magnitude of SG&A cost increases when sales rise. Thus, } in model 
(1b) is expected to be negative. Because labor effort is not directly 
observable, H1c is supported if the magnitude of SG&A costs increases can 
neither be ascribed to increases in selling prices (H1b) nor to an exploitation 
of capacity following a prior period decrease (H1a). In addition, a comparison 
of the ratio of personnel expenses per employee is conducted. According to 
H1c, the ratio is predicted to be lower for companies facing restrictions in 
labor supply.  
H1d (“Pessimistic Expectations”) predicts that managers of firms that report 
restrictions in labor supply are more pessimistic with respect to future sales 
because they do not have enough skilled employees who are able to acquire 
new projects and win tendering processes. Accordingly, they are more willing 
to cut SG&A resources when demand is falling. Hence, ~ K f in model (1b). 
To further investigate this hypothesis, differences in SG&A cost behavior are 
tested separately for managers of firms that are indicating positive, neutral or 
negative managerial expectations. If managerial expectations induce a 
significant difference in SG&A cost behavior for demand decreases between 
companies facing restrictions in labor supply .'M+M	
  =1 and companies 
that have sufficient labor available .'M+M	
  f1, then ~ would only be 
significantly positive for firms with pessimistic managerial expectations.  
To test H2, the difference in SG&A cost behavior between companies with 
insufficient labor availability and companies with no restrictions is 
investigated after two consecutive periods of limited labor supply. To this 
end, the variable 'M+M	
J, which captures reported shortages in labor 
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supply during the previous period, is added to model (1b). Because it takes 
time for companies to write job descriptions, talk with recruiters and 
internally coordinate the specification of requirements for potential new 
employees, the effect is expected to be stronger at the beginning of the supply 
shock, but decreasing over time. Hence, H2 implies that  is significantly 
positive and  is significantly negative. The signs of all other regression 
coefficients were defined previously. H2 is tested using model (3) below: 
ñå
  
 
  
     
    	
  
   b}  
  ~  	
  
d  'M+M	
   b  
    	
  
d  'M+M	
 'M+M	
J   7 ~ ?-Lj? "	
  	
  
 
(3) 
To test H3, parameter estimates in model (1b), which capture the association 
between SG&A cost behavior and sales for companies operating in a tight 
labor markets, are adapted to allow for a variation by geographical region in 
Denmark. Dummy variables show the differences between regions, with 
Zealand as the control group. A lower level of SG&A cost stickiness due to 
higher labor adjustment costs for construction firms operating in less dense 
geographical areas is reflected in a higher value of . Based on the average 
size of the population between 1998 and 2013, it is therefore predicted that 
companies in North Denmark (0.58 million citizens) and South Denmark (1.19 
million citizens) exhibit a lower degree of SG&A cost stickiness than 
construction firms located in the capital region (1.65 million citizens) and 
Central Denmark (1.22 million citizens). Accordingly, model (4) is specified as 
follows: 42 
                                
42 Due to an insufficient number of observations, it is not possible to differentiate the 
magnitude of cost changes per one percent increase in sales .}1 by region. 
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ñå
  
 
  
     
    	
  
   b}  
  ~  	
  
d  'M+M	
     	
  
  'M+M	
   hgPMÈ	
~    7  ?-Lj? "	
  	
  
 
(4) 
4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.1 SG&A Cost Asymmetry Conditional on the Availability of Labor (H1) 
Regression coefficients based on the standard cost stickiness model according 
to Anderson et al. (2003) are shown in Table 2. The first column tabulates 
estimates based on model (1a) without control variables, while the second 
column tabulates estimates with control variables (1a’).43 A prime indicates 
that the regression is performed based on the latter which refers to the full 
model including all controls (this notation also used in all of the following 
tables). In line with predictions by Anderson et al. (2003), SG&A costs are 
therefore sticky on average. SG&A costs increase 0.95 .1 percent per one 
percent increase in sales but decrease only 0.77 .  1  percent per one 
percent decrease in sales (Table 2, model 1a).  
Moreover, regression estimates conditioned on whether companies reported 
shortages in labor supply are consistent with H1. Results are depicted in 
Table 2, column four. On the one hand, firms with unrestricted access to 
labor exhibit sticky SG&A costs.  is significantly positive and  is 
significantly negative. On the other hand, SG&A cost stickiness is lower for 
firms facing restrictions in labor supply:     0.75 is smaller than  
                                
43 Because Anderson et al. (2003) do not use additional control variables in their main 
model; regression estimates based on model (1) without control variables are tabulated to 
facilitate a comparison of results.  
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+}  ~  =fÜ. The F-Test at the bottom of the table shows that the 
difference is statistically significant..=
`=1  `Éf
 %j K   ff`1. 
Table 2 also provides initial support for H1a-H1c (specific results are 
discussed in the following section). SG&A costs increase significantly less for 
companies facing restrictions in labor supply than for companies operating 
with a sufficient number of employees (}  >f`É1. The difference is 
statistically significant with .=
êê1  ê, %j K   ff. Furthermore, 
the positive and significant coefficient ~  fÜ is in line with H1d. The 
latter implies that for demand decreases, SG&A resources are cut more by 
companies reported limits in labor supply than by companies with no labor 
supply restrictions.   
Even though SG&A costs of construction firms are predominantly related to 
labor, contractors undoubtedly also incur capital costs to pursue their 
operations. As well, should the theoretical reasoning apply for capital 
intensive input factors. Hence, to additionally validate the hypothesis that 
companies face higher adjustment costs if they exhibit shortages in the supply 
of input factors, the behavior of SG&A costs is investigated conditional on 
shortages of equipment or other non-labor overhead. Because the percentage 
of capital related SG&A costs is relatively low and only very few companies 
actually report shortages in capital, substituting the variable “limits in labor” 
through the variable “limits in capital” is likely to affect the magnitude of the 
effect but not the direction. Untabulated results show that this intuition is 
empirically supported if additional controls for changes in managers’ 
expectations and prices are excluded from the model. Otherwise, the effect 
diminishes due to price increases and negative sales expectations when sales 
decline. 
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Table 2: SG&A Cost Asymmetry Conditional on the Availability of Labor 
(H1)(One-Period Model) 
 
Model (1a): ñå
      
    	
  

 Ò 7 ~ ?-Lj? "	
  	
 
 
Model (1b): ñå
      
    	
  
  b}  
  ~  	
  
d  'M+M	
  7 ~ ?-Lj? "	
  	
  
      
   Model 1a Model 1a’ Model 1b Model 1b’ 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
 
 + 0.95*** (22.92) 0.93*** (19.81) 0.93*** (21.99) 0.92*** (19.01)  	
  
 - -0.18** (-2.32) -0.22** (-2.49) -0.14** (-1.72) -0.17** (-1.86) ®Æ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
· -   -0.37** (-2.73) -0.34** (-2.37) 
®Î ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  +   0.65** (3.38) 0.65** (3.22) 7 
  %hMg¢p	
   -0.48** (-2.15)  -0.37* (-1.52) 7 	
  
  %hMg¢p	
    2.94 (0.82)  -0.44 (-0.15) 7} 
  %hMgçyp	
    0.05 (0.56)  0.04 (0.53) 7~ 	
  
  %hMgçyp	
    0.04 (0.32)  -0.01 (-0.06) 7 
  gò%gFGz	
   0.01 (0.12)  0.09 (1.00) 7 	
  
  gò%gFGz	
   0.06 (0.39)  -0.15 (-1.12) 7 
  gò%góyô	
    0.04 (0.35)  0.00 (0.02) 7 	
  
  gò%góyô	
   0.12 (0.89)  0.23* (1.55) 7 %þ'M	
   0.04 (0.57)  0.05 (0.56) 
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Table 2 continued: 
   Model 1a Model 1a’ Model 1b Model 1b’ 7J~ Region Fixed Effects  No Yes No Yes 
n   1554 1547 1282 1282 
Adj. R2   0.48 0.48 0.52 0.52 
   
 
Model 1b 
 
Model 1b’ 
.  f1   }  f vs.   }  f  .=
ê`Ü1  `É` %j K   ff` .=
êê1  ê %j K   ff 
.  =1     }  ~  f vs.     }  ~  f  f  .=
Éf1  ëÜ %j K   ff .=
`=1  `Éf %j K   ff` 
     
 
*,**,*** Indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. T-
statistics are calculated based on firm and time clusters. 
All variables are calculated as defined in Table 10. 
 
4.2 The Moderating Effects of Prior Period Sales, Price Changes, Labor Effort 
and Managerial Expectations (H1a-H1d) 
Table 3 depicts regression results of model (2b) following the two-period 
model specification by Banker et al. (2014). In line with expectations, F¢p  }F¢p  fÜ is significantly greater than Fçyp  }Fçyp  f=ë, with }F¢p
 }Fçyp e f (column four). However, the F-Test at the bottom of Table 3 
shows that the magnitude of SG&A cost increases of companies facing 
restrictions in labor supply is not significantly different from the magnitude of 
SG&A cost increases of companies that operate without labor constraints. 
Inconsistent with H1a, it can therefore not be concluded that a decrease in 
the cost-to-sales ratio for companies reporting shortages in labor supply is 
merely a consequence of a reemployment of free capacity after a period of 
falling demand.  
 180 
 
Except for the regression coefficient Fçyp which is insignificant, all other 
estimates are in line with results reported by Banker et al. (2014); i.e. F¢p,Fçyp
 ~F¢p
 ~Fçyp K f and Fçyp,}F¢p
 }Fçyp e f. 
 
Table 3: SG&A Cost Asymmetry Conditional on the Availability of Labor 
(H1a) (Two-Period Model)           
 
Model (2a): ñå
   M	
JbF¢p  
  F¢p  	
  
d 	
JbFçypõ  
  Fçypõ  	
  
d
 Ò 7 ~ ?-Lj? "	
  	
 
 
Model (2b): ñå
   M	
JbF¢p  
  F¢p  	
  
d 	
JbFçypõ  
  Fçypõ  	
  
dM	
Jb}F¢p  
  ~F¢p  	
  
d 'M+M	
 	
Jb}Fçypõ  
  ~Fçypõ  	
  
d
 'M+M	
  Ò 7 ~ ?-Lj? "	
  	
 
   Model 2a Model 2a’ Model 2b Model 2b’ 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
F¢p M	
J  
 + 0.97*** (13.63) 0.97*** (12.75) 0.97*** (12.76) 0.96*** (11.86) 
F¢p M	
J  	
  
 - -0.22** (-1.98) -0.27** (-2.27) -0.20** (-1.76) -0.24** (-1.95) 
Fçypõ 	
J  
 + 1.02*** (19.99) 0.99*** (16.28) 0.98*** (20.42) 0.95*** (16.18) 
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Table 3 continued:      
   Model 2a Model 2a’ Model 2b Model 2b’ 
Fçypõ 	
J  	
  
 - -0.29** (-1.92) -0.31** (-1.94) -0.18 (-1.15) -0.18 (-1.08) 
®ÆÃ¾Ç¹ ¾¶
·J¯  ö÷øùúûøü
ý Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  -   -0.32* (-1.57) -0.31* (-1.48) 
®ÎÃ¾Ç¹ ¾¶
·J¯  ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  +   0.62** (2.45) 0.61** (2.36) 
®ÆÃ¸´¹ ¸¶
·J¯  ö÷øùúûøü
ý Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  -   -0.79** (-1.8) -0.77** (-1.66) 
®ÎÃ¸´¹ ¸¶
·J¯  ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  +   1.63* (1.56) 1.70* (1.59) 
7 
  %hMg¢p	
   -0.24 (-1.21)  -0.08 (-0.37) 7 	
  
  %hMg¢p	
   0.14 (0.05)  -0.48 (-0.16) 7} 
  %hMgçyp	
   0.15** (2.04)  0.16** (2.36) 7~ 	
  
  %hMgçyp	
   -0.09 (-0.68)  -0.11 (-0.88) 7 
  gò%gFGz	
   -0.11 (-1.07)  -0.02 (-0.23) 
7 	
  
 gò%gFGz	
    0.28** (1.66)  0.02 (0.11) 7 
  gò%góyô	
   -0.06 (-0.58)  -0.10 (-0.95) 
7 	
  
 gò%góyô	
    0.26* (1.64)  0.36** (2.22) 
7 %þ'M	
   0.01 (0.09)  0.03 (0.29) 7J~ Region Fixed Effects  No Yes No Yes 
n   1220 1220 1064 1064 
Adj. R2   0.48 0.48 0.52 0.52 
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Table 3 continued: 
   Model 2b Model 2b’ 
.  f1 
F¢p  Fçypõ  }F¢p  }Fçypõ  f 
vs. F¢p  Fçypõ  }F¢p  }Fçypõ  f  .=
ªf1  =f %j K   f== .=
ë=1  =`= %j K   f=É 
.  =1 
F¢p  F¢p  Fçypõ  Fçypõ }F¢p  ~F¢p  }Fçypõ  ~Fçypõ  f vs. F¢p  F¢p  Fçypõ  Fçypõ }F¢p  ~F¢p  }Fçypõ  ~Fçypõ  f   .=
ÉÜÉ1  == %j K   f= .=
É1  = %j K   f= 
     
 
*,**,*** Indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. T-
statistics are calculated based on firm and time clusters.  
All variables are calculated as defined in Table 10. 
 
 
In agreement with H1b, column two in Table 4 shows that the mechanism 
through which a relative decrease in the SG&A cost-to-sales ratio is realized 
can be partially ascribed to price increases as a reaction to supply shortages. }(=-0.34) is marginally significant for firms that increased prices. 
Interestingly however, this is also the case for companies that did not change 
selling prices. As shown in the third column of Table 4, } is still significantly 
negative with -0.42. Thus, selling price increases can only partially explain a 
lower increase in SG&A costs relative to sales for companies facing 
restrictions in labor supply than for companies operating with sufficient labor 
capacity. 
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Building on the labor hoarding concept (Hamermesh 1993; Oi 1962), this 
finding suggests that firms who are unable to hire new employees temporarily 
cope with rising demand by exerting more effort instead of building up 
capacity. Similar to employees decreasing effort as a result of labor hoarding 
when demand falls, managers and administrative staff are inclined to work 
longer, reduce breaks and increase task efficiency when demand is high. Even 
though labor effort is not directly observable, differences in personnel 
expenses per employee presented in Table 5 provide support for this inference. 
The average amount of personnel expenses per employee is significantly 
smaller for companies facing limits in labor supply during sales increases, 
whereas the difference for firms with sufficient labor capacity is nearly equal 
and insignificant for sales decreases. 
Personnel expenses represent the entire remuneration a company pays to its 
employees. Next to salaries, these expenses include holiday payments, pension 
contribution, and health insurance but also overtime premiums. Firms 
initially react by increasing hours per employee instead of hiring additional 
staff to avoid investments in the training and recruiting of extra people 
(Hamermesh 1993; Oi 1962). Increasing working hours is not without costs 
nonetheless. The average overtime premium in Denmark lies between 150 
percent and 200 percent of the hourly wage plus overtime premiums.44 
However, as long as the marginal costs of hiring an additional employee 
dominates the marginal wage rate, companies will choose to comply with 
increasing demand without employing more people (Bentolila and Bertola 
1990). The increase in personnel expenses through a rise in overtime payment 
consequently intensifies the level of cost stickiness because costs increase to a 
greater extent for a rise in demand than for a fall in demand. Nevertheless, 
the possibility to comply with strong macroeconomic growth by working 
overtime is restricted to a maximum number of hours per person. Moreover, 
                                
44 See https://www.cfe-eutax.org/taxation/labor-law/denmark. 
 185 
 
overtime is often not paid to general management or higher-level employees 
whose salaries would be included in SG&A costs. Thus, construction 
companies that are restricted in labor supply are likely to have reached the 
limit of overtime hours and might react by leveraging existing capacity and 
allocating more projects to existing employees. Consequently, an increase in 
SG&A costs per one percent increase in sales is not be reflected in an increase 
in personnel expenses of companies operating in tight labor markets. 
 
Table 5:  Ratio of Personnel Expenses per Employee (H1c) 
  No Limits in 
Labor 
Limits in  
Labor 
t-test for  
Difference 
     
 
Personnel expenses in thousand DKK 
per employee (all observations): 
187.09 159.00 *** 
Personnel expenses in thousand DKK 
per employee (sales increases): 210.22 169.88 *** 
Personnel expenses in thousand DKK 
per employee (sales decreases): 155.68 141.78  
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6 depicts regression results estimated separately for companies where 
managers indicated pessimistic expectations (column one), neutral 
expectations (column two) or optimistic expectations (column three) with 
respect to future sales. Data on managers’ expectations are obtained from the 
business and consumer survey conducted by Denmark Statistics.45 Contrary 
to H1d, ~ is not significantly positive for managers with pessimistic 
expectations. Even though this result could be ascribed to a lack of statistical 
power because of a low number of observations, ~ is significant and positive 
                                
45 http://www.dst.dk/en/ 
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for firms with managers that do not expect demand to change in the future 
(third column). Thus, a decrease in cost stickiness when labor is scarce cannot 
be ascribed to heavy cost cutting initiates through managers that expect a 
long-term decline of sales in the future. 
Collectively, these results indicate that firms increase labor productivity as 
well as selling prices when they face restrictions in labor supply.   
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4.3 SG&A Cost Behavior Conditional on Two Subsequent Periods of Labor 
Shortage (H2) 
H2 predicts that the difference in SG&A cost behavior between firms 
reporting limits in labor availability and firms not reporting limits in labor 
availability shrinks with the length of the labor supply shock. In line with 
expectations, Table 7 shows that ~ is significantly positive and  is 
significantly negative. Thus, firms experiencing two periods of restricted labor 
availability have higher cost stickiness than firms for which the supply shock 
dissolves quickly. 
 
Table 7: SG&A Cost Asymmetry Conditional on Current and Prior Labor 
Availability (H2) 
Model (3): ñå
      
    	
  
 b}  
  ~  	
  
d  'M+M	
 b  
    	
  
d  'M+M	

 'M+M	
J  Ò 7 ~ ?-Lj? "	
  	
 
   Model 3 Model 3’ 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  
 + 0.97*** (24.71) 0.95*** (20.32)  	
  
 - -0.17** (-2.11) -0.19** (-2.07) ®Æ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
· - -0.57** (-3.42) -0.51** (-3.08) ®Î ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
· + 0.97** (3.19) 0.91** (2.87) ®Ï ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·J¯ + 0.51** (1.78) 0.60** (2.10) ®Ð ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·J¯  - -0.69* (-1.48) -0.73* (-1.53) 7 
  %hMg¢p	
   -0.39* (-1.42) 7 	
  
  %hMg¢p	
   -0.31 (-0.11) 
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Table 7 continued:    
  Model 3 Model 3’ 
7} 
  %hMgçyp	
   0.10* (1.62) 7~ 	
  
  %hMgçyp	
   -0.05 (-0.46) 7 
  gò%gFGz	
   0.01 (0.12) 7 	
  
  gò%gFGz	
   -0.05 (-0.35) 7 
  gò%góyô	
   0.03 (0.33) 7 	
  
  gò%góyô	
   0.18* (1.35) 7 %þ'M	
   -0.04 (-0.46) 7J~ Region Fixed Effects  No Yes 
n   1163 1163 
Adj. R2   0.58 0.58 
 
*,**,*** Indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. T-
statistics are calculated based on firm and time clusters. 
All variables are calculated as defined in Table 10. 
4.4 The Interplay between Labor Supply Shortages and Geographical 
Location of Firms (H3) 
Estimation results of model 3 are displayed in Table 8. In accordance with 
H3, North and South Denmark are the regions with the smallest population 
and therefore are more strongly affected by a tightening labor market than 
other areas in Denmark. Companies located in North and South Denmark 
have a significantly lower SG&A cost stickiness (or higher anti-stickiness) 
than companies located around the capital and in Central Denmark. The 
respective regression coefficients are positive and significant with óGõ wG  .I1  == compared to /n	nx  /y¢õnx  .I1  fÜ.  
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The sequence according to population size is not as clear, however. For 
instance, construction firms in South Denmark exhibit the highest degree of 
SG&A cost anti-stickiness even though North Denmark has fewer citizens. 
These differences may arise considering that population density is unlikely to 
be a perfect representation of the potential labor market for construction 
companies. 
 
Table 8: SG&A Cost Asymmetry Conditional on the Availability of Labor 
Differentiated by Geographical Region (H3) 
Model (4): ñå
      
    	
  
  b}  
 ~  	
  
d  'M+M	
    	
  
 'M+M	
   hgPMÈ	
~   7  ?-Lj? "	
  	
  
   Model 4 Model 4’ 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  
 + 0.93*** (21.96) 0.92*** (19.04)  	
  
 - -0.15** (-1.79) -0.19** (-2.03) ®Æ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
· - -0.36** (-2.71) -0.33** (-2.35) ®Î ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
· + -0.02 (-0.06) -0.01 (-0.02) ®Ï ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  Ä½Â¾ÞÊ²	¶·²³¶
· + 0.63* (1.58) 0.61* (1.52) ®Ï ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  Ä½Â¾ÞÊ´Ç·²³¶
· + 0.62* (1.46) 0.59* (1.44) ®Ï ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  Ä½Â¾ÞÅ·
¶
· + 0.96** (2.58) 0.96** (2.56) ®Ï ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ý¾á¾Ë±¶
·  Ä½Â¾Þ±Åº·
¶
· + 1.17** (1.82) 1.21** (1.9) 7 
  %hMg¢p	
   -0.35* (-1.47) 7 	
  
  %hMg¢p	
   0.31 (0.1) 7} 
  %hMgçyp	
   0.04 (0.5) 7~ 	
  
  %hMgçyp	
   0.01 (0.05) 
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Table 8 continued:    
  Model 4 Model 4’ 7 
  gò%gFGz	
   0.10 (1.02) 7 	
  
  gò%gFGz	
   -0.16 (-1.17) 7 
  gò%góyô	
   0.00 (-0.01) 7 	
  
  gò%góyô	
   0.23* (1.58) 7 %þ'M	
   0.02 (0.17) 
n   1282 1282 
Adj. R2   0.52 0.52 
 
*,**,*** Indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. T-
statistics are calculated based on firm and time clusters. All variables are calculated as 
defined in Table 10.
 
5 Robustness Checks 
This section addresses potential concerns with respect to the robustness of 
presented results. For the sake of brevity, regression estimates are not 
tabulated but available on request.  
5.1 Alternative Measure of Labor Supply 
To validate previous empirical results with respect to self-reported shortages 
in labor supply, main analyses are repeated using an alternative measure. 
This measure captures the variation in the mean level of employment in the 
construction industry as a percentage of overall employment in Denmark. In 
line with the theoretical reasoning, it is expected that if the level of 
employment rises (or unemployment falls), it is more difficult for companies 
to find and recruit potential employees. This trend reflects an increase in 
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upward adjustment costs, which reduces cost stickiness. Results are robust 
when subjected to the alternative measure (g+%'O1.  
5.2 Heterogeneity of Firms  
The cross-sectional approach of this study entices the question whether the 
observation of anti-sticky SG&A costs arises due to restricted labor 
availability and the presumed increase in adjustment costs or the selection of 
companies that are more reluctant to build up resources irrespective of 
variations in labor supply. To rebut this concern, main analyses tested using 
models 1b and 2b are repeated based on a sample that contains only 
observations of companies that at least once over the entire time period 
indicated shortages in labor supply. Thus, firms that never reported labor 
supply shortages are excluded from the sample. Results continue to show that 
companies operating in tight labor markets exhibit significantly lower cost 
stickiness or even anti-sticky SG&A costs.  
5.3 Substitution of Labor through Capital 
Because depreciation can lead to spurious findings of asymmetric cost 
behavior (Shust and Weiss 2014), SG&A costs are calculated without 
including depreciation expenses. This can however be a challenge in 
identifying anti-stickiness if firms substitute labor through capital that is 
depreciated over time. In this case, a positive and significant regression 
coefficient for deceases in sales would reflect an increase in labor productivity 
due to an intensification of capital relative to labor and not a higher work 
load of current employees. Notably, Banker et al. (2014) also indicate that a 
change in labor productivity may explain findings inconsistent with their 
predictions.46 To rule out this explanation, H1 is tested by regressing the 
                                
46 “This does not mean that all cost categories are automatically expected to be sticky 
(anti-sticky) on average whenever a sample is dominated by prior sales increases 
(decreases). For example, if increases in labor productivity outpace average sales growth, 
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change in SG&A costs on the change in sales moderated by the dummy 
variable 'M+M	
 as well as asset and employee intensity.47 Results show that 
the level of cost stickiness is still significantly lower for companies facing 
restrictions in labor supply. Hence, previous findings are unlikely to be driven 
by a substitution of labor through capital. 
6 Conclusion 
To summarize, this paper shows that a limited supply of labor can lead to an 
increase in adjustment costs, which induces a reduction in SG&A cost 
stickiness or even anti-sticky costs. Prior research does not establish a link 
between supply dynamics and the asymmetric change in SG&A resources. 
Rather, anti-stickiness is explained by examining managerial sales 
expectations and variations in selling prices irrespective of the underlying 
functional shape of adjustment costs.  
Building on a sample of Danish construction firms, findings document that 
companies are more willing to increase selling prices if they face shortages in 
labor supply during periods of high demand. Moreover, results suggest that 
the scarcity of skilled labor partially induces contractors to comply with 
strong demand by leveraging current capacity and allocating more projects to 
available employees. Consequently, sales generated per DKK of SG&A costs 
are relatively higher for companies facing limits in labor supply. The effects 
are reversed after two years of consecutive labor shortage because firms have 
more time to establish contractual arrangements and expand their search for 
suitable employees.   
                                                                                                        
then labor resources can exhibit anti-stickiness on average even when prior sales increases 
in the data outweigh prior sales decreases.” (Banker et al. 2014, p. 230). 
47 Asset and employee intensity are calculated as the logarithm of total assets to sales and 
the logarithm of the total number of employees to sales (Table 10). 
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Overall, this paper shows that a rise in adjustment costs can explain a 
significant reduction in cost stickiness irrespective of prior period sales 
decreases and despite optimistic managerial sales expectations.   
Besides the limited generalizability due to the specific framing of this study, 
the conditions under which SG&A cost behavior is observed are likely to 
occur in other industries and countries as well. Hence, it is suggested that 
prospective studies acknowledge changes in adjustment costs due to supply 
shortages in a dynamic model that distinguishes variations in demand over 
time. Measurement of these effects may help to improve decision-making 
using methods that strongly depend on the accuracy of cost information. 
Nevertheless it should be considered that this study focuses on the behavior 
of SG&A costs without examining individual components of these costs. 
Labor supply shortages might affect companies differently however, depending 
on the hierarchical positioning of vacancies and qualifications required from 
potential new employees. Insufficient labor capacity for specific types of 
employees can additionally affect other personnel, such as construction 
workers whose wages are not included in SG&A costs. A separate analysis of 
different cost categories at a more granular level and an unraveling of 
interdependencies offer a valuable approach for future research.   
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Table 9: Excerpt from the questionnaire for construction companies 
participating in the Joint Harmonized EU Program of Business 
and Consumer Surveys 
 
Expression 
 
Question Answer possibilities 
Expectations How do you expect your 
building activity (sales) to 
change over the next three 
months? 
 Increase 
 Remained Unchanged 
 Deteriorate 
Limiting factors What main factors are 
currently limiting your 
building activity? 
 none 
 insufficient demand 
 weather conditions 
 shortage of labor force 
 shortage of material 
and/or equipment 
 financial constraints 
 other factors 
Prices How did the prices you 
charged change over the 
past three months? 
 Increased 
 Remained Unchanged 
 Deteriorated 
Order backlog in 
months 
Assuming normal working 
hours, about how many 
months’ work is accounted 
for by the work in hand and 
the work already contracted 
for? 
Number of months 
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Table 10: Variable Definition 
Variable Name Description Calculation 
QgMÈ	
 Log-Ratio of total assets to 
operating sales  ?@ ?L Q""!L"	
 !"	
  
	
 Dummy variable for sales 
decreases between t-1 and t. ã=,ä !"	
 e  !"	
Jf,ä !"	
 c  !"	
J 
	
J Dummy variable for sales 
decreases between t-2 and t-
1. 
ã =,ä !"	
J e  !"	
Jf,ä !"	
J c  !"	
J 
g+%	
 Log-ratio of personnel 
expenses to operating sales.  ?@  gs«i?	
«!jL,-@" !"	
 
g+%MÈ	
 Log-ratio of the total number 
of employees to operating 
sales 
 ?@ gs« ?t!!"	
 !"	
  
g+%'O Mean level of employment in 
the construction industry 
divided by total employment 
in Denmark 
+!-gs« ?t!!"
¢uzõ$?L gs« ?t!!"
ç =fff 
gò%góyô	
 Dummy variable for 
pessimistic (negative) future 
sales expectations according 
to the assessment of 
construction companies, 
annualized based on the 
median of monthly answers. 
=,ä+!,-g«!iLL,?-" !L!j,?jL!f,ä! "!  
gò%gFGz	
 Dummy variable for 
optimistic (positive) future 
sales expectations according 
to the assessment of 
construction companies, 
annualized based on the 
median of monthly answers. 
=,ä+!,-g«!iLL,?-" M-ij!"!f,ä! "!  
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M	
J Dummy variable for sales 
increases between t-2 and t-
1. 
ã=,ä !"	
J K  !"	
Jf,ä !"	
J ¬  !"	
J 
'M+M	
 Dummy variable for limits in 
the availability of labor 
according to the assessment 
of construction companies, 
annualized based on the 
median of monthly answers. 
ã=,ä &?j,-L," ,s,L!f,ä! "!  
'M+M	
J Dummy variable for prior 
period limits in the 
availability of labor 
according to the assessment 
of construction companies, 
annualized based on the 
median of monthly answers. 
ã=,ä &?j,-L > =," ,s,L!f,ä! "!  
%hMgçyp	
 Dummy variable for price 
decreases according to the 
assessment of construction 
companies, annualized based 
on the median of monthly 
answers.  
=,ä+!,-%j,i!" !L!j,?jL!f,ä! "!  
%hMg¢p	
 Dummy variable for price 
increases according to the 
assessment of construction 
companies, annualized based 
on the median of monthly 
answers. 
=,ä+!,-%j,i!" M-ij!"!f,ä! "!  
%þ'M	
 Dummy variable if the 
company is public. ã=,ä«r& ,if,ä! "!  
hgPMÈ	
 Dummy variable for each of 
the five main geographical 
regions in Denmark. 
 

 Log-change in sales between 
t and t-1.  ?@   !"	
 !"	
J 
ñå
 Log-change in SG&A costs 
between t and t-1.  ?@  PåQ	
PåQ	
J 
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D PAPER III 
 
Price Changes, Resource Adjustments and 
Rational Expectations 
 
Abstract: 
This study investigates the relationship between the accuracy of managerial 
demand expectations, resource adjustment decisions and selling price changes. 
In line with rational expectation theory, it is argued that managers adjust 
resources and selling prices differently in response to expected compared to 
unexpected demand shocks. The association is tested using the empirical 
concept of cost stickiness. Cost stickiness arises as a consequence of 
asymmetric resource or price adjustments. Resource and price adjustments 
are termed asymmetric if the magnitude of change is different for increases 
compared to decreases in activity. 
Based on a longitudinal dataset of 1,677 private and public companies in 
Denmark, this paper shows that asymmetric resource adjustments are 
associated with unforeseen negative demand shocks. Cost stickiness due to 
asymmetric price adjustments however result from a decrease in prices 
through managers that anticipated the drop in demand and proactively lower 
selling prices and cut resources. Moreover, this study provides evidence for 
the moderating effect of managerial forecast accuracy on the relationship 
between demand uncertainty and cost elasticity. Findings show that cost 
elasticity is higher when a demand decrease is expected among companies 
with similar exposure to demand uncertainty. Overall, this implies that 
managerial competences in predicting future demand significantly determines 
firms’ profitability; especially when demand uncertainty is high or 
macroeconomic growth is declining.   
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Keywords: Cost Stickiness, Resource Adjustment Costs, Rational 
Expectations, Managerial Decision-Making, Slippery Prices, 
Demand Uncertainty. 
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1 Introduction 
The heated debate around the cost stickiness phenomenon highlights the need 
for more empirical research on cost behavior (Balakrishnan, Labro, and 
Soderstrom 2014; Banker and Byzalov 2014). Whereas traditional cost models 
assume that cost behavior can be approximated by a linear function between 
total cost and the level of activity (Horngren 2015; Noreen 1991), recent 
studies show that costs move differently in response to positive compared to 
negative changes in their driver. Specifically, costs are found to be sticky if 
the change in costs is greater for activity increases than for equivalent 
activity decreases (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Anderson et al. 
2007; Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom 2004; Balakrishnan and Gruca 
2008; Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis 2012; Dierynck, Landsman, and Renders 
2012; Weiss 2010). In light of the cost stickiness literature, this study 
investigates the association between the accuracy of managers’ demand 
expectations, resource adjustment decisions and selling price changes. 
Expectation accuracy captures the degree to which managers’ beliefs about 
future demand coincides with the actual path of demand. 
To understand how managers adjust resources and prices, the effect of 
managerial expectation accuracy on the degree of cost stickiness is examined. 
By doing so, it is possible to disentangle observed cost stickiness from merely 
price effects. Sticky costs can be ascribed to asymmetric resource or price 
adjustments or cases in which the marginal costs for adding capacity when 
demand grows are greater than marginal costs for adding capacity when 
demand falls (Cannon 2014). Thus, the application of the cost stickiness 
concept allows examining the simultaneous adjustment of resources and 
selling prices by assuming that these decisions do not only depend on 
managers’ expectations about future demand but also on the ex-post accuracy 
of their expectations.  
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Using data from a Danish business survey and financial statement line items, 
this paper predicts and finds that cost stickiness decreases with increasing 
managerial expectation accuracy. The unique dataset provides several 
advantages. Most importantly, the survey contains information on managers’ 
expectations about future demand, actual demand development and price 
changes. This allows for the construction of an empirical measure of 
expectation accuracy that does not require the aggregation of observations 
across years. Instead, management expectations and actual demand are 
compared on a monthly basis for each company. In addition, the 
incorporation of selling price changes as an endogenous variable circumvents 
some empirical design weaknesses in prior studies and provides evidence that 
cost stickiness can arise through asymmetric price adjustments when a 
decrease in demand is expected (Anderson and Lanen 2009; Cannon 2014). 
Another advantage of the dataset is that potential biases of empirical 
estimates due to information asymmetry or goal incongruence are mitigated 
because almost all the companies in the sample are privately owned (Chen, 
Lu, and Sougiannis 2012).  
The analyses within the frame of this study build on the theoretical notion 
that firms react differently to expected compared to unexpected changes in 
demand (Hamermesh 1993). The difference is less pronounced for positive 
demand shocks because the exploitation of slack capacity and overtime work 
provides firms with a flexible option to react to increasing demand. The 
reverse however, reacting to an economic downturn by cutting resources, is 
generally more difficult e.g., due to employee protection laws or company 
reputation (Banker, Byzalov, and Threinen 2013; Bentolila and Bertola 1990). 
Hence, managers who anticipate a fall in demand try to avoid losses and react 
early by cutting costs and reducing capacity before the shock occurs. But if 
the change in demand is unexpected, the firm cannot pre-adjust to the actual 
drop in demand. Rather than proactively preparing the company for a 
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decrease in demand, these firms adapt capacity and selling prices only after 
the shock occurred initially. Thus, the value of deriving implications for 
resource adjustments is gained from interpreting cost behavior as a 
consequence of deliberate decision-making in conjunction with the extent to 
which managers’ sales expectations coincide with the actual path of demand. 
To do so, the following analysis comprises three steps. 
The first part investigates how cost stickiness varies due to resource 
adjustments that differ depending on the degree to which managers correctly 
anticipate future demand. Building on the empirical model suggested by 
Anderson et al. (2003), the magnitude of cost stickiness is measured as the 
percentage change in selling, general and administrative costs (SG&A) per 
one percent change in sales. In this model, sales are used as the empirical 
proxy for demand changes. Because cost stickiness reflects a lower cost 
response to sales decreases than to sales increases, costs are predicted to be 
less sticky when resources are cut in anticipation of a fall in demand. Indeed, 
results show that managers who correctly anticipate a negative demand shock 
cut SG&A costs more than managers who did not correctly anticipate 
demand to fall. Robustness checks demonstrate that this association also 
holds for other cost categories such as total operating costs and personnel 
expenses.48  
Based on the previous results, the second part of this study tests whether the 
accuracy of managerial expectations also moderates the adjustment of selling 
prices. To do so, the sample is split between firm-years during which prices 
stayed unchanged and all remaining observations for which prices either 
decreased or increased. Results suggest that mangers who correctly anticipate 
a negative demand shock lower cost stickiness by cutting resources and 
decreasing prices whereas managers who did not expect a fall in demand 
                                
48 The accuracy of managerial expectations is not expected to moderate the change in cost 
of goods sold because fluctuations in demand are compensated with inventory adjustments. 
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retain SG&A resources and do not change prices. This implies that 
asymmetric resource adjustments predominantly arise due to unforeseen 
demand decreases. Conversely, asymmetric price adjustments can be ascribed 
to deliberate price decreases by executives who anticipate a fall in demand.  
In addition to the previous two parts of this study, a supplementary analysis 
is conducted focusing on the association between demand uncertainty and 
cost behavior.  
The degree to which managers are able to form accurate forecasts is closely 
related to demand uncertainty. Demand uncertainty is often measured as the 
long-term variance of sales for each company (Banker, Byzalov, and Plehn-
Dujowich 2014). However, the notion of demand uncertainty is mostly 
unexplored in the cost stickiness literature because sticky costs are generally 
ascribed to short-term fluctuations in demand. To fill this gap, this study 
combines the concept of demand uncertainty and cost stickiness by embracing 
a short-term view of managerial demand expectations and their ex-post 
accuracy. Building on the cost elasticity literature,49 this paper tests whether 
the empirical measure of managerial expectation accuracy moderates the 
documented relationship between demand uncertainty and cost behavior 
(Banker, Byzalov, and Plehn-Dujowich 2014; Goex 2002; Holzhacker, 
Krishnan, and Mahlendorf 2015). This is performed by replicating the 
empirical model of Banker et al. (2014), first, without and then, with 
including managerial expectation accuracy as additional explanatory variable. 
Results show that an increase in demand uncertainty induces a decrease in 
cost elasticity irrespective of managerial expectation accuracy. For demand 
decreases however, the association is different for firms that anticipated a 
negative demand shock than for firms that did not foresee the decrease in 
demand. This implies that managerial expectation accuracy is an important 
                                
49 Cost elasticity is measured as the percentage change in costs per one percent change in 
their driver. This relationship can be affected by cost stickiness that arises when costs 
respond less to decreases than to increases in demand.  
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explanatory variable that should be acknowledged when analyzing cost 
behavior.  
Overall, this study contributes to research in two ways. First, findings explain 
how managers adjust resources and prices in line with their expectations 
about future demand and how the accuracy of their expectations determines 
the degree of cost stickiness of the firm. Other cost stickiness studies 
recognize that managers adjust resources in accordance with their demand 
expectations but do not investigate the trade-off between selling price changes 
and capacity adjustments conditional on these expectations (Anderson, 
Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Banker et al. 2014; Chen, Gores, and Nasev 
2013; Chen, Kama, and Lehavy 2015; Venieris, Naoum, and Vlismas 2015). 
Second, this paper links demand uncertainty and cost stickiness research 
through the concept of managerial expectation accuracy. By demonstrating 
that the association between demand uncertainty and cost behavior depends 
on the accuracy of managerial expectations, the empirical results in this study 
moreover help to reconcile inconsistent conclusions in the literature. Contrary 
to the conventional thought, Banker et al. (2014) for instance argue that high 
demand uncertainty is positively associated with a more rigid cost structure 
(i.e., reduced cost response to changes in activity) than low demand 
uncertainty. However, this study shows that during a fall in demand, cost 
rigidity only increases with increasing uncertainty if the change in demand is 
unforeseen.   
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. The next section 
provides an overview of the theoretical background from which the main 
hypothesis is derived. Section three explains the research design by describing 
the empirical model and the data used to test predicted effects. The main 
findings are discussed in section four with a description of additional tests and 
robustness checks in section five. The last section concludes.  
 214 
 
2 Theory and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Accuracy of Managerial Expectations and Resource Adjustments 
Managers’ expectations about future demand drive asymmetric cost behavior. 
Research documents that if the adjustment of resources is costly, an executive 
who is optimistic with respect to future demand is more willing to build up or 
retain resources than a manager who expects a prospective decrease in 
demand. Thus, a higher degree of cost stickiness is associated with positive 
expectations. To test this relationship, several measures are used as estimates 
for management expectations. These include variables such as GDP growth 
(Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Banker et al. 2014), order backlog 
(Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom 2004; Banker et al. 2014), the tone 
of forward-looking statements in 10-K reports (Chen, Kama, and Lehavy 
2015), analyst forecasts (Banker et al. 2014), intangible investments (Venieris, 
Naoum, and Vlismas 2015),50 and managerial overconfidence (Chen, Gores, 
and Nasev 2013).51  
Recent work moreover analyzes the interplay between demand uncertainty 
and managers’ resource adjustment decisions.  
Banker et al. (2014) argue that firms will try to avoid congestion and 
therefore choose a more rigid cost structure when demand uncertainty is high. 
Using a combined analytical and empirical approach, the authors show that 
marginal costs increase with increasing congestion due to the convexity of the 
cost function. To prevent expensive bottlenecks, managers therefore invest in 
                                
50 Venieris et al. (2015) argue that high levels of intangible assets reflect investments in 
organizational capital that is required to support the company’s long-term growth strategy. 
Hence, high intangible assets are associated with optimistic sales expectations.
51 According to Chen, Gores and Nasev (2013), overconfident managers are more likely to 
a) overestimate their impact of restoring demand when sales decline and b) overestimate 
the accuracy of their assessment of prospective demand. Therefore, overconfident managers 
are more optimistic with respect to future sales.  
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fixed capacity when demand is uncertain and the likelihood of extreme 
realizations of demand is higher.52 
An exploration of actions through which managers alter the company’s cost 
structure in response to demand uncertainty and financial risk is provided in 
Holzhacker et al. (2015b). Results show that decision-makers deliberately 
adapt cost elasticity through three main mechanisms: leasing instead of 
purchasing of equipment, engaging in flexible work contracts and outsourcing.  
Although the effect of demand uncertainty on cost behavior is acknowledged, 
none of these studies distinguish between expected and unexpected changes in 
demand by investigating if the anticipated path of future sales is realized. 
However, doing so can alter previous inferences. For instance, higher cost 
rigidity (i.e., lower cost elasticity) can result from a delayed adjustment of 
capacity when a negative demand shock is unexpected irrespective of the 
aggregate level of demand uncertainty. Examples of such include customer 
credit failure, launch of competitive products and currency fluctuations.   
As illustrated in Figure 1, the adjustment of resources to expected shocks in 
demand is different from resource adjustment to unexpected shocks in 
demand. If the firm correctly anticipates an economic downturn, it will begin 
to adapt its current level of capacity before the shock occurs to prevent losses. 
On the contrary, if the shock is completely unexpected or expected to be 
positive, the firm cannot pre-adjust to the actual path of demand. The 
decision-maker becomes convinced of the shock only after it occurred initially 
                                
52 This argument contrasts the conventional thinking claiming that the value of flexibility 
increases with uncertainty. According to Banker et al. (2014), increased demand 
uncertainty is associated with a higher variance of demand. Thus, managers increase the 
level of fixed capacity to prevent congestion when demand is uncertain, but would favor a 
greater variabilization of the company’s cost structure only if also average demand is 
lower, which is reflected in a greater downside risk of demand (i.e., higher likelihood of 
unfavorable realizations without a commensurate increase of favorable realizations of 
demand).  
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(Hamermesh 1993). This leads to a lag in the adjustment of resources relative 
to the actual level of demand.53  
 
Figure 1: Resource Adjustment under Uncertainty 
 
 
Adapted from Hamermesh (1993). 
The figure shows how managers adjust resources differently in response to expected 
compared to unexpected changes in demand. Specifically, when a drop in demand is 
expected managers can proactively decide to cut resources in order to prevent losses. When 
a drop in demand is unexpected, the adjustment is made with a time-lag after the demand 
shock occurred initially. 
 
In case of a positive demand shock, all companies produce and sell as much as 
their current resources allow. This generally induces an increase in capacity 
utilization. However, sales are higher for firms that anticipated a growth in 
demand. Managers take advantage of their knowledge and smoothly build up 
capacity prior to the shock to exploit demand when it rises. Conversely, firms 
that did not expect a rise in demand are more likely to respond by using 
                                
53 The effect is stronger for companies that face a convex adjustment cost function that 
make large and abrupt changes in resources more costly compared to small and gradual 
changes (Hamermesh and Pfann 1996). 
Time 
Negative 
Demand Shock 
Resources 
Resource adjustment when demand shock is 
Resource adjustment when demand shock is 
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overtime work or short-term labor. As this requires the payment of a 
premium, marginal costs are greater for firms that respond to unforeseen 
demand increases compared to firms that anticipated the change.   
2.2 Accuracy of Managerial Expectations and Price Adjustments 
Firms do not react to expected changes in demand by solely cutting or adding 
resources. They can also adjust selling prices. Under uncertainty, the optimal 
capacity and pricing decision then depends on what is known about demand 
at the time of the decision and the incorporation of new information over the 
planning cycle (Goex 2002).  
Following Anderson et al. (2003), the majority of studies estimate the 
elasticity of cost response to variations in demand by regressing the change in 
costs on the change in sales. The statistical specification is as follows: 
 	
    	
  
	
, where 	
      	
 (1) 
 	
 and 
 capture the log-change between the current and 
the previous period in costs and sales, respectively, and 	
 is a dummy 
variable set to one when sales decrease and zero otherwise. In the standard 
model according to Anderson et al. (2003), the implied association is 
estimated using SG&A costs. SG&A costs are sticky on average if  K f and  e f The general intuition is that managers retain idle capacity during 
periods of declining demand to avoid adjustment costs inherited in the act of 
changing resources (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Banker and 
Byzalov 2014). 
However, using sales as a proxy for activity can give rise to cost stickiness 
irrespective of changes in labor or capital resources. Specifically, costs are 
observed to be sticky if managers adjust selling prices asymmetrical, i.e., they 
lower prices to exploit existing capacity when demand decreases but build up 
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capacity (instead of raising prices) when demand increases (Cannon 2014). 
Thus, the investigation of cost behavior based on a model that uses sales 
instead of actual activity can only be informative by including selling price 
changes as an endogenous variable.  
2.3 Accuracy of Managerial Expectations and the Trade-Off between Price 
and Resource Adjustments 
The previous two sections describe how cost stickiness arises as a consequence 
of asymmetric resource and asymmetric price adjustments. Asymmetric 
resource adjustments imply that managers retain resources as demand falls 
but add resources as demand grows (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 
2003; Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom 2004; Banker and Byzalov 
2014). Asymmetric price adjustments imply that managers decrease selling 
prices to utilize capacity as demand falls but keep selling prices unchanged as 
demand grows (Cannon 2014). Accordingly, a lower level of cost stickiness 
can be obtained by decreasing the asymmetry of resource or price 
adjustments.  
As explained above, managers make resource and price adjustments in 
accordance with their expectations about future demand. This can be 
described using three simplified scenarios. First, demand changes but 
managers did not expect it and correspondingly maintained prices and 
resources. Second, a demand shock occurs but managers expected it. They 
responded by either cutting resources and/or decreasing prices or by adding 
resources and/or increasing prices. Third, demand falls but managers 
expected a positive development or demand rises but managers expected a 
negative development. Resources and/or prices were adapted in the opposite 
direction than the actual path of demand. Hence, the timeliness of correct 
price and resource adjustments is higher for firms that expect a change in 
demand. In the second case, this leads to lower price asymmetry if firms 
increase prices (instead of adding capacity) when they expect an increase in 
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demand and lower resource asymmetry if they downsize capacity (instead of 
reducing prices) when they expect a decrease in demand. Accordingly, the 
main hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
H1: The degree of cost stickiness decreases with increasing accuracy of 
managers’ demand anticipations. 
The question remains however as to which mix of resource and price 
adjustments firms choose in order to respond to a shock in demand. Prior 
literature suggests that adjustments are costly for both capacity (Hamermesh 
and Pfann 1996; Hayashi 1982) as well as prices (Mankiw 1985; Rotemberg 
1982). To keep adjustment costs low, decision makers will therefore chose the 
least expensive mechanism in response to demand changes. Whether the 
choice of price and/or resources adjustments depends on the accuracy of 
managers’ expectations prior to a shock in demand is investigated as part of 
the following analysis.    
3 Research Design and Sample Selection 
3.1 Empirical Model 
The association between the accuracy of managerial expectations on firm-
specific cost behavior is estimated based on the regression models below. 
Model (2) refers to the main model without additional control variables and 
model (2’) refers to the specification that contains all control variables. To 
ensure that results are not driven by omitted-variable-bias, all explanatory 
variables are included as main effects as well as interaction terms. 
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Without controls: 
 PåQ	
    	
  
  	
    QþhQO	
  	
 (2) 
 
where 	
      	
  }  QþhQO	
  ~  	
  QþhQO	
  
 
With controls: 
 PåQ	
    	
  
    	
    QþhQO	
 
 7  ?-Lj? "	
	
 
(2’)
 
where 
 
	
      	
  }  QþhQO	
  ~  	
  QþhQO	

 7  ?-Lj? "	
  
The change-specification captures the short-term elasticity of SG&A costs in 
response to a variation in sales and follows previous studies based on the 
standard model introduced by Anderson et al. (2003).  is interpreted as the 
percentage change in SG&A costs per one percent change in sales and the 
dummy variable 	
 distinguishes the cost response between increases and 
decreases in demand. Hence, cost stickiness implies a lower cost elasticity for 
decreases in demand, which is reflected in a flatter slope of the cost function.  is therefore negative if SG&A costs are sticky.54 
The objective of the following analysis is to estimate the association between 
the accuracy of managerial expectations and cost behavior .} and ~1. QþhQO	
 is a logarithmic transformation of the percentage of months 
                                
54 The log-model has several advantages over the linear model. First, the log-
transformation alleviates heteroscedasticity and increases the comparability of variables 
across firms. Second, the logarithmic specification produces a more symmetric distribution 
than the linear model. Third, the logarithm facilitates an interpretation of the regression 
coefficients as elasticities (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003). 
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during which future sales were correctly anticipated within one year. Because 
the survey elicited managers’ expectations about demand over the next three 
months and actual demand development over the past three months, 
expectations are considered to be correct if the anticipated demand in t is 
equivalent to the actual demand in t+3.55 The calculation is:  
QþhQO	
   ?@?jj!iLqrsst  =  
with ?jj!iLqrsst  GG¢z4	pGõõypyypn	G¢z  
Because the values of ?jj!iLqrsst are confined to the interval between 
0 and 1 and the log-transformed values range from > to +, the 
application of the logistic measure induces a more normalized distribution 
through a reduction of positive skewness. An overview of possible 
combinations of managerial expectations and actual demand realizations is 
provided in Figure 2. 
  
                                
55 See Table 8 for a description of survey questions. 
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Figure 2: Case Example For Estimating The Variable ÊÞÄÄ½ÊËq¸ááÍ¶
· 
ÊÞÄÄ½ÊËq¸ááÍ¶
·  ¯ 
 
Expected demand 
in (t)  
Actual demand 
in (t+3) 
Case a) Demand Increase  Demand Increase 
Case b) Demand Decrease  Demand Decrease 
Case c) No Change in Demand  No Change in Demand 
 
 ÊÞÄÄ½ÊËq¸ááÍ¶
·  À 
 
Expected demand 
in (t)  
Actual demand 
in (t+3) 
Case a) Demand Increase  Demand Decrease 
Case b) Demand Decrease  Demand Increase 
Case c) No Change in Demand  Demand Decrease 
Case d) No Change in Demand  Demand Increase 
Case e) Demand Increase  No Change in Demand 
Case f) Demand Decrease  No Change in Demand 
 
The information on expected demand and actual demand are obtained from the Danish 
tendency survey which is conducted as part of the Joint Harmonized EU Program of 
Business and Consumer Survey. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/dbindicators/surveys/indexen.htm).  
The survey question refers to managers expectations about demand over the next three 
months and the actual demand development during the past three months. Therefore 
expected demand and t and actual demand in t+3 are compared.  
 
Control variables are additionally incorporated in the slope and intercept of 
model (2’).  
Differences in adjustment costs and size among firms are controlled for by 
including the empirical proxy of employee and asset intensity (Anderson, 
Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Banker and Byzalov 2014) in the regression 
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model.56 Employee intensity is measured as the amount of personnel expenses 
divided by sales bg+%MÈ	
d and asset intensity is measured as the amount 
of total assets divided by sales bQgMÈ	
d.57 Because the degree to which 
managers are able to predict future sales can be influenced by the overall 
level of demand uncertainty, the variable þÈgh	
 is moreover included in 
model (2’). Following Banker et al. (2014), demand uncertainty is estimated 
as the standard deviation of log-changes in sales for each company. 
Acknowledging the objections of Balakrishnan, Labro and Soderstrom (2014) 
and the findings of Balakrishnan et al. (2004), the model moreover controls 
for industry differences .MÈ	1 as well as capacity utilization bQ%Q	
d.58 The 
latter is defined as in Banker et al. (2014), who capture high capacity 
utilization with an indicator variable that is set to one if sales in the previous 
year increased and zero otherwise. Because prior period sales increases are not 
available for all firm-years, parameter estimates are tabulated separately, 
first, without controlling for capacity utilization and then, with controlling for 
capacity utilization. 
Finally, this study investigates if selling price changes play a role in 
interpreting the association between resource adjustment decisions and 
managerial expectations. To do so model (2’) is estimated for firm-year 
                                
56 Although the majority of studies do not separately control for size when including 
employee intensity and asset intensity, a robustness check is conducted by testing if 
parameter estimates differ after including also the log-amount of total assets in model (2’). 
Results show that the magnitude of cost stickiness .1 varies with size for certain 
industries. However, the effect of managerial expectations on the change in SG&A costs 
remains strongly significant with the same sign of parameter estimates. To avoid 
multicollinearity, the log-amount of total assets is therefore not included as a separate 
control variable. Instead, the model controls for size by scaling all variables with total sales 
(including total assets) and using a logarithmic transformation. 
57 Because the total number of employees is not available for all firms, this study uses the 
ratio of personnel expenses to sales to estimate employee intensity (see also Holzhacker, 
Krishnan, and Mahlendorf 2015b). 
58 Industry dummies are coded based on the Danish 19-group standard industrial 
classification (http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/dokumentation/Nomenklaturer/DB). 
Except for some subdivisions, the Danish industry classification is similar to NACE, rev. 2.  
 224 
 
observations where managers indicated that selling prices either increased or 
decreased for at least one month during the year and separately for firm-year 
observations where managers stated stable selling prices.  
3.2 Predicted Effects 
In the case of a negative demand shock, the degree of cost stickiness is 
predicted to be lower for firms that correctly anticipated it. They will cut 
costs earlier to avoid a decrease in profitability. Accordingly, H1 is supported 
if ~ K f with    e     }  ~. Similarly, the magnitude of SG&A 
cost increases is predicted to be lower if a positive demand shock is expected. 
Companies will build up capacity prior to the shock whereas other firms that 
are surprised by high demand are more likely to use overtime work, which 
requires the payment of a premium. This implies that } e f with  K  }. Predicted effects are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of Predicted Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above figure illustrates predicted effects according to H1.  captures the percentage 
increase in SG&A costs per one percent increase in activity. If the increase of SG&A costs 
is less for companies with high accuracy of managerial expectations then +} e . The 
slope of the cost function for activity decreases is estimated trough the sum of  and . 
If costs are sticky on average, then  K   . According to H1, the degree of cost 
stickiness decreases with increasing accuracy of managerial expectations. For negative 
demand changes, this implies that    e     }  ~ with QþhQO	
 K f. 
SG&A 
Costs 
+ 
++}+~ 
+} 
 
	
=1 
Activity 
Increase 
Activity 
Decrease 	
=0 
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3.3 Data and Sample Selection 
The analysis is conducted based on data from 1,677 Danish companies from 
1999 to 2013. Because financial statements do not include information on 
actual managerial expectations and price changes on a monthly basis, this 
study uses micro-data from a business and consumer survey conducted by 
Denmark Statistics in addition to financial statement information.59 The 
survey was launched as part of a harmonized EU-wide study with the 
objective of gaining insights into economic trends, short-term developments 
and potential turning points in the economic cycle (European Commission 
2014). Authorized Danish research institutions are eligible to submit a project 
proposal that allows approved scholars to purchase access rights to firm-
specific data. The interplay between the accuracy of managerial expectations, 
resource adjustment decisions and price changes can thus be studied on a firm 
basis instead of using aggregate information. Following the grouping of the 
original survey, the allocation of observations in the manufacturing, service, 
construction and trade sectors is 48 percent, 41 percent, nine percent and two 
percent, respectively. Because the manufacturing sector is the largest and is 
also the greatest contributor to the GDP in Denmark, it serves as the 
reference group for the following regressions.  
Each analysis is performed on the secure server operated by Denmark 
Statistics. Raw data obtained from Denmark statistics are provided in 
separate files for each month and sector. Because the variable names and 
coding in the different sector files did not coincide, the monthly datasets were 
first cleansed and aggregated by year, followed by an aggregation by sector. 
Finally, financial statement information is anonymized and then merged with 
the survey data using the (modified) company ID as an individual identifier. 
Firm-month observations for which the same company ID occurs in different 
sectors are allocated to the sector in which the firm was listed with the 
                                
59 http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/konjunkturbarometre 
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majority of observations. Due to privacy protection it is not possible or 
allowed to identify individual companies. 
Hypothesis 1 is tested based on two samples. The first sample contains all 
firm-year observations from 1999 to 2013. To ensure that results are not 
driven by very pessimistic managerial expectations during the financial crisis 
(Banker, Fang, and Metha 2013), the second sample (referred to as the 
‘Reduced Sample’) excludes observations from 2007 and 2008. Private and 
public financial statement information on sales, operating income, 
depreciation, total assets and personnel expenses were obtained from the 
Orbis database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk. Because SG&A costs are not 
stated as separate line items, the amount is indirectly calculated by 
subtracting operating income, depreciation and costs of goods sold (for non-
service firms) from operating sales per company. All financial variables are 
deflated to 2000 DKK values.  
The final testing sample is obtained after cleansing the dataset in line with 
the procedure proposed by Anderson et al. (2003). Missing variables for 
SG&A costs, sales and observations with greater SG&A costs than sales are 
deleted and the sample is trimmed at two percent and 98 percent of the 
distribution.60 Moreover, monthly data on managers’ assessment of future 
sales over the next three months and information on actual sales development 
of the last three months are required. On this basis, expectations and actual 
demand are compared for periods during which a demand change occurred. 
This implies that demand either increased or decreased. For instance, a valid 
period would be if demand has been unchanged, then increases for three 
months followed by unchanged demand. This procedure assures that results 
are not driven by differences in demand variance as firms with lower demand 
variance are more likely to have correct expectations in demand. Additionally, 
                                
60 One deviation from Anderson et al. (2003) is the deletion of extreme observations. Due 
to the potential influence of outliers in this smaller dataset, two percent of the tails of the 
distribution are trimmed whereas Anderson et al. (2003) chose a 0.5 percent limit.
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this approach safeguards that the following empirical estimations are not 
influenced by the length of the demand shock, which is suggested by 
Anderson et al. (2003). To further alleviate this concern, a supplementary 
robustness check is conducted in which the degree of cost stickiness for firms 
with a very low accuracy of managerial expectations and for firms with a 
moderate accuracy of managerial expectations is compared among companies 
with the same time frame of the demand shock. Results indicate that 
potential biases due to differences in the length of the demand shock are not a 
concern in the following analyses. 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Univariate descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 
The average company in the sample generates 377 million DKK in sales (48 
million USD) with 84 million DKK in SG&A costs (11 million USD) and 85 
million in DKK in personnel expenses. The mean ratio of SG&A costs and 
personnel expenses to sales is 34 percent. The average number of employees is 
465 with total assets of up to 82 percent of operating sales. Pearson 
correlations are shown in Panel B of Table 1. 
The main explanatory variable in this study refers to the congruence of 
managerial expectations prior to a change in demand and the development of 
actual sales. Descriptive statistics are provided in Panel C of Table 1. Shown 
on the top, 41 percent of sales developments are correctly anticipated. hhgqþ++O	
  = implies that managers’ assessment of the 
development of demand over the next three months is equivalent to the 
actual realization of demand.61 There does not appear to be a clear tendency 
of whether firm executives are more or less optimistic when they make 
accurate predictions on future demand on a monthly (Panel C.2.) or annual 
(Panel C.4.) basis. Approximately half of all companies expect either a 
                                
61 See Figure 2 for a detailed overview of possible cases. 
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negative demand change or a positive demand change.62 Conversely, prices are 
only increased in nine percent and decreased in 16 percent of all firm-month 
observations (Panel C.3.). The latter provides initial support for Cannon’s 
(2014) “Slippery Price” hypothesis which predicts that cost stickiness is 
partially a consequence of asymmetric price adjustments.63  
Panel D of Table 1 presents the average level of capacity utilization 
differentiated by sales decreases (D.1.) and sales increases (D.2.) as well as 
correctness of expectations. The tabulated figures represent a much smaller 
proportion of the underlying dataset because the variable is only surveyed for 
manufacturing companies. Nevertheless, it provides an initial indication of the 
hypothesized effects. The level of capacity utilization is significantly higher 
when managers correctly anticipated future demand decreases whereas the 
difference is insignificant for demand increases. 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics in Million DKK (Million 2000 USD) 
  
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Operating Sales [1] 
376.89 
(47.53) 
1,498.40 
(189.85) 
29.19 
(3.68) 
100.06 
(12.62) 
289.09 
(36.45) 
SG&A costs [2] 
84.12 
(10.61) 
298.12 
(37.59) 
8.23 
(1.04) 
22.60 
(2.85) 
61.17 
(7.71) 
Personnel expenses [3] 
85.11 
(10.73) 
280.83 
(3.54) 
10.45 
(1.31) 
28.02 
(3.53) 
67.60 
(8.52) 
SG&A costs/ 
Operating Sales [4] 0.34 0.25 0.15 0.28 0.47 
Personnel expenses/ 
Operating Sales [5] 0.34 0.23 0.21 0.31 0.45 
Total Assets/ 
Operating Sales [6] 0.82 1.17 0.41 0.61 0.87 
                                
62 Note that reported percentages are not weighted by the frequency of actual demand 
increases and demand decreases in each group. 
63 Specifically, companies’ price elasticity for demand decreases is greater than for demand 
increases because managers decrease prices to utilize existing capacity when demand falls, 
but increase capacity (instead of prices) when demand rises.   
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Table 1 continued: 
      
Number of 
Employees [7] 465 1556 60 171 387 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Pearson Correlation 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
[1] Operating Sales       
[2] SG&A costs 0.67***      
[3] Personnel expenses 0.86*** 0.84***     
[4] SG&A costs/ 
Operating Sales 
-0.12*** 0.10*** -0.03**    
[5] Personnel expenses/ 
Operating Sales 
-0.13*** -0.04*** -0.02** 0.54***   
[6] Total Assets/ 
Operating Sales 
-0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03** 0.05***  
[7] Number of 
Employees 
0.83*** 0.71*** 0.90*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C:  Descriptive Statistics Differentiated by Accuracy of Expectations 
 
 
Panel C.1.:      Correctness of Expectations 
 
(Percent) 
hhgqþ++O	
 f hhgqþ++O	
 = All  firms Rao-Scott Second-Order Chi-Square 
 58.75 41.25 100 *** 
     
Panel C.2.:      Sales Expectations and Correctness 
 
(Percent) 
hhgqþ++O	
 f hhgqþ++O	
 = All  firms Rao-Scott Second-Order Chi-Square 
Expected negative 
demand change 26.96 25.22 26.24 
*** No expected demand change 45.06 47.23 45.95 
Expected positive 
demand change 27.99 27.55 27.81 
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Table 1 continued: 
 
Panel C.3.:      Price Developments and Expectation Accuracy 
 
(Percent) 
hhgqþ++O	
 f hhgqþ++O	
 = All firms Rao-Scott Second-Order Chi-Square 
Price Decrease 16.48 16.18 16.35 
 Price Unchanged 75.06 75.22 75.12 
Price Increase 8.46 8.60 8.52 
 
Panel C.4.:     One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
 +!-.QþhQO	1 F Value «j K  
Demand Decrease 0.077 
0.43 0.51 
Demand Increase 0.079 
 
 
Panel D:  Average Level of Capacity Utilization for Manufacturing 
Companies (monthly) 
Panel D.1.:  Demand Decrease 
 
 
(Percent) 
hhgqþ++O	
 f hhgqþ++O	
 =  F-test for Difference 
Capacity utilization 70.11 72.87  ** 
     
Panel D.2.:  Demand Increase 
 
 
(Percent) 
hhgqþ++O	
 f hhgqþ++O	
 =  F-test for Difference 
Capacity utilization 77.93 78.48   
 ð %j K  of 0.10, ðð %j K  of 0.05, ððð %j K  of 0.01. 
*,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 hhgqþ++O	
 captures the congruence between managerial expectations about 
future demand and actual demand on a monthly basis. Qhhgqþ++O	
  = if the 
manager’s expectation in t is equivalent to the actual change in demand in t+3. The 
difference is three months because the survey asks for the expected change in demand for 
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the next three months and the actual development of demand over the past three months. 
See Figure 2 for an overview of all possible cases. 
 +!-.QþhQO	1 is the mean annual level of .?jj!iL  =1 with ?jj!iL ?äs?-L"*,Li?jj!iL!«!iLL,?-"=. 
 
Number of observations = 1,078. 
 
The level of capacity utilization is retrieved from the survey questionnaire for 
manufacturing companies. See Table 7 in the appendix for the description of the variable. 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Resource Adjustments 
The main regression model is derived from the standard cost stickiness 
specification introduced by Anderson et al. (2003). The first column of Table 
2 shows the respective parameter estimates using model (1). For comparison, 
results of estimating model (2) based on the whole sample and the reduced 
sample are shown in columns two and three.64 Model (2) does not include 
additional control variables. As can be seen, costs are sticky on average.  is 
significantly positive whereas  is significantly negative. Moreover, the F-test 
results shown at the bottom of Table 2 confirm the significant difference in 
the effect of  QþhQO	
 for decreases in demand but not for increases in 
demand. The latter is unsurprising as all companies benefit from high demand 
irrespective of their previous expectations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                
64 The whole sample includes all firm-year observations from 1999 to 2013. The reduced sample excludes 
observations during the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008. 
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Table 2:  Comparison of Estimates between the Anderson et al. (2003) 
model (1) and the Accuracy of Expectations Model (2) 
Model (1):  PåQ	
    	
  
	
, where 	
      	
 
Model (2):  PåQ	
    	
  
  	
    QþhQO	
  	
,  
Where  	
      	
  }  QþhQO	
  ~  	
  QþhQO 
 
  
 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
 
  
 Whole Samplea  
Reduced 
Sampleb 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  Intercept ­ -0.04*** (-4.26) -0.05*** (-4.72) -0.06*** (-5.00) ®¯ ö÷øùúûøü
ý + 0.97*** (52.88) 1.00*** (42.64) 1.01*** (41.15) ®¿ ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý - -0.10*** (-3.68) -0.17*** (-4.00) -0.23*** (-4.52) ®Æ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
· >  -0.34* (-1.63) -0.39** (-1.83) 
®Î ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
·  +  0.81** (2.14) 0.99** (2.15) 
 	
 ­ -0.01 (-0.61) -0.01 (-0.65) -0.01 (-0.7)  QþhQO	
 ­  0.19** (2.15) 0.23** (2.32) 7 ?-Lj? "	
  No No No 
n   5,501 5,501 4,649 
Adj. R2  0.69 0.69 0.66 
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Table 2 continued:    
   Model (2) 
   
Whole  
Samplea 
Reduced  
Sampleb  
. f1 H0:   }  f vs.  Ha:   }  f  .
ªÉ1  ff %j K   fÉf .
ª1  fê %j K   f`ë 
. =1 H0:     }  ~  f vs.    Ha:     }  ~  f  .
=1  `ª %j K   ff= .
fª1  `ªê %j K   ff= 
 
 
a  Whole sample including all firm-year observations between 1999 to 2013. 
b Reduced sample includes all firm-year observations between 1999 to 2013, excluding firm-
year observations from 2007 and 2008. 
 
*,**,*** Indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. The 
numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm and 
year. 
 QþhQO	  .?jj!iL  =1 with ?jj!iL  ?äs?-L"*,Li?jj!iL!«!iLL,?-"=. 
 
See Table 7 in the appendix for a description of all variables. 
 
Table 3 presents parameter estimates based on the full model (2’) that 
additionally controls for differences in adjustment costs, demand uncertainty, 
industry and capacity utilization. As described, SG&A costs decrease less for 
demand decreases than they increase for demand increases ( K   ). 
However, the magnitude of cost stickiness decreases with an increase in the 
number of months during which a change in demand was correctly 
anticipated. ~ is significantly positive, and } is significantly negative. The 
results are similar using the restricted sample that excludes 2007 and 2008 
observations.  
For ease of interpretation, the average change in SG&A costs during 
unexpected shocks in demand .QþhQO	
  f1 and expected shocks in 
demand at the mean level of QþhQO	
 is depicted on the bottom of Table 
3. These results support H1 and show that managers will adapt resources 
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differently in response to foreseen demand shocks compared to unforeseen 
demand shocks. Specifically, at the average level of accuracy of managerial 
expectations the change in SG&A costs is 0.69 percent for one percent of 
anticipated sales decrease whereas it is only 0.63 percent if the shock is 
unexpected (column one). In accordance with results reported by 
Balakrishnan et al. (2004), parameter estimates furthermore show that cost 
stickiness is more pronounced for companies with high capacity utilization. 
The difference in the change of SG&A costs is 0.33 percent and 0.42 percent, 
respectively (column two).  
Overall, these results may help to reconcile non-conforming findings in the 
literature regarding the association between demand uncertainty and cost 
elasticity. For instance, Banker et al. (2014) show that costs are stickier when 
demand uncertainty is high whereas Holzhacker et al. (2015) conclude that 
firms will alter their procurement choices to decrease cost stickiness in 
response to high uncertainty. Because the latter study is based on a sample of 
German hospitals, Holzhacker et al. (2015) argue that the difference in results 
might stem from diverging management incentives and ownership structure 
compared with public firms, as in Banker et al.’s setting. Nevertheless, this 
study shows that cost behavior is particularly determined by the accuracy of 
managers’ expectations about future demand. These results hold with and 
without controlling for the level of aggregate demand uncertainty. Thus, the 
difference in previous findings can likewise be explained by managers’ 
capacity adjustment decisions depending on whether they were surprised by a 
change in demand or correctly anticipated it.  
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Table 3:  Estimation of the Accuracy of Expectations Model (2’) for SG&A 
Costs 
Model (2’): 
 
 PåQ	
    	
  
    	
    QþhQO	
 7  ?-Lj? "	
	
 
where:  	
      	
  }  QþhQO	
  ~  	
  QþhQO  7  ?-Lj? "	
  
 
  Model (2’) 
   Whole Samplea  Reduced Sampleb 
   
Not 
controlling 
for capacity 
utilization 
Controlling 
for  
capacity 
utilization 
Not 
controlling 
for capacity 
utilization 
Controlling 
for  
capacity 
utilization 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
 Intercept ­ -0.06** (-2.1) -0.08*** (-2.61) -0.08*** (-2.57) -0.11*** (-3.14) ®¯ ö÷øùúûøü
ý + 1.21*** (16.49) 1.28*** (15.41) 1.23*** (16.14) 1.30*** (15.06) ®¿ ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý - -0.38*** (3.12) -0.58*** (-3.91) -0.40*** (-2.84) -0.78*** (-4.33) ®Æ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
· > -0.49** (-2.23) -0.54** (-2.29) -0.56*** (-2.44) -0.63*** (-2.56) ®Î ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
· + 1.07*** (2.69) 1.20*** (2.86) 1.34*** (2.81) 1.54*** (3.04)  	
 ­ 0.00 (-0.21) -0.01 (-0.37) 0.00 (0.09) -0.01 (-0.57)  QþhQO	
 ­ 0.25*** (2.65) 0.27*** (2.59) 0.29*** (2.77) 0.33*** (2.76) 7 
  g+%MÈ	
  0.07** (1.81) 0.09** (2.06) 0.08** (1.82) 0.09** (2.09) 7 	
  
  g+%MÈ	
  -0.10* (-1.57) -0.12** (-1.76) -0.12* (-1.64) -0.14** (-1.87) 7} g+%MÈ	
  0.01 (0.57) 0.00 (-0.27) 0.00 (0.3) -0.01 (-0.56) 7~ 
  QgMÈ	
  0.00 (0.35) 0.01 (0.52) 0.00 (0.32) 0.01 (0.55) 7 	
  
  QgMÈ	
  -0.01 (-0.42) 0.00 (-0.07) -0.03 (-1.19) -0.02 (-0.97) 7 QgMÈ	
  0.00 (0.4) 0.00 (-0.2) 0.00 (0.1) -0.01 (-0.5) 7 
  þÈgh	
  -0.20*** (-2.62) -0.19** (-2.11) -0.21*** (-2.73) -0.19** (-2.11) 
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Table 3 continued:      
  Model (2’) 
  Whole Samplea 
 
Reduced Sampleb 
Controls  
Not 
controlling 
for capacity 
utilization 
Controlling 
for  
capacity 
utilization 
Not 
controlling  
for capacity 
utilization 
Controlling 
for  
capacity 
utilization 
7 	
  
  þÈgh	
  0.20* (1.63) 0.18 (1.17) 0.21* (1.42) 0.17 (0.92) 7 þÈgh	
  0.03 (1.2) 0.03 (0.64) 0.05* (1.42) 0.04 (0.82) 7 
  Q%Q	
   -0.06* (-1.5)  -0.07** (-1.73) 7 	
  
  Q%Q	
   0.21*** (2.36)  0.42*** (3.53) 7 Q%Q	
   0.01 (0.66)  0.02 (1.03) 7 Industry slope and main effect  yes yes yes yes 
n   5,158 4,414 4,339 3,655 
Adj. R2  0.69 0.71 0.67 0.68 
Á´²´ ³Ç ±ÂåÁ¶
· ²·ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
·  Àå»´²Ç³´´³Å¹ÅÇ·Å³²¶²³´µ
demand increase   
0.93*** 
(24.57) 
0.92*** 
(19.35) 
0.94*** 
(24.41) 
0.92*** 
(19.27) 
demand decrease  
0.63*** 
(7.36) 
0.49*** 
(6.37) 
0.61*** 
(6.57) 
0.48*** 
(5.41) 
 difference: 
0.30*** 
(2.98) 
0.42*** 
(4.44) 
0.33*** 
(3.02) 
0.45*** 
(4.28) Á´²´ ³Ç ±ÂåÁ¶
· ²·»´²ÇbÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
·då»´²Ç³´´³Å¹ÅÇ·Å³²¶²³´µ  
demand increase  
0.91*** 
(25.79) 
0.90*** 
(19.97) 
0.92*** 
(25.67) 
0.90*** 
(19.88) 
demand decrease  
0.69*** 
(8.74) 
0.57*** 
(8.01) 
0.69*** 
(8.13) 
0.57*** 
(7.18) 
 difference: 
0.22** 
(2.34) 
0.33*** 
(3.83) 
0.22** 
(2.26) 
0.33*** 
(3.51) 
     
 
a Whole sample including all firm-year observations between 1999 to 2013. 
b Reduced sample includes all firm-year observations between 1999 to 2013, excluding firm-
year observations from 2007 and 2008. 
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*,**,*** Indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. The 
numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm and 
year. 
 
The following control variables b?-Lj? "	
d are included as both fixed effects as well as 
interaction effects: employee intensitybg+%MÈ	
d, asset intensitybQgMÈ	
d, empirical 
proxy for demand uncertaintybþÈgh	
d, industry classification.MÈ	1 and the empirical 
proxy for capacity utilization bQ%Q	
d.  
 QþhQO	  .?jj!iL  =1  
with?jj!iL  ?äs?-L"*,Li?jj!iL!«!iLL,?-"=. 
 
See Table 7 in the appendix for a description of all variables. 
 
4.2 Price Adjustments 
Results reported in Table 4 are distinguished between firm-year observations 
with no price changes (Panel A) and firm-year observations with at least one 
month during which prices were adapted (Panel B). 
The differences between parameter estimates generated based on the standard 
cost stickiness model (1) and the extended model (2’) are striking. Whereas 
the insignificant estimate for  in Panel A suggests that cost stickiness is 
merely a consequence of asymmetric price adjustments (column one), 
inferences are reversed when acknowledging the accuracy of managerial 
expectations (column two and three). The following interpretation therefore 
focuses on the regression results of model (2’).   
The significant negative parameter estimate  in column two and three of 
Panel A indicates that unforeseen negative changes in demand lead to an 
increase in idle capacity as SG&A resources are decreased less than the actual 
drop in demand. Conversely, results in Panel B show that  is insignificant 
when prices are decreased. Hence, managers who did not expect a fall in 
demand respond with a delayed or no adjustment of resources and do not 
adapt prices. However, the reverse does not hold for expected shocks in 
demand. If a drop in demand is foreseen, managers react by cutting resources 
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as well as prices. ~ is significantly positive in Panel B and marginally 
significant in Panel A. Overall, this implies that cost stickiness through 
asymmetric resource adjustments arises because a negative demand shock is 
unexpected whereas cost stickiness through asymmetric price adjustments is 
driven by early price decreases when a negative demand shock is anticipated. 
In addition to merely price decreases, forward-looking executives also cut 
resources when demand is expected to fall. This leads to a decrease in SG&A 
cost stickiness, whereas the effect is even stronger for firms with high capacity 
utilization. 
 
Table 4:  The Interplay between Selling Price Changes, Resource 
Adjustments and the Accuracy of Expectations 
 
Model (1):  PåQ	
    	
  
	
, where 	
      	
 
Model (2’): 
 
 PåQ	
    	
  
    	
    QþhQO	
 7  ?-Lj? "	
	
 
where:  	
      	
  }  QþhQO	
  ~  	
  QþhQO 7  ?-Lj? "	
 
 
Panel A:   No Price Changes     
   Model (1)  Model (2’) 
    
Not  
controlling for  
capacity 
utilization 
Controlling  
for  
capacity 
utilization 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  Intercept ­ -0.05** (-2.42) -0.19*** (-2.91) -0.20*** (-2.78) ®¯ ö÷øùúûøü
ý + 0.89*** (15.52) 1.70*** (8.77) 1.84*** (9.40) ®¿ ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý - -0.05 (-0.65) -1.09*** (-3.25) -1.42*** (-4.17) ®Æ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
· >  -0.93 (-1.14) -1.39* (-1.71) ®Î ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
· +  1.48 (1.15) 2.31* (1.77) 
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Table 4 continued:     
Controls  Model (1)  Model (2’) 
    
Not 
controlling for  
capacity 
utilization 
Controlling 
for  
capacity 
utilization 
 	
 ­ 
 
0.02 
(0.56) 
0.03 
(0.81) 
0.01 
(0.28)  QþhQO	
 ­  0.30 (1.26) 0.47* (1.88) 7 
  g+%MÈ	
   0.40*** (2.82) 0.44*** (2.99) 7 	
  
  g+%MÈ	
   -0.60*** (-2.65) -0.63*** (-2.71) 7} g+%MÈ	
   -0.06 (-1.57) -0.06 (-1.41) 7~ 
  QgMÈ	
   0.00 (-0.24) 0.00 (0.01) 7 	
  
  QgMÈ	
   0.05 (1.51) 0.03 (1.00) 7 QgMÈ	
   0.04* (1.73) 0.03 (1.17) 7 
  þÈgh	
   -0.22 (-0.94) -0.23 (-0.96) 7 	
  
  þÈgh	
   0.14 (0.39) 0.25 (0.76) 7 þÈgh	
   0.07 (1.2) 0.06 (0.98) 7 
  Q%Q	
    -0.10 (-0.94) 7 	
  
  Q%Q	
    0.24 (1.25) 7 Q%Q	
    -0.01 (-0.15) 7 Industry slope and main effect Yes Yes Yes 
n   1,172 1,059 935 
Adj. R2  0.57 0.61 0,62 
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Table 4 continued: 
 
Panel B:   Price Changes 
 
   
   Model (1)  Model (2’) 
    
Not 
controlling for  
capacity 
utilization 
Controlling 
for  
capacity 
utilization 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  Intercept ­ -0.02* (-1.68) -0.02 (-0.51) -0.02 (-0.44) ®¯ ö÷øùúûøü
ý + 0.98*** (35.72) 1.13*** (10.20) 1.02*** (8.79) ®¿ ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý - -0.11** (-2.52) -0.32 (-1.52) -0.23 (-1.00) ®Æ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
· >  -0.66** (-2.22) -0.75** (-2.37) ®Î ¸¶
·  ö÷øùúûøü
ý  ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
· +  1.47*** (2.58) 1.71*** (2.86)  	
 ­ -0.01 (-0.64) -0.01 (-0.29) -0.02 (-0.69)  QþhQO	
 ­  0.28** (1.98) 0.29* (1.94) 
Controls      7 
  g+%MÈ	
   0.02 (0.24) -0.01 (-0.12) 7 	
  
  g+%MÈ 	
   -0.04 (-0.35) 0.02 (0.16) 7} g+%MÈ	
   0.03 (1.43) 0.03 (1.34) 7~ 
  QgMÈ	
   0.02 (0.95) 0.04 (1.37) 7 	
  
  QgMÈ	
   -0.06 (-1.17) -0.05 (-0.96) 7 QgMÈ	
   -0.01 (-0.76) -0.02 (-1) 7 
  þÈgh	
   -0.19 (-1.61) -0.07 (-0.51) 7 	
  
  þÈgh	
   0.28 (1.19) 0.02 (0.09) 7 þÈgh	
   0.03 (0.55) 0.01 (0.14) 7 
  Q%Q	
    0.04 (0.72) 
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Table 4 continued:     7 	
  
  Q%Q	
    0.06 (0.51) 7 Q%Q	
    0.01 (0.37) 7 Industry slope and main effect  Yes Yes Yes 
n   2,505 2,339 2,049 
Adj. R2  0.66 0.67 0,68 
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. The 
numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm and 
year. 
 
The following control variables b?-Lj? "	
d are included as both fixed effects as well as 
interaction effects: employee intensitybg+%MÈ	
d, asset intensitybQgMÈ	
d, empirical 
proxy for demand uncertaintybþÈgh	
d, industry classification.MÈ	1 and the empirical 
proxy for capacity utilization bQ%Q	
d. 
 QþhQO	  .?jj!iL  =1  
with ?jj!iL  ?äs?-L"*,Li?jj!iL!«!iLL,?-"=. 
 
See Table 7 in the appendix for a description of all variables. 
5 Additional Analysis and Robustness Checks 
5.1 The Interplay between Cost Elasticity, Demand Uncertainty and 
Accuracy of Expectations 
According to findings documented by Banker et al. (2014), cost elasticity is 
lower for companies with high demand uncertainty. Demand uncertainty is 
measured as the standard deviation of the log-change in sales across all years 
for each firm. The authors argue that a decrease in cost elasticity reflects 
investments in fixed capacity to avoid congestion when demand is high. The 
association between demand uncertainty and cost behavior is modeled as 
follows (Banker, Byzalov, and Plehn-Dujowich 2014): 
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 PåQ	
    	
  
7  ?-Lj? "	
  	
 (3)
 
where  	
      þÈgh	
7  ?-Lj? "	
  
 
Previous analyses have shown that the degree of managers’ forecast accuracy 
significantly moderates the magnitude of cost stickiness. Because higher cost 
stickiness reflects lower cost elasticity for negative demand changes, cost 
elasticity should also be higher for expected demand decreases and lower for 
unexpected demand decreases. This implies that the effect of demand 
uncertainty on cost elasticity is additionally moderated by the degree to 
which managers correctly anticipate a fall in demand.65 To test this 
prediction, model (3) is modified in the following way: 
  PåQ	
    	
  
 ~  QþhQO	
7  ?-Lj? "	
  	
 (4)
where  	
      þÈgh	
}  þÈgh	
  QþhQO	
7 ?-Lj? "	
  
Table 5 presents the estimation results using model (3) differentiated by the 
direction of change in demand. Consistent with Banker et al. (2014), higher 
demand uncertainty leads to a more rigid cost structure.  is negative and 
significant for all observations and for demand increases. However, there is no 
significant relationship for demand decreases. 
 
 
 
  
                                
65 In line with Banker et al. (2014), manufacturing companies are the reference group for 
all empirical tests. 
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Table 5:  The Effect of Demand Uncertainty on Cost Elasticity; modeled 
According to Banker et al. (2014) 
 
Model (3):  PåQ	
    	
  
7  ?-Lj? "	
  	
,  
where   	
      þÈgh	
7  ?-Lj? "	
 
   Model (3) 
   
All 
Observations  
Demand 
Increase 
Demand 
Decrease 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  Intercept ­ 0.00*** (-3.69) 0.00 (-0.08) 0.00*** (-3.46) ®¯ ö÷øùúûøü
ý + 0.89*** (36.46) 0.69*** (19.09) 0.65*** (16.86) ®¿ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ê½ÄË¶
· - -0.07*** (-3.17) -0.08*** (-2.97) -0.03 (-1.17) 
 
 
Controls      7 
  P%	
  -0.07*** (8.24) -0.07*** (-2.38) 0.02 (0.72) 7} P%	
  -0.02*** (-2.47) -0.10*** (-3.55) 0.09*** (2.68) 7 Industry slope and main effect  Yes Yes Yes 
n   5,214 2,723 2,491 
Adj. R2   0.70 0.49 0,41 
      
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. The 
numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm.  
The following control variables b?-Lj? "	
d are included as both fixed effects as well as 
interaction effects: GDP growth.P%	
1 and industry classification.MÈ	1 
 þÈgh	
  ÓÛb
d 
 
See Table 7 in the appendix for a description of all variables. 
 
Table 6 presents the estimation results using model (4) differentiated by the 
direction of change in demand. As can be seen, the degree to which managers 
correctly anticipate a negative demand shock moderates the relationship 
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between demand uncertainty and cost behavior. The association is negative if 
managers do not expect a fall in demand and positive if a fall in demand is 
foreseen. Moreover, the F-test results in Table 6 support the hypothesis that }  ~  f. 
Overall, this implies that the causal relationship between demand uncertainty 
and cost behavior depends on the accuracy of managers’ expectations during a 
fall in demand. Thus, if a sample is dominated by demand decreases, then the 
association can be positive if managers have a high predictability of demand 
changes. However, if a sample is dominated by demand increases, the effect of 
managerial forecast accuracy diminishes. 
 
Table 6:  The Effect of Demand Uncertainty on Cost Elasticity Moderated 
by Accuracy of Expectations 
 
Model (4):  PåQ	
    	
  
 ~  QþhQO	
7  ?-Lj? "	
  	
 
where: 	
      þÈgh	
}  þÈgh	
  QþhQO	
7  ?-Lj? "	
 
   Model (4) 
   
All  
Observations  
Demand 
Increase 
Demand 
Decrease 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  Intercept ­ 0.00*** (-3.9) 0.00 (-0.48) 0.00*** (-3.91) ®¯ ö÷øùúûøü
ý + 0.89*** (36.45) 0.69*** (19.23) 0.65*** (17.00) ®¿ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ê½ÄË¶
· - -0.07*** (-3.11) -0.07*** (-2.53) -0.06** (-2.09) ®Æ ö÷øùúûøü
ý  Ê½ÄË¶
·  ÁÊÊÄÁÊÍ¶
·  0.00 (0.26) -0.02 (-0.85) 0.06** (2.23) ~ QþhQO	
 + 0.01 (1.21) 0.02 (0.86) 0.05** (2.13) 
 
      
 245 
 
Table 6 continued:  Model (4) 
   
All 
Observations  
Demand 
Increase 
Demand 
Decrease 
7 
  P%	
  -0.07*** (-8.26) -0.07*** (-2.38) 0.02 (0.72) 7} P%	
  -0.02*** (-2.47) -0.10*** (-3.56) 0.09*** (2.65) 7 Industry slope and main effect  Yes Yes Yes 
n   5,214 2,723 2,491 
Adj. R2  0.70 0.49 0,41 
H0: }  ~  f vs. Ha: }  ~  f  .
=ê`1 fêÉ .
Üë1 f`ê .
Éf1 Ü 
   
%j K  fÉ 
 %j K  f` %j K  ffÉ 
 
*,**,*** Indicate two-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. The 
numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
The following control variables b?-Lj? "	
d are included as both fixed effects as well as 
interaction effects: GDP growth .P%	
1 and industry classification.MÈ	1 
 þÈgh	
  ÓÛb
d QþhQO	  .?jj!iL  =1 with ?jj!iL  ?äs?-L"*,Li?jj!iL!«!iLL,?-"=. 
 
See Table 7 in the appendix for a description of all variables. 
 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
5.2.1 Managerial Incentives to Meet or Beat the Zero-Earnings Benchmark 
Companies have an incentive to report healthy earnings to avoid negative 
consequences. These could be related to a greater intervention by banks due 
to the violation of debt contracts, prevention of dividend payments and cash 
bonuses, or the issuance of going-concern opinions. Thus, executives are 
inclined to manage costs to meet or beat the zero-earnings benchmark. To 
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realize necessary cost reductions, firms reporting small profits are more likely 
to dismiss blue-collar workers when demand decreases and increase hours 
(instead of employees) when demand increases (Dierynck, Landsman, and 
Renders 2012). On average, this leads to a reduction in the level of cost 
stickiness.66  
To verify that previous estimates are not driven by managerial incentives to 
meet or beat the zero-earnings benchmark, results are subjected to two 
robustness tests. First, regression estimates are obtained based on a reduced 
sample by excluding firm-year observations with small profits. Second, model 
(2’) is estimated with an additional control variable capturing the effect of 
small profit firms. This approach follows Dierynck, Landsman and Renders 
(2012), who select small profit firms using a dummy variable that is set to 
one if the net income scaled by total assets is greater than or equal to zero 
but less than one percent. Overall, untabulated results of both tests show that 
previous findings remain unchanged.   
5.2.2 Ownership Structure 
Apart from high accuracy of managerial expectations, a lower level of cost 
stickiness can also result from differences in the ownership structure across 
companies in the sample. Capital market pressure and managerial 
compensation tied to stock performance have been identified as sources of 
short-termism that induces managers of public companies to avoid reporting 
losses or meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (Bhojraj and Libby 2005; Degeorge, 
Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; Roychowdhury 2006). In contrast, the large 
proportion of family ownership in private firms can lead to an alignment 
effect that incentivizes long-term strategies over short-term benefits to 
preserve family reputation (Bennedsen et al. 2007; Chen, Chen, and Cheng 
                                
66 Other studies test the impact of managerial incentives on cost behavior by investigating 
the effect of meeting earnings targets or managerial empire building (Chen, Lu, and 
Sougiannis 2012; Kama and Weiss 2013). 
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2008). In another robustness check, model (2’) is therefore extended by the 
moderation of a dummy variable that is equal to one if the company is public 
and zero otherwise. Untabulated results show that the association between 
correct anticipations of demand changes and a lower level of firm-specific cost 
stickiness is stronger for public firms but also significant and positive for 
private firms.  
5.2.3 Regression Specifications and Additional Cost Categories 
To test the robustness of standard errors against structural changes over 
time, model (2’) is estimated using Fama-MacBeth regressions (Fama and 
MacBeth 1973). Corresponding parameter estimates represent the average of 
each slope coefficient based on separate cross-sectional regressions for each 
year. Overall, Fama-MacBeth regressions yield similar results as previous 
analyses. The parameter estimates capturing the effect of accuracy of 
managerial expectations on SG&A cost behavior continue to stay significantly 
negative for increases in sales and significantly positive for decreases in sales.   
In addition to SG&A costs, model (2’) is performed using the change in total 
operating costs and the change in total personnel expenses as dependent 
variables. The behavior of cost of goods sold is not examined because changes 
in inventories prevent stickiness of cost of goods sold. Thus, it is not expected 
that accuracy of managerial expectations have a significant effect on this cost 
category. Overall, untabulated results support the hypothesis that the 
accuracy of managerial expectations determines not only SG&A cost 
behavior, but also the change in total operating costs as well as the change in 
personnel expenses. 
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6 Conclusion 
This study uses a merged dataset from a Danish business survey and financial 
statement information to investigate the interplay between the accuracy of 
managers’ demand expectations and SG&A cost behavior. Other researchers 
have shown that cost behavior is driven by deliberate resource adjustment 
decisions to avoid adjustment costs associated with adapting resource levels. 
The level of capacity utilization is considered to be the outcome of these 
decisions (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Anderson et al. 2007; 
Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom 2004; Kama and Weiss 2013).  
Consistent with this line of reasoning, it is hypothesized that the accuracy of 
managerial expectations is an important predictor of cost behavior. Because 
fluctuations in demand do not only occur on an annual basis, accuracy is 
measured as the log-transformation of the number of months during which 
managers correctly anticipate future demand. Results show that if demand is 
expected to fall, managers cut capacity to avoid losses when the shock occurs. 
This leads to a significant decrease in SG&A cost stickiness compared to 
firms that did not correctly anticipate a change in demand.  
Thereupon, the study tests the interplay between managerial expectations, 
resource adjustments and selling price changes. Findings suggest that cost 
stickiness caused by asymmetric resource adjustments arises because 
managers did not expect a fall in demand. Firms retain idle capacity and do 
not decrease selling prices. Conversely, cost stickiness caused by asymmetric 
price adjustments arises because managers lower selling prices if they 
anticipate a negative demand shock. The magnitude of cost stickiness is less if 
forward-looking managers also cut resources in addition to decreasing selling 
prices.  
Finally, additional analyses are conducted to test if the accuracy of 
managerial expectations moderates the association between demand 
uncertainty and cost behavior. Building on the empirical model introduced by 
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Banker et al. (2014), the sign of the parameter estimates reveals that the 
relationship is negative for unexpected demand decreases but positive for 
expected demand decreases. However, the effect is insignificant for demand 
increases. These results may help to explain contrary findings in the literature 
claiming that cost variability is either positively or negatively related to 
demand uncertainty.   
All analyses in this study were conducted using data from Danish companies. 
Consequently, empirical estimates are not influenced by national differences 
in labor laws and market conditions but also limit the generalizability of 
findings. Additionally, it should be noted that even though the treatment of 
selling prices as an endogenous variable is a clear contribution of this study, 
the categorical nature of the survey results does not allow for measurement of 
the magnitude of price changes in response to expected or unexpected 
demand changes. Furthermore, the argument underlying the main hypothesis 
implies that adjustment costs occur within the time frame of the empirical 
tests. However, it is possible that some adjustment costs (e.g., negative effects 
on company reputation or working atmosphere) arise with a time lag and are 
consequently not captured by the empirical tests. To overcome these 
limitations suggest itself as a valuable approach for future research. Moreover, 
this study shows how managerial expectations impact cost as well as price 
adjustment decisions but does not provide insights into how managers derive 
expectations about future demand. The investigation of these factors, such as 
personal characteristics, analyses and decision-making processes, is left to 
future research. 
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Table 7:  Variable Description 
Variable Name Description Calculation 
?jj!iL Percentage of months during 
which future demand is 
correctly anticipated in one 
year. 
?äs?-L"*,L?jj!iL!«!iLL,?-"=  
hhgqþ++O	
 Congruence of managerial 
expectations and actual 
demand development.  =,ä!«!iLL,?-",-L iLr !s-,-L  `f,ä!«!iLL,?-",-L iLr !s-,-L  `  QþhQO	 Logarithmic transformation of ?jj!iL. Captures the 
accuracy of managers’ 
expectations per year. 
.?jj!iL  =1 
QgMÈ	
 Log-Ratio of total assets to 
operating sales  ?@ ?L Q""!L"	
 !"	
  
Q%Q	
 Empirical proxy for capacity 
utilization. Capacity 
utilization is high if prior 
period sales increased. 
ã=,ä !"	
J K  !"	
Jf,ä !"	
J ¬  !"	
J 
	
 Dummy variable for sales 
decreases between t-1 and t. ã=,  !"	
 e  !"	
Jf,ä !"	
 c  !"	
J 
g+%MÈ	
 Log-ratio of personnel 
expenses to operating sales.  ?@  gs«i?	
«!jL,-@" !"	
 
P%	
 Real GDP growth in 
Denmark 
 
þÈgh	
 Standard deviation of the log-
change in sales between t and 
t-1 
 k ?@   !"	
 !"	
Jl 

 Log-change in sales between t 
and t-1.  ?@   !"	
 "	
J 
ñå
 Log-change in SG&A costs 
between t and t-1.  ?@  PåQ	
PåQ	
J 
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Table 8: Excerpt from the Questionnaire of the Joint Harmonized EU 
Program of Business and Consumer Surveys 
  
Expression 
 
Question Answer possibilities 
Expectations How do you expect demand 
(sales) to change over the 
next three months? 
 Increase 
 Remained Unchanged 
 Deteriorate 
Actual Demand How did demand (sales) 
change over the past three 
months? 
 Increased 
 Remained Unchanged 
 Deteriorated 
Prices How did the prices you 
charged change over the 
past three months? 
 Increased 
 Remained Unchanged 
 Deteriorated 
Capacity Utilization67  At what capacity is your 
company currently operating 
(as a percentage of full 
capacity)? 
Percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                
67 Question is included in the survey for manufacturing companies only. 
 259 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 260 
 
  
TITLER I PH.D.SERIEN:
2004
1. Martin Grieger
 Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces
 and Supply Chain Management
2. Thomas Basbøll
 LIKENESS
 A Philosophical Investigation
3. Morten Knudsen
 Beslutningens vaklen
 En systemteoretisk analyse of mo-
derniseringen af et amtskommunalt 
sundhedsvæsen 1980-2000
4. Lars Bo Jeppesen
 Organizing Consumer Innovation
 A product development strategy that 
is based on online communities and 
allows some ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a 
distributed process of innovation by 
consumers
5. Barbara Dragsted
 SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION 
AND TRANSLATION MEMORY 
 SYSTEMS
 An empirical investigation of cognitive
 segmentation and effects of integra-
ting a TM system into the translation 
process
6. Jeanet Hardis
 Sociale partnerskaber
 Et socialkonstruktivistisk casestudie 
 af partnerskabsaktørers virkeligheds-
opfattelse mellem identitet og 
 legitimitet
7. Henriette Hallberg Thygesen
 System Dynamics in Action
8. Carsten Mejer Plath
 Strategisk Økonomistyring
9. Annemette Kjærgaard
 Knowledge Management as Internal 
 Corporate Venturing
 – a Field Study of the Rise and Fall of a
  Bottom-Up Process
10. Knut Arne Hovdal
 De profesjonelle i endring
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
11. Søren Jeppesen
 Environmental Practices and Greening 
 Strategies in Small Manufacturing 
 Enterprises in South Africa
 – A Critical Realist Approach
12. Lars Frode Frederiksen
 Industriel forskningsledelse
 – på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde 
i danske forskningsintensive virksom-
heder
13. Martin Jes Iversen
 The Governance of GN Great Nordic
 – in an age of strategic and structural
  transitions 1939-1988
14. Lars Pynt Andersen
 The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV 
 Advertising 
 A study of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years with 
 special emphasis on genre and irony
15. Jakob Rasmussen
 Business Perspectives on E-learning
16. Sof Thrane
 The Social and Economic Dynamics 
 of Networks 
 – a Weberian Analysis of Three 
 Formalised Horizontal Networks
17. Lene Nielsen
 Engaging Personas and Narrative 
 Scenarios – a study on how a user-
 centered approach inﬂuenced the 
 perception of the design process in 
the e-business group at AstraZeneca
18. S.J Valstad
 Organisationsidentitet
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen
 Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk 
in Energy Markets
20.  Sabine Madsen
 Emerging Methods – An Interpretive
  Study of ISD Methods in Practice
21. Evis Sinani
 The Impact of Foreign Direct Inve-
stment on Efﬁciency, Productivity 
Growth and Trade: An Empirical Inve-
stigation
22. Bent Meier Sørensen
 Making Events Work Or, 
 How to Multiply Your Crisis
23. Pernille Schnoor
 Brand Ethos
 Om troværdige brand- og 
 virksomhedsidentiteter i et retorisk og 
diskursteoretisk perspektiv 
24. Sidsel Fabech
 Von welchem Österreich ist hier die 
Rede?
 Diskursive forhandlinger og magt-
kampe mellem rivaliserende nationale 
identitetskonstruktioner i østrigske 
pressediskurser 
25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen
 Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i
  ﬂersprogede forbundsstater
 Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og 
 Canada
26. Dana B. Minbaeva
 Human Resource Practices and 
 Knowledge Transfer in Multinational 
 Corporations
27. Holger Højlund
 Markedets politiske fornuft
 Et studie af velfærdens organisering i 
 perioden 1990-2003
28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen
 A.s erfaring
 Om mellemværendets praktik i en 
transformation af mennesket og 
 subjektiviteten
29. Sine Nørholm Just
 The Constitution of Meaning
 – A Meaningful Constitution? 
 Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion 
in the debate on the future of Europe
2005
1. Claus J. Varnes
 Managing product innovation through 
 rules – The role of formal and structu-
red methods in product development
2. Helle Hedegaard Hein
 Mellem konﬂikt og konsensus
 – Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker
3. Axel Rosenø
 Customer Value Driven Product Inno-
vation – A Study of Market Learning in 
New Product Development
4. Søren Buhl Pedersen
 Making space
 An outline of place branding
5. Camilla Funck Ellehave
 Differences that Matter
 An analysis of practices of gender and 
 organizing in contemporary work-
places
6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond
 Styring af kommunale forvaltninger
7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen
 Supply Chain versus Supply Chain
 Benchmarking as a Means to 
 Managing Supply Chains
8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan
 From an idea to a standard
 The UN and the global governance of 
 accountants’ competence
9. Norsk ph.d. 
10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni
 An Experimental Field Study on the 
 Effectiveness of Grocer Media 
 Advertising 
 Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition, 
 Purchase Intentions and Short-Term 
Sales
11. Allan Mortensen
 Essays on the Pricing of Corporate 
Bonds and Credit Derivatives
12. Remo Stefano Chiari
 Figure che fanno conoscere
 Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo 
e espressivo della metafora e di altri 
tropi da Aristotele e da Vico ﬁno al 
cognitivismo contemporaneo
13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
 Strategic Planning and Corporate 
 Performance
 An integrative research review and a 
 meta-analysis of the strategic planning 
 and corporate performance literature 
 from 1956 to 2003
14. Jens Geersbro
 The TDF – PMI Case
 Making Sense of the Dynamics of 
 Business Relationships and Networks
15 Mette Andersen
 Corporate Social Responsibility in 
 Global Supply Chains
 Understanding the uniqueness of ﬁrm 
 behaviour
16.  Eva Boxenbaum
 Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic
 Foundations of Institutional Change
17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
 Capacity Development, Environmental 
 Justice NGOs, and Governance: The 
Case of South Africa
18. Signe Jarlov
 Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse
19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
 Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening 
 Comprehension in English as a Foreign 
 Language
 An empirical study employing data 
 elicited from Danish EFL learners
20. Christian Nielsen
 Essays on Business Reporting
 Production and consumption of  
strategic information in the market for 
information
21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
 Egos and Ethics of Management 
 Consultants
22. Annie Bekke Kjær
 Performance management i Proces-
 innovation 
 – belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk
 perspektiv
23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
 GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
 Om organisering af den kreative gøren 
i den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis
24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
 Revenue Management
 Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige & 
 organisatoriske konsekvenser
25. Thomas Riise Johansen
 Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
 The Danish Case of Accounting and 
 Accountability to Employees
26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
 The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’ 
 Adoption Decisions
27. Birgitte Rasmussen
 Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes 
 fornyende rolle
28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
 Remerger
 – skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og 
 opkøb
29. Carmine Gioia
 A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF 
 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
 Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot, 
 pædagog eller politiker?
 Et studie i arbejdslederes meningstil-
skrivninger i forbindelse med vellykket 
gennemførelse af ledelsesinitierede 
forandringsprojekter
31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
 Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynami-
ske 
 læringsnettverk i toppidretten
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
 Linking Healthcare
 An inquiry into the changing perfor-
 mances of web-based technology for 
 asthma monitoring
33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
 Virtuel Uddannelsespraksis
 Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie 
i hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering 
kan forbedre praksis i virtuelle lærings-
miljøer
34. Anika Liversage
 Finding a Path
 Labour Market Life Stories of 
 Immigrant Professionals
35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
 Studier i samspillet mellem stat og   
 erhvervsliv i Danmark under 
 1. verdenskrig
36. Finn Janning
 A DIFFERENT STORY
 Seduction, Conquest and Discovery
37. Patricia Ann Plackett
 Strategic Management of the Radical 
 Innovation Process
 Leveraging Social Capital for Market 
 Uncertainty Management
2006
1. Christian Vintergaard
 Early Phases of Corporate Venturing
2. Niels Rom-Poulsen
 Essays in Computational Finance
3. Tina Brandt Husman
 Organisational Capabilities, 
 Competitive Advantage & Project-
Based Organisations
 The Case of Advertising and Creative 
 Good Production
4. Mette Rosenkrands Johansen
 Practice at the top
 – how top managers mobilise and use
 non-ﬁnancial performance measures
5. Eva Parum
 Corporate governance som strategisk
 kommunikations- og ledelsesværktøj
6. Susan Aagaard Petersen
 Culture’s Inﬂuence on Performance 
 Management: The Case of a Danish 
 Company in China
7. Thomas Nicolai Pedersen
 The Discursive Constitution of Organi-
zational Governance – Between unity 
and differentiation
 The Case of the governance of 
 environmental risks by World Bank 
environmental staff
8. Cynthia Selin
 Volatile Visions: Transactons in 
 Anticipatory Knowledge
9. Jesper Banghøj
 Financial Accounting Information and  
 Compensation in Danish Companies
10. Mikkel Lucas Overby
 Strategic Alliances in Emerging High-
Tech Markets: What’s the Difference 
and does it Matter?
11. Tine Aage
 External Information Acquisition of 
 Industrial Districts and the Impact of 
 Different Knowledge Creation Dimen-
sions
 
 A case study of the Fashion and  
Design Branch of the Industrial District 
of Montebelluna, NE Italy
12. Mikkel Flyverbom
 Making the Global Information Society 
 Governable
 On the Governmentality of Multi- 
Stakeholder Networks
13. Anette Grønning
 Personen bag
 Tilstedevær i e-mail som inter-
aktionsform mellem kunde og med-
arbejder i dansk forsikringskontekst
14. Jørn Helder
 One Company – One Language?
 The NN-case
15. Lars Bjerregaard Mikkelsen
 Differing perceptions of customer 
value
 Development and application of a tool 
for mapping perceptions of customer 
value at both ends of customer-suppli-
er dyads in industrial markets
16. Lise Granerud
 Exploring Learning
 Technological learning within small 
 manufacturers in South Africa
17. Esben Rahbek Pedersen
 Between Hopes and Realities: 
 Reﬂections on the Promises and 
 Practices of Corporate Social 
 Responsibility (CSR)
18. Ramona Samson
 The Cultural Integration Model and 
 European Transformation.
 The Case of Romania
2007
1. Jakob Vestergaard
 Discipline in The Global Economy
 Panopticism and the Post-Washington 
 Consensus
2. Heidi Lund Hansen
 Spaces for learning and working
 A qualitative study of change of work, 
 management, vehicles of power and 
 social practices in open ofﬁces
3. Sudhanshu Rai
 Exploring the internal dynamics of 
software development teams during 
user analysis
 A tension enabled Institutionalization 
 Model; ”Where process becomes the 
 objective”
4. Norsk ph.d. 
 Ej til salg gennem Samfundslitteratur
5. Serden Ozcan
 EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN 
 ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND 
 OUTCOMES
 A Behavioural Perspective
6. Kim Sundtoft Hald
 Inter-organizational Performance 
 Measurement and Management in 
Action
 – An Ethnography on the Construction 
of Management, Identity and 
 Relationships
7. Tobias Lindeberg
 Evaluative Technologies
 Quality and the Multiplicity of 
 Performance
8. Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg
 Den globale soldat
 Identitetsdannelse og identitetsledelse 
i multinationale militære organisatio-
ner
9. Lars Frederiksen
 Open Innovation Business Models
 Innovation in ﬁrm-hosted online user 
 communities and inter-ﬁrm project 
 ventures in the music industry 
 – A collection of essays
10. Jonas Gabrielsen
 Retorisk toposlære – fra statisk ’sted’ 
til persuasiv aktivitet
11. Christian Moldt-Jørgensen
 Fra meningsløs til meningsfuld  
evaluering.
 Anvendelsen af studentertilfredsheds-
 målinger på de korte og mellemlange  
 videregående uddannelser set fra et 
 psykodynamisk systemperspektiv
12. Ping Gao
 Extending the application of 
 actor-network theory
 Cases of innovation in the tele-
 communications industry
13. Peter Mejlby
 Frihed og fængsel, en del af den 
samme drøm? 
 Et phronetisk baseret casestudie af 
 frigørelsens og kontrollens sam-
eksistens i værdibaseret ledelse! 
 
14. Kristina Birch
 Statistical Modelling in Marketing
15. Signe Poulsen
 Sense and sensibility: 
 The language of emotional appeals in 
insurance marketing
16. Anders Bjerre Trolle
 Essays on derivatives pricing and dyna-
mic asset allocation
17. Peter Feldhütter
 Empirical Studies of Bond and Credit 
Markets
18. Jens Henrik Eggert Christensen
 Default and Recovery Risk Modeling 
and Estimation
19. Maria Theresa Larsen
 Academic Enterprise: A New Mission 
for Universities or a Contradiction in 
Terms?
 Four papers on the long-term impli-
cations of increasing industry involve-
ment and commercialization in acade-
mia
20.  Morten Wellendorf
 Postimplementering af teknologi i den  
 offentlige forvaltning
 Analyser af en organisations konti-
nuerlige arbejde med informations-
teknologi
21.  Ekaterina Mhaanna
 Concept Relations for Terminological 
Process Analysis
22.  Stefan Ring Thorbjørnsen
 Forsvaret i forandring
 Et studie i ofﬁcerers kapabiliteter un-
der påvirkning af omverdenens foran-
dringspres mod øget styring og læring
23.  Christa Breum Amhøj
 Det selvskabte medlemskab om ma-
nagementstaten, dens styringstekno-
logier og indbyggere
24.  Karoline Bromose
 Between Technological Turbulence and 
Operational Stability
 – An empirical case study of corporate 
venturing in TDC
25.  Susanne Justesen
 Navigating the Paradoxes of Diversity 
in Innovation Practice
 – A Longitudinal study of six very 
 different innovation processes – in 
practice
26.  Luise Noring Henler
 Conceptualising successful supply 
chain partnerships
 – Viewing supply chain partnerships 
from an organisational culture per-
spective
27.  Mark Mau
 Kampen om telefonen
 Det danske telefonvæsen under den 
tyske besættelse 1940-45
28.  Jakob Halskov
 The semiautomatic expansion of 
existing terminological ontologies 
using knowledge patterns discovered 
on the WWW – an implementation 
and evaluation
29.  Gergana Koleva
 European Policy Instruments Beyond 
Networks and Structure: The Innova-
tive Medicines Initiative
30.  Christian Geisler Asmussen
 Global Strategy and International 
 Diversity: A Double-Edged Sword?
31.  Christina Holm-Petersen
 Stolthed og fordom
 Kultur- og identitetsarbejde ved ska-
belsen af en ny sengeafdeling gennem 
fusion
32.  Hans Peter Olsen
 Hybrid Governance of Standardized 
States
 Causes and Contours of the Global 
Regulation of Government Auditing
33.  Lars Bøge Sørensen
 Risk Management in the Supply Chain
34.  Peter Aagaard
 Det unikkes dynamikker
 De institutionelle mulighedsbetingel-
ser bag den individuelle udforskning i 
professionelt og frivilligt arbejde
35.  Yun Mi Antorini
 Brand Community Innovation
 An Intrinsic Case Study of the Adult 
Fans of LEGO Community
36.  Joachim Lynggaard Boll
 Labor Related Corporate Social Perfor-
mance in Denmark
 Organizational and Institutional Per-
spectives
2008
1. Frederik Christian Vinten
 Essays on Private Equity
2.  Jesper Clement
 Visual Inﬂuence of Packaging Design 
on In-Store Buying Decisions
3.  Marius Brostrøm Kousgaard
 Tid til kvalitetsmåling?
 – Studier af indrulleringsprocesser i 
forbindelse med introduktionen af 
kliniske kvalitetsdatabaser i speciallæ-
gepraksissektoren
4. Irene Skovgaard Smith
 Management Consulting in Action
 Value creation and ambiguity in 
 client-consultant relations
5.  Anders Rom
 Management accounting and inte-
grated information systems
 How to exploit the potential for ma-
nagement accounting of information 
technology
6.  Marina Candi
 Aesthetic Design as an Element of 
 Service Innovation in New Technology-
based Firms
7.  Morten Schnack
 Teknologi og tværfaglighed
 – en analyse af diskussionen omkring 
 indførelse af EPJ på en hospitalsafde-
ling
8. Helene Balslev Clausen
 Juntos pero no revueltos – un estudio 
sobre emigrantes norteamericanos en 
un pueblo mexicano
9. Lise Justesen
 Kunsten at skrive revisionsrapporter.
 En beretning om forvaltningsrevisio-
nens beretninger
10. Michael E. Hansen
 The politics of corporate responsibility:
 CSR and the governance of child labor 
and core labor rights in the 1990s
11. Anne Roepstorff
 Holdning for handling – en etnologisk 
undersøgelse af Virksomheders Sociale 
Ansvar/CSR
12. Claus Bajlum
 Essays on Credit Risk and 
 Credit Derivatives
13. Anders Bojesen
 The Performative Power of Competen-
ce  – an Inquiry into Subjectivity and 
Social Technologies at Work
14. Satu Reijonen
 Green and Fragile
 A Study on Markets and the Natural  
Environment
15. Ilduara Busta
 Corporate Governance in Banking
 A European Study
16. Kristian Anders Hvass
 A Boolean Analysis Predicting Industry 
Change: Innovation, Imitation & Busi-
ness Models
 The Winning Hybrid: A case study of 
isomorphism in the airline industry
17. Trine Paludan
 De uvidende og de udviklingsparate
 Identitet som mulighed og restriktion 
blandt fabriksarbejdere på det aftaylo-
riserede fabriksgulv
18. Kristian Jakobsen
 Foreign market entry in transition eco-
nomies: Entry timing and mode choice
19. Jakob Elming
 Syntactic reordering in statistical ma-
chine translation
20. Lars Brømsøe Termansen
 Regional Computable General Equili-
brium Models for Denmark
 Three papers laying the foundation for 
regional CGE models with agglomera-
tion characteristics
 
21. Mia Reinholt
 The Motivational Foundations of 
Knowledge Sharing
22.  Frederikke Krogh-Meibom
 The Co-Evolution of Institutions and 
Technology
 – A Neo-Institutional Understanding of 
Change Processes within the Business 
Press – the Case Study of Financial 
Times
23. Peter D. Ørberg Jensen
 OFFSHORING OF ADVANCED AND 
HIGH-VALUE TECHNICAL SERVICES: 
ANTECEDENTS, PROCESS DYNAMICS 
AND FIRMLEVEL IMPACTS
24. Pham Thi Song Hanh
 Functional Upgrading, Relational 
 Capability and Export Performance of 
Vietnamese Wood Furniture Producers
25. Mads Vangkilde
 Why wait?
 An Exploration of ﬁrst-mover advanta-
ges among Danish e-grocers through a 
resource perspective
26.  Hubert Buch-Hansen
 Rethinking the History of European 
Level Merger Control
 A Critical Political Economy Perspective
2009
1. Vivian Lindhardsen
 From Independent Ratings to Commu-
nal Ratings: A Study of CWA Raters’ 
Decision-Making Behaviours
2. Guðrið Weihe
 Public-Private Partnerships: Meaning 
and Practice
3. Chris Nøkkentved
 Enabling Supply Networks with Colla-
borative Information Infrastructures
 An Empirical Investigation of Business 
Model Innovation in Supplier Relation-
ship Management
4.  Sara Louise Muhr
 Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulner-
ability of Diversity Management
5. Christine Sestoft
 Forbrugeradfærd i et Stats- og Livs-
formsteoretisk perspektiv
6. Michael Pedersen
 Tune in, Breakdown, and Reboot: On 
the production of the stress-ﬁt self-
managing employee
7.  Salla Lutz
 Position and Reposition in Networks 
 – Exempliﬁed by the Transformation of 
the Danish Pine Furniture Manu-
 facturers
8. Jens Forssbæck
 Essays on market discipline in 
 commercial and central banking
9. Tine Murphy
 Sense from Silence – A Basis for Orga-
nised Action 
 How do Sensemaking Processes with 
Minimal Sharing Relate to the Repro-
duction of Organised Action?
10. Sara Malou Strandvad
 Inspirations for a new sociology of art: 
A sociomaterial study of development 
processes in the Danish ﬁlm industry
11. Nicolaas Mouton
 On the evolution of social scientiﬁc 
metaphors: 
 A cognitive-historical enquiry into the 
divergent trajectories of the idea that 
collective entities – states and societies, 
cities and corporations – are biological 
organisms.
12. Lars Andreas Knutsen
 Mobile Data Services:
 Shaping of user engagements
13. Nikolaos Theodoros Korﬁatis
 Information Exchange and Behavior
 A Multi-method Inquiry on Online 
Communities
14.  Jens Albæk
 Forestillinger om kvalitet og tværfaglig-
hed på sygehuse
 – skabelse af forestillinger i læge- og 
plejegrupperne angående relevans af 
nye idéer om kvalitetsudvikling gen-
nem tolkningsprocesser
15.  Maja Lotz
 The Business of Co-Creation – and the 
Co-Creation of Business
16. Gitte P. Jakobsen
 Narrative Construction of Leader Iden-
tity in a Leader Development Program 
Context
17. Dorte Hermansen
 ”Living the brand” som en brandorien-
teret dialogisk praxis:
 Om udvikling af medarbejdernes 
brandorienterede dømmekraft
18. Aseem Kinra
 Supply Chain (logistics) Environmental 
Complexity
19. Michael Nørager
 How to manage SMEs through the 
transformation from non innovative to 
innovative? 
20.  Kristin Wallevik
 Corporate Governance in Family Firms
 The Norwegian Maritime Sector
21. Bo Hansen Hansen
 Beyond the Process
 Enriching Software Process Improve-
ment with Knowledge Management
22. Annemette Skot-Hansen
 Franske adjektivisk aﬂedte adverbier, 
der tager præpositionssyntagmer ind-
ledt med præpositionen à som argu-
menter
 En valensgrammatisk undersøgelse
23. Line Gry Knudsen
 Collaborative R&D Capabilities
 In Search of Micro-Foundations
24. Christian Scheuer
 Employers meet employees
 Essays on sorting and globalization
25. Rasmus Johnsen
 The Great Health of Melancholy
 A Study of the Pathologies of Perfor-
mativity
26. Ha Thi Van Pham
 Internationalization, Competitiveness 
Enhancement and Export Performance 
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 Evidence from Vietnam
27. Henriette Balieu
 Kontrolbegrebets betydning for kausa-
tivalternationen i spansk
 En kognitiv-typologisk analyse
2010
1.  Yen Tran
 Organizing Innovationin Turbulent 
Fashion Market
 Four papers on how fashion ﬁrms crea-
te and appropriate innovation value
2. Anders Raastrup Kristensen
 Metaphysical Labour
 Flexibility, Performance and Commit-
ment in Work-Life Management
3. Margrét Sigrún Sigurdardottir
 Dependently independent
 Co-existence of institutional logics in 
the recorded music industry
4.  Ásta Dis Óladóttir
 Internationalization from a small do-
mestic base:
 An empirical analysis of Economics and 
Management
5.  Christine Secher
 E-deltagelse i praksis – politikernes og 
forvaltningens medkonstruktion og 
konsekvenserne heraf
6. Marianne Stang Våland
 What we talk about when we talk 
about space:
 
 End User Participation between Proces-
ses of Organizational and Architectural 
Design
7.  Rex Degnegaard
 Strategic Change Management
 Change Management Challenges in 
the Danish Police Reform
8. Ulrik Schultz Brix
 Værdi i rekruttering – den sikre beslut-
ning
 En pragmatisk analyse af perception 
og synliggørelse af værdi i rekrutte-
rings- og udvælgelsesarbejdet
9. Jan Ole Similä
 Kontraktsledelse
 Relasjonen mellom virksomhetsledelse 
og kontraktshåndtering, belyst via ﬁre 
norske virksomheter
10. Susanne Boch Waldorff
 Emerging Organizations: In between 
local translation, institutional logics 
and discourse
11. Brian Kane
 Performance Talk
 Next Generation Management of  
Organizational Performance
12. Lars Ohnemus
 Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and 
Shareholder Value
 An Empirical Reconciliation of two 
Critical Concepts
13.  Jesper Schlamovitz
 Håndtering af usikkerhed i ﬁlm- og 
byggeprojekter
14.  Tommy Moesby-Jensen
 Det faktiske livs forbindtlighed
 Førsokratisk informeret, ny-aristotelisk 
τηθος-tænkning hos Martin Heidegger
15. Christian Fich
 Two Nations Divided by Common 
 Values
 French National Habitus and the 
 Rejection of American Power
16. Peter Beyer
 Processer, sammenhængskraft  
og ﬂeksibilitet
 Et empirisk casestudie af omstillings-
forløb i ﬁre virksomheder
17. Adam Buchhorn
 Markets of Good Intentions
 Constructing and Organizing 
 Biogas Markets Amid Fragility  
and Controversy
18. Cecilie K. Moesby-Jensen
 Social læring og fælles praksis
 Et mixed method studie, der belyser 
læringskonsekvenser af et lederkursus 
for et praksisfællesskab af offentlige 
mellemledere
19. Heidi Boye
 Fødevarer og sundhed i sen- 
modernismen
 – En indsigt i hyggefænomenet og  
de relaterede fødevarepraksisser
20. Kristine Munkgård Pedersen
 Flygtige forbindelser og midlertidige 
mobiliseringer
 Om kulturel produktion på Roskilde 
Festival
21. Oliver Jacob Weber
 Causes of Intercompany Harmony in 
Business Markets – An Empirical Inve-
stigation from a Dyad Perspective
22. Susanne Ekman
 Authority and Autonomy
 Paradoxes of Modern Knowledge 
Work
23. Anette Frey Larsen
 Kvalitetsledelse på danske hospitaler
 – Ledelsernes indﬂydelse på introduk-
tion og vedligeholdelse af kvalitetsstra-
tegier i det danske sundhedsvæsen
24.  Toyoko Sato
 Performativity and Discourse: Japanese 
Advertisements on the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Desire
25. Kenneth Brinch Jensen
 Identifying the Last Planner System 
 Lean management in the construction 
industry
26.  Javier Busquets
 Orchestrating Network Behavior  
for Innovation
27. Luke Patey
 The Power of Resistance: India’s Na-
tional Oil Company and International 
Activism in Sudan
28. Mette Vedel
 Value Creation in Triadic Business Rela-
tionships. Interaction, Interconnection 
and Position
29.  Kristian Tørning
 Knowledge Management Systems in 
Practice – A Work Place Study
30. Qingxin Shi
 An Empirical Study of Thinking Aloud 
Usability Testing from a Cultural 
Perspective
31.  Tanja Juul Christiansen
 Corporate blogging: Medarbejderes 
kommunikative handlekraft
32.  Malgorzata Ciesielska
 Hybrid Organisations.
 A study of the Open Source – business 
setting
33. Jens Dick-Nielsen
 Three Essays on Corporate Bond  
Market Liquidity
34. Sabrina Speiermann
 Modstandens Politik
 Kampagnestyring i Velfærdsstaten. 
 En diskussion af traﬁkkampagners sty-
ringspotentiale
35. Julie Uldam
 Fickle Commitment. Fostering political 
engagement in 'the ﬂighty world of 
online activism’
36. Annegrete Juul Nielsen
 Traveling technologies and 
transformations in health care
37. Athur Mühlen-Schulte
 Organising Development
 Power and Organisational Reform in 
the United Nations Development 
 Programme
38. Louise Rygaard Jonas
 Branding på butiksgulvet
 Et case-studie af kultur- og identitets-
arbejdet i Kvickly
2011
1. Stefan Fraenkel
 Key Success Factors for Sales Force 
Readiness during New Product Launch
 A Study of Product Launches in the 
Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry
2. Christian Plesner Rossing
 International Transfer Pricing in Theory 
and Practice
3.  Tobias Dam Hede
 Samtalekunst og ledelsesdisciplin
 – en analyse af coachingsdiskursens 
genealogi og governmentality
4. Kim Pettersson
 Essays on Audit Quality, Auditor Choi-
ce, and Equity Valuation
5. Henrik Merkelsen
 The expert-lay controversy in risk 
research and management. Effects of 
institutional distances. Studies of risk 
deﬁnitions, perceptions, management 
and communication
6. Simon S. Torp
 Employee Stock Ownership: 
 Effect on Strategic Management and 
Performance
7. Mie Harder
 Internal Antecedents of Management 
Innovation
8. Ole Helby Petersen
 Public-Private Partnerships: Policy and 
Regulation – With Comparative and 
Multi-level Case Studies from Denmark 
and Ireland
9. Morten Krogh Petersen
 ’Good’ Outcomes. Handling Multipli-
city in Government Communication
10. Kristian Tangsgaard Hvelplund
 Allocation of cognitive resources in 
translation - an eye-tracking and key-
logging study
11. Moshe Yonatany
 The Internationalization Process of 
Digital Service Providers
12. Anne Vestergaard
 Distance and Suffering
 Humanitarian Discourse in the age of 
Mediatization
13. Thorsten Mikkelsen
 Personligsheds indﬂydelse på forret-
ningsrelationer
14. Jane Thostrup Jagd
 Hvorfor fortsætter fusionsbølgen ud-
over ”the tipping point”?
 – en empirisk analyse af information 
og kognitioner om fusioner
15. Gregory Gimpel
 Value-driven Adoption and Consump-
tion of Technology: Understanding 
Technology Decision Making
16. Thomas Stengade Sønderskov
 Den nye mulighed
 Social innovation i en forretningsmæs-
sig kontekst
17.  Jeppe Christoffersen
 Donor supported strategic alliances in 
developing countries
18. Vibeke Vad Baunsgaard
 Dominant Ideological Modes of  
Rationality: Cross functional 
 integration in the process of product
 innovation
19.  Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson
 Governance Failure and Icelands’s
 Financial Collapse
20.  Allan Sall Tang Andersen
 Essays on the modeling of risks in
 interest-rate and inflation markets
21.  Heidi Tscherning
 Mobile Devices in Social Contexts
22.  Birgitte Gorm Hansen
 Adapting in the Knowledge Economy
  Lateral Strategies for Scientists and 
Those Who Study Them
23.  Kristina Vaarst Andersen
 Optimal Levels of Embeddedness
  The Contingent Value of Networked 
Collaboration
24.  Justine Grønbæk Pors
 Noisy Management
  A History of Danish School Governing 
from 1970-2010
25.  Stefan Linder
  Micro-foundations of Strategic  
Entrepreneurship
  Essays on Autonomous Strategic Action
26.  Xin Li
  Toward an Integrative Framework of 
National Competitiveness
 An application to China
27.  Rune Thorbjørn Clausen
 Værdifuld arkitektur 
  Et eksplorativt studie af bygningers 
rolle i virksomheders værdiskabelse
28.  Monica Viken
  Markedsundersøkelser som bevis i 
varemerke- og markedsføringsrett
29.  Christian Wymann
  Tattooing 
  The Economic and Artistic Constitution 
of a Social Phenomenon
30.  Sanne Frandsen
 Productive Incoherence 
  A Case Study of Branding and  
Identity Struggles in a Low-Prestige 
Organization
31.  Mads Stenbo Nielsen
 Essays on Correlation Modelling
32.  Ivan Häuser
 Følelse og sprog
  Etablering af en ekspressiv kategori, 
eksemplificeret på russisk
33.  Sebastian Schwenen
 Security of Supply in Electricity Markets
2012
1.  Peter Holm Andreasen
  The Dynamics of Procurement  
Management
 - A Complexity Approach
2.  Martin Haulrich
  Data-Driven Bitext Dependency 
 Parsing and Alignment
3.  Line Kirkegaard
  Konsulenten i den anden nat 
  En undersøgelse af det intense  
arbejdsliv
4.  Tonny Stenheim
  Decision usefulness of goodwill  
under IFRS
5.  Morten Lind Larsen
  Produktivitet, vækst og velfærd
  Industrirådet og efterkrigstidens  
Danmark 1945 - 1958
6.  Petter Berg
  Cartel Damages and Cost Asymmetries 
7.  Lynn Kahle
 Experiential Discourse in Marketing 
  A methodical inquiry into practice  
and theory
8.  Anne Roelsgaard Obling
  Management of Emotions  
in Accelerated Medical Relationships
9.  Thomas Frandsen
  Managing Modularity of  
Service Processes Architecture
10.  Carina Christine Skovmøller
  CSR som noget særligt
  Et casestudie om styring og menings-
skabelse i relation til CSR ud fra en 
intern optik
11.  Michael Tell
  Fradragsbeskæring af selskabers  
finansieringsudgifter
  En skatteretlig analyse af SEL §§ 11, 
11B og 11C
12.  Morten Holm
  Customer Profitability Measurement 
Models
  Their Merits and Sophistication  
across Contexts
13.  Katja Joo Dyppel
  Beskatning af derivater 
 En analyse af dansk skatteret
14.  Esben Anton Schultz
  Essays in Labor Economics 
 Evidence from Danish Micro Data
15.  Carina Risvig Hansen
  ”Contracts not covered, or not fully 
covered, by the Public Sector Directive”
16.  Anja Svejgaard Pors
 Iværksættelse af kommunikation
  - patientfigurer i hospitalets strategiske 
kommunikation
17.  Frans Bévort
  Making sense of management with 
logics
  An ethnographic study of accountants 
who become managers
18.  René Kallestrup
  The Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign 
Credit Risk
19.  Brett Crawford
  Revisiting the Phenomenon of Interests 
in Organizational Institutionalism
  The Case of U.S. Chambers of  
Commerce
20.  Mario Daniele Amore
  Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance
21.  Arne Stjernholm Madsen
  The evolution of innovation strategy 
  Studied in the context of medical 
device activities at the pharmaceutical 
company Novo Nordisk A/S in the 
period 1980-2008
22.  Jacob Holm Hansen
  Is Social Integration Necessary for  
Corporate Branding?
  A study of corporate branding  
strategies at Novo Nordisk
23.  Stuart Webber
  Corporate Profit Shifting and the  
Multinational Enterprise
24.  Helene Ratner
  Promises of Reflexivity
  Managing and Researching  
Inclusive Schools
25.  Therese Strand
  The Owners and the Power: Insights 
from Annual General Meetings
26.  Robert Gavin Strand
  In Praise of Corporate Social  
Responsibility Bureaucracy
27.  Nina Sormunen
 Auditor’s going-concern reporting
  Reporting decision and content of the 
report
28.  John Bang Mathiasen
  Learning within a product development 
working practice:
  - an understanding anchored  
in pragmatism
29.  Philip Holst Riis
  Understanding Role-Oriented Enterprise 
Systems: From Vendors to Customers
30.  Marie Lisa Dacanay
 Social Enterprises and the Poor 
  Enhancing Social Entrepreneurship and 
Stakeholder Theory
31.  Fumiko Kano Glückstad
  Bridging Remote Cultures: Cross-lingual 
concept mapping based on the  
information receiver’s prior-knowledge
32.  Henrik Barslund Fosse
  Empirical Essays in International Trade
33.  Peter Alexander Albrecht
  Foundational hybridity and its  
reproduction 
 Security sector reform in Sierra Leone
34.  Maja Rosenstock
 CSR  - hvor svært kan det være? 
  Kulturanalytisk casestudie om  
udfordringer og dilemmaer med at 
forankre Coops CSR-strategi
35.  Jeanette Rasmussen
 Tweens, medier og forbrug
  Et studie af 10-12 årige danske børns 
brug af internettet, opfattelse og for-
ståelse af markedsføring og forbrug
36.  Ib Tunby Gulbrandsen
  ‘This page is not intended for a  
US Audience’
  A five-act spectacle on online  
communication, collaboration  
& organization.
37.  Kasper Aalling Teilmann
  Interactive Approaches to  
Rural Development
38.  Mette Mogensen
  The Organization(s) of Well-being  
and Productivity
  (Re)assembling work in the Danish Post
39.  Søren Friis Møller
  From Disinterestedness to Engagement 
  Towards Relational Leadership In the 
Cultural Sector
40.  Nico Peter Berhausen
  Management Control, Innovation and 
Strategic Objectives – Interactions and 
Convergence in Product Development 
Networks
41.  Balder Onarheim
 Creativity under Constraints
  Creativity as Balancing  
‘Constrainedness’
42.  Haoyong Zhou
 Essays on Family Firms
43.  Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen
 Making sense of organisational conflict
  An empirical study of enacted sense-
making in everyday conflict at work
2013
1.  Jacob Lyngsie
  Entrepreneurship in an Organizational 
Context
2.  Signe Groth-Brodersen
 Fra ledelse til selvet
  En socialpsykologisk analyse af  
forholdet imellem selvledelse, ledelse 
og stress i det moderne arbejdsliv
3.  Nis Høyrup Christensen
  Shaping Markets: A Neoinstitutional 
Analysis of the Emerging  
Organizational Field of Renewable 
Energy in China
4.  Christian Edelvold Berg
 As a matter of size 
  THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL  
MASS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS 
5.  Christine D. Isakson
  Coworker Influence and Labor Mobility  
Essays on Turnover, Entrepreneurship 
and Location Choice in the Danish 
Maritime Industry
6.  Niels Joseph Jerne Lennon
  Accounting Qualities in Practice  
Rhizomatic stories of representational 
faithfulness, decision making and  
control
7.  Shannon O’Donnell
 Making Ensemble Possible
  How special groups organize for  
collaborative creativity in conditions  
of spatial variability and distance
8.  Robert W. D. Veitch
  Access Decisions in a  
Partly-Digital World 
Comparing Digital Piracy and Legal 
Modes for Film and Music
9.  Marie Mathiesen
 Making Strategy Work 
 An Organizational Ethnography
10.  Arisa Shollo
 The role of business intelligence in   
 organizational decision-making 
11.  Mia Kaspersen
  The construction of social and  
environmental reporting
12. Marcus Møller Larsen
 The organizational design of offshoring
13. Mette Ohm Rørdam
 EU Law on Food Naming
 The prohibition against misleading   
 names in an internal market context
14. Hans Peter Rasmussen 
 GIV EN GED!
 Kan giver-idealtyper forklare støtte 
 til velgørenhed og understøtte 
 relationsopbygning?
15. Ruben Schachtenhaufen 
 Fonetisk reduktion i dansk
16. Peter Koerver Schmidt
 Dansk CFC-beskatning
  I et internationalt og komparativt  
perspektiv
17. Morten Froholdt
 Strategi i den offentlige sektor 
 En kortlægning af styringsmæssig   
 kontekst, strategisk tilgang, samt 
 anvendte redskaber og teknologier for  
 udvalgte danske statslige styrelser
18. Annette Camilla Sjørup
 Cognitive effort in metaphor translation
 An eye-tracking and key-logging study
19. Tamara Stucchi
  The Internationalization  
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 A Context-Specific Study
20. Thomas Lopdrup-Hjorth
 “Let’s Go Outside”:
 The Value of Co-Creation
21. Ana Alačovska
 Genre and Autonomy in Cultural 
 Production
 The case of travel guidebook 
 production
22. Marius Gudmand-Høyer
  Stemningssindssygdommenes historie  
i det 19. århundrede
  Omtydningen af melankolien og 
manien som bipolære stemningslidelser 
i dansk sammenhæng under hensyn til 
dannelsen af det moderne følelseslivs 
relative autonomi. 
  En problematiserings- og erfarings-
analytisk undersøgelse
23. Lichen Alex Yu
 Fabricating an S&OP Process
  Circulating References and Matters  
of Concern
24. Esben Alfort
 The Expression of a Need
 Understanding search
25. Trine Pallesen
 Assembling Markets for Wind Power  
 An Inquiry into the Making of 
 Market Devices
26. Anders Koed Madsen
 Web-Visions
 Repurposing digital traces to organize  
 social attention
27. Lærke Højgaard Christiansen
 BREWING ORGANIZATIONAL 
 RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
28. Tommy Kjær Lassen
 EGENTLIG SELVLEDELSE
  En ledelsesfilosofisk afhandling om 
selvledelsens paradoksale dynamik og 
eksistentielle engagement
29. Morten Rossing
 Local Adaption and Meaning Creation  
 in Performance Appraisal
30. Søren Obed Madsen
 Lederen som oversætter
 Et oversættelsesteoretisk perspektiv 
 på strategisk arbejde
31. Thomas Høgenhaven
 Open Government Communities
 Does Design Affect Participation?
32. Kirstine Zinck Pedersen 
 Failsafe Organizing? 
 A Pragmatic Stance on Patient Safety
33. Anne Petersen
 Hverdagslogikker i psykiatrisk arbejde
 En institutionsetnografisk undersøgelse  
 af hverdagen i psykiatriske 
 organisationer
34. Didde Maria Humle
 Fortællinger om arbejde
35. Mark Holst-Mikkelsen
 Strategieksekvering i praksis 
 – barrierer og muligheder! 
36. Malek Maalouf
 Sustaining lean
 Strategies for dealing with
 organizational paradoxes
37. Nicolaj Tofte Brenneche
 Systemic Innovation In The Making
 The Social Productivity of 
 Cartographic Crisis and Transitions 
 in the Case of SEEIT
38. Morten Gylling
 The Structure of Discourse
 A Corpus-Based Cross-Linguistic Study
39. Binzhang YANG
 Urban Green Spaces for Quality Life
  - Case Study: the landscape  
architecture for people in Copenhagen
40. Michael Friis Pedersen
 Finance and Organization:  
 The Implications for Whole Farm 
 Risk Management
41. Even Fallan
 Issues on supply and demand for 
 environmental accounting information
42. Ather Nawaz
 Website user experience
 A cross-cultural study of the relation  
 between users´ cognitive style, context  
 of use, and information architecture 
 of local websites
43. Karin Beukel
 The Determinants for Creating 
 Valuable Inventions
44. Arjan Markus
 External Knowledge Sourcing 
 and Firm Innovation 
 Essays on the Micro-Foundations 
 of Firms’ Search for Innovation
2014
1.  Solon Moreira
  Four Essays on Technology Licensing 
and Firm Innovation
2.  Karin Strzeletz Ivertsen
 Partnership Drift in Innovation 
 Processes
 A study of the Think City electric 
 car development
3.  Kathrine Hoffmann Pii
 Responsibility Flows in Patient-centred  
 Prevention
4.  Jane Bjørn Vedel
 Managing Strategic Research
 An empirical analysis of 
 science-industry collaboration in a   
 pharmaceutical company
5.  Martin Gylling
 Processuel strategi i organisationer   
 Monografi om dobbeltheden i 
 tænkning af strategi, dels som 
 vidensfelt i organisationsteori, dels 
 som kunstnerisk tilgang til at skabe 
 i erhvervsmæssig innovation
6.  Linne Marie Lauesen
 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 in the Water Sector: 
 How Material Practices and their 
 Symbolic and Physical Meanings Form 
 a Colonising Logic
7.  Maggie Qiuzhu Mei
 LEARNING TO INNOVATE: 
 The role of ambidexterity, standard,  
 and decision process
8.  Inger Høedt-Rasmussen
 Developing Identity for Lawyers
 Towards Sustainable Lawyering
9.  Sebastian Fux
 Essays on Return Predictability and   
 Term Structure Modelling
10.  Thorbjørn N. M. Lund-Poulsen
 Essays on Value Based Management
11.  Oana Brindusa Albu
 Transparency in Organizing: 
 A Performative Approach
12.  Lena Olaison
 Entrepreneurship at the limits
13.  Hanne Sørum
 DRESSED FOR WEB SUCCESS?
  An Empirical Study of Website Quality 
in the Public Sector
14.  Lasse Folke Henriksen
 Knowing networks
 How experts shape transnational 
 governance
15.  Maria Halbinger
 Entrepreneurial Individuals
 Empirical Investigations into 
 Entrepreneurial Activities of 
 Hackers and Makers
16.  Robert Spliid
 Kapitalfondenes metoder 
 og kompetencer
17.  Christiane Stelling
 Public-private partnerships & the need,  
 development and management 
 of trusting 
 A processual and embedded 
 exploration
18.  Marta Gasparin
 Management of design as a translation  
 process
19.  Kåre Moberg
 Assessing the Impact of 
 Entrepreneurship Education
 From ABC to PhD
20.  Alexander Cole
 Distant neighbors
 Collective learning beyond the cluster
21.  Martin Møller Boje Rasmussen
 Is Competitiveness a Question of 
 Being Alike?
 How the United Kingdom, Germany  
 and Denmark Came to Compete   
 through their Knowledge Regimes 
 from 1993 to 2007
22.  Anders Ravn Sørensen
 Studies in central bank legitimacy, 
 currency and national identity
 Four cases from Danish monetary 
 history
23.  Nina Bellak
  Can Language be Managed in  
International Business?
 Insights into Language Choice from a  
 Case Study of Danish and Austrian  
 Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
24.  Rikke Kristine Nielsen
 Global Mindset as Managerial 
 Meta-competence and Organizational  
 Capability: Boundary-crossing 
 Leadership Cooperation in the MNC
  The Case of ‘Group Mindset’ in 
 Solar A/S.
25.  Rasmus Koss Hartmann
 User Innovation inside government  
 Towards a critically performative 
 foundation for inquiry
26.  Kristian Gylling Olesen
  Flertydig og emergerende ledelse i 
folkeskolen 
  Et aktør-netværksteoretisk ledelses-
studie af politiske evalueringsreformers 
betydning for ledelse i den danske 
folkeskole
27.  Troels Riis Larsen
  Kampen om Danmarks omdømme 
1945-2010
 Omdømmearbejde og omdømmepolitik
28.  Klaus Majgaard
  Jagten på autenticitet i offentlig styring
29.  Ming Hua Li
 Institutional Transition and
 Organizational Diversity:
 Differentiated internationalization
 strategies of emerging market 
 state-owned enterprises
30.  Sofie Blinkenberg Federspiel
 IT, organisation og digitalisering: 
 Institutionelt arbejde i den kommunale 
 digitaliseringsproces
31.  Elvi Weinreich
 Hvilke offentlige ledere er der brug for 
 når velfærdstænkningen flytter sig
 – er Diplomuddannelsens lederprofil 
 svaret?
32.  Ellen Mølgaard Korsager 
 Self-conception and image of context 
 in the growth of the firm
 – A Penrosian History of Fiberline 
 Composites
33.  Else Skjold
  The Daily Selection
34.  Marie Louise Conradsen
  The Cancer Centre That Never Was
 The Organisation of Danish Cancer  
 Research 1949-1992
35.  Virgilio Failla
  Three Essays on the Dynamics of  
Entrepreneurs in the Labor Market
36.  Nicky Nedergaard
 Brand-Based Innovation
  Relational Perspectives on Brand Logics 
and Design Innovation Strategies and 
Implementation
37.  Mads Gjedsted Nielsen
 Essays in Real Estate Finance
38.  Kristin Martina Brandl
  Process Perspectives on  
Service Offshoring
39.  Mia Rosa Koss Hartmann
 In the gray zone
 With police in making space  
 for creativity
40.  Karen Ingerslev
  Healthcare Innovation under  
The Microscope
  Framing Boundaries of Wicked  
Problems
41.  Tim Neerup Themsen
  Risk Management in large Danish 
public capital investment programmes
2015
1.  Jakob Ion Wille 
 Film som design 
  Design af levende billeder i  
film og tv-serier
2.  Christiane Mossin 
 Interzones of Law and Metaphysics 
  Hierarchies, Logics and Foundations  
of Social Order seen through the Prism 
of EU Social Rights
3.  Thomas Tøth
  TRUSTWORTHINESS: ENABLING 
GLOBAL COLLABORATION
  An Ethnographic Study of Trust,  
Distance, Control, Culture and  
Boundary Spanning within Offshore  
Outsourcing of IT Services
4.  Steven Højlund 
 Evaluation Use in Evaluation Systems –  
 The Case of the European Commission
5.  Julia Kirch Kirkegaard
 AMBIGUOUS WINDS OF CHANGE – OR  
 FIGHTING AGAINST WINDMILLS IN  
 CHINESE WIND POWER
 A CONSTRUCTIVIST INQUIRY INTO   
 CHINA’S PRAGMATICS OF GREEN   
 MARKETISATION MAPPING  
 CONTROVERSIES OVER A POTENTIAL  
 TURN TO QUALITY IN CHINESE WIND  
 POWER
6.  Michelle Carol Antero
  A Multi-case Analysis of the  
Development of Enterprise Resource 
Planning Systems (ERP) Business 
Practices
  Morten Friis-Olivarius
 The Associative Nature of Creativity
7.  Mathew Abraham
 New Cooperativism:
  A study of emerging producer  
organisations in India
8.  Stine Hedegaard
 Sustainability-Focused Identity: Identity  
 work performed to manage, negotiate  
 and resolve barriers and tensions that  
 arise in the process of constructing or 
 ganizational identity in a sustainability  
 context 
9.  Cecilie Glerup
 Organizing Science in Society – the  
 conduct and justification of resposible  
 research
10.  Allan Salling Pedersen
 Implementering af ITIL®  IT-governance
 - når best practice konflikter med   
 kulturen Løsning af implementerings- 
 problemer gennem anvendelse af   
 kendte CSF i et aktionsforskningsforløb.
11.  Nihat Misir
 A Real Options Approach to 
 Determining Power Prices
12.  Mamdouh Medhat
 MEASURING AND PRICING THE RISK  
 OF CORPORATE FAILURES
13.  Rina Hansen
 Toward a Digital Strategy for 
 Omnichannel Retailing
14.  Eva Pallesen
 In the rhythm of welfare creation
  A relational processual investigation 
moving beyond the conceptual horizon 
of welfare management
15. Gouya Harirchi
 In Search of Opportunities: Three   
 Essays on Global Linkages for Innovation
16. Lotte Holck
 Embedded Diversity: A critical  
 ethnographic study of the structural  
 tensions of organizing diversity
17. Jose Daniel Balarezo
 Learning through Scenario Planning
18. Louise Pram Nielsen
  Knowledge dissemination based on 
terminological ontologies. Using eye 
tracking to further user interface  
design.
19. Sofie Dam
  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR 
INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY 
TRANSFORMATION
  An embedded, comparative case study 
of municipal waste management in 
England and Denmark
20. Ulrik Hartmyer Christiansen 
  Follwoing the Content of Reported Risk 
Across the Organization 
21. Guro Refsum Sanden 
  Language strategies in multinational 
corporations. A cross-sector study  
of financial service companies and  
manufacturing companies.  
22. Linn Gevoll 
  Designing performance management 
for operational level
  - A closer look on the role of design 
choices in framing coordination and 
motivation
23.  Frederik Larsen
  Objects and Social Actions
 – on Second-hand Valuation Practices
24.  Thorhildur Hansdottir Jetzek
  The Sustainable Value of Open  
Government Data
  Uncovering the Generative Mechanisms 
of Open Data through a Mixed  
Methods Approach
25.  Gustav Toppenberg
  Innovation-based M&A 
  – Technological-Integration  
Challenges – The Case of  
Digital-Technology Companies
26.  Mie Plotnikof
  Challenges of Collaborative  
Governance
  An Organizational Discourse Study  
of Public Managers’ Struggles  
with Collaboration across the 
 Daycare Area
27.  Christian Garmann Johnsen
  Who Are the Post-Bureaucrats?
  A Philosophical Examination of the 
Creative Manager, the Authentic Leader 
and the Entrepreneur
28.  Jacob Brogaard-Kay
  Constituting Performance Management
  A field study of a pharmaceutical  
company
29.  Rasmus Ploug Jenle
  Engineering Markets for Control: 
Integrating Wind Power into the Danish 
Electricity System
30.  Morten Lindholst
  Complex Business Negotiation:  
Understanding Preparation and  
Planning
31. Morten Grynings
 TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY FROM AN  
 ALIGNMENT PERSPECTIVE
32.  Peter Andreas Norn
  Byregimer og styringsevne: Politisk 
lederskab af store byudviklingsprojekter
33.  Milan Miric
  Essays on Competition, Innovation and 
Firm Strategy in Digital Markets
34.  Sanne K. Hjordrup
 The Value of Talent Management 
  Rethinking practice, problems and  
possibilities
35.  Johanna Sax
 Strategic Risk Management 
  – Analyzing Antecedents and  
Contingencies for Value Creation
36.  Pernille Rydén
 Strategic Cognition of Social Media
37.  Mimmi Sjöklint
 The Measurable Me 
 - The Influence of Self-tracking on the  
 User Experience
38.  Juan Ignacio Staricco
 Towards a Fair Global Economic   
 Regime? A critical assessment of Fair 
 Trade through the examination of the  
 Argentinean wine industry
39.  Marie Henriette Madsen
 Emerging and temporary connections  
 in Quality work
40.  Yangfeng CAO
 Toward a Process Framework of 
 Business Model Innovation in the   
 Global Context
 Entrepreneurship-Enabled Dynamic  
 Capability of Medium-Sized  
 Multinational Enterprises
41.  Carsten Scheibye
  Enactment of the Organizational Cost
 Structure in Value Chain Configuration
 A Contribution to Strategic Cost
 Management
2016
1.  Signe Sofie Dyrby
 Enterprise Social Media at Work
2.  Dorte Boesby Dahl
  The making of the public parking  
attendant
  Dirt, aesthetics and inclusion in public 
service work
3.  Verena Girschik
  Realizing Corporate Responsibility 
Positioning and Framing in Nascent 
Institutional Change
4.  Anders Ørding Olsen
  IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS
  Inertia, Knowledge Sources and Diver-
sity in Collaborative Problem-solving
5.  Pernille Steen Pedersen
  Udkast til et nyt copingbegreb
  En kvalifikation af ledelsesmuligheder 
for at forebygge sygefravær ved 
psykiske problemer.
6.  Kerli Kant Hvass
  Weaving a Path from Waste to Value: 
Exploring fashion industry business 
models and the circular economy
7.  Kasper Lindskow
  Exploring Digital News Publishing  
Business Models – a production  
network approach
8.  Mikkel Mouritz Marfelt
  The chameleon workforce:
 Assembling and negotiating the   
 content of a workforce 
9.  Marianne Bertelsen
 Aesthetic encounters
  Rethinking autonomy, space & time  
in today’s world of art
10.  Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen
 EU PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL  
 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
11.  Abid Hussain
  On the Design, Development and  
Use of the Social Data Analytics Tool 
(SODATO):  Design Propositions,  
Patterns, and Principles for Big  
Social Data Analytics
12.  Mark Bruun
  Essays on Earnings Predictability
13.  Tor Bøe-Lillegraven
 BUSINESS PARADOXES, BLACK BOXES,  
 AND BIG DATA: BEYOND 
 ORGANIZATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY
14.  Hadis Khonsary-Atighi
  ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF  
DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN AN OIL-
BASED ECONOMY: THE CASE OF IRAN 
(1965-2010)
15.  Maj Lervad Grasten
  Rule of Law or Rule by Lawyers?  
On the Politics of Translation in Global 
Governance
16.  Lene Granzau Juel-Jacobsen
 SUPERMARKEDETS MODUS OPERANDI 
 – en hverdagssociologisk undersøgelse  
 af forholdet mellem rum og handlen
 og understøtte relationsopbygning?
17.  Christine Thalsgård Henriques
 In search of entrepreneurial learning 
 – Towards a relational perspective on  
 incubating practices?
18.  Patrick Bennett
 Essays in Education, Crime, and Job
 Displacement
19.  Søren Korsgaard
 Payments and Central Bank Policy
20.  Marie Kruse Skibsted
  Empirical Essays in Economics of  
Education and Labor
21.  Elizabeth Benedict Christensen
  The Constantly Contingent Sense of 
Belonging of the 1.5 Generation  
 Undocumented Youth
 An Everyday Perspective
22.  Lasse J. Jessen
  Essays on Discounting Behavior and 
Gambling Behavior
23. Kalle Johannes Rose
 Når stifterviljen dør…
 Et retsøkonomisk bidrag til 200 års  
 juridisk konflikt om ejendomsretten
24.  Andreas Søeborg Kirkedal
 Danish Stød and Automatic Speech  
 Recognition
25.  Ida Lunde Jørgensen
 Institutions and Legitimations in 
 Finance for the Arts
26.  Olga Rykov Ibsen
 An empirical cross-linguistic study of 
 directives: A semiotic approach to the  
 sentence forms chosen by British,   
 Danish and Russian speakers in native  
 and ELF contexts
27.  Desi Volker 
 Understanding Interest Rate Volatility
28.  Angeli Elizabeth Weller 
 Practice at the Boundaries of Business  
 Ethics & Corporate Social Responsibility
29.  Ida Danneskiold-Samsøe
 Levende læring i kunstneriske 
 organisationer
 En undersøgelse af læringsprocesser  
 mellem projekt og organisation på   
 Aarhus Teater
30.  Leif Christensen 
  Quality of information – The role of 
internal controls and materiality
31.  Olga Zarzecka 
  Tie Content in Professional Networks
32.  Henrik Mahncke
 De store gaver
  - Filantropiens gensidighedsrelationer i 
teori og praksis
33.  Carsten Lund Pedersen
  Using the Collective Wisdom of 
Frontline Employees in Strategic Issue 
Management 
34.  Yun Liu
  Essays on Market Design
35.  Denitsa Hazarbassanova Blagoeva
  The Internationalisation of Service Firms
36.  Manya Jaura Lind
  Capability development in an off-
shoring context: How, why and by 
whom
37.  Luis R. Boscán F.
  Essays on the Design of Contracts and 
Markets for Power System Flexibility
38.  Andreas Philipp Distel
 Capabilities for Strategic Adaptation: 
  Micro-Foundations, Organizational 
Conditions, and Performance  
Implications
39.  Lavinia Bleoca
  The Usefulness of Innovation and  
Intellectual Capital in Business  
Performance:  The Financial Effects of 
 Knowledge Management vs. Disclosure
40.  Henrik Jensen
  Economic Organization and Imperfect 
Managerial Knowledge: A Study of the 
Role of Managerial Meta-Knowledge  
in the Management of Distributed 
Knowledge
41.  Stine Mosekjær
 The Understanding of English Emotion  
 Words by Chinese and Japanese 
 Speakers of English as a Lingua Franca
 An Empirical Study
42.  Hallur Tor Sigurdarson
 The Ministry of Desire - Anxiety and  
 entrepreneurship in a bureaucracy
43.  Kätlin Pulk
 Making Time While Being in Time 
 A study of the temporality of 
 organizational processes
44.  Valeria Giacomin
 Contextualizing the cluster Palm oil in  
 Southeast Asia in global perspective  
 (1880s–1970s)
45.  Jeanette Willert
  Managers’ use of multiple  
Management Control Systems:
  The role and interplay of management 
control systems and company  
performance
46.  Mads Vestergaard Jensen
  Financial Frictions: Implications for Early 
Option Exercise and Realized Volatility
47.  Mikael Reimer Jensen
 Interbank Markets and Frictions
48.  Benjamin Faigen
 Essays on Employee Ownership
49.  Adela Michea
 Enacting Business Models 
  An Ethnographic Study of an Emerging 
Business Model Innovation within the 
Frame of a Manufacturing Company. 
50.  Iben Sandal Stjerne 
  Transcending organization in  
temporary systems
  Aesthetics’ organizing work and  
employment in Creative Industries
51.  Simon Krogh 
 Anticipating Organizational Change
52.  Sarah Netter 
 Exploring the Sharing Economy
53.  Lene Tolstrup Christensen
  State-owned enterprises as institutional 
market actors in the marketization of 
public service provision: 
  A comparative case study of Danish 
and Swedish passenger rail 1990–2015
54.  Kyoung(Kay) Sun Park 
 Three Essays on Financial Economics
2017
1.  Mari Bjerck 
  Apparel at work. Work uniforms and 
women in male-dominated manual 
occupations. 
2.  Christoph H. Flöthmann 
  Who Manages Our Supply Chains?
  Backgrounds, Competencies and 
Contributions of Human Resources in 
Supply Chain Management
3.  Aleksandra Anna Rzez´nik
 Essays in Empirical Asset Pricing
4.  Claes Bäckman
 Essays on Housing Markets
5.  Kirsti Reitan Andersen
  Stabilizing Sustainability  
in the Textile and Fashion Industry
6.  Kira Hoffmann
 Cost Behavior: An Empirical Analysis  
 of Determinants and Consequences  
 of Asymmetries 
TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN
1992
1.  Niels Kornum
  Servicesamkørsel – organisation, øko-
nomi og planlægningsmetode
1995
2.  Verner Worm
 Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
 Kulturspecifikke interaktionsrelationer
 ved nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i
 Kina
1999
3.  Mogens Bjerre
 Key Account Management of Complex
 Strategic Relationships
 An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving
 Consumer Goods Industry
2000
4.  Lotte Darsø
 Innovation in the Making
  Interaction Research with heteroge-
neous Groups of Knowledge Workers
 creating new Knowledge and new
 Leads
2001
5.  Peter Hobolt Jensen
 Managing Strategic Design Identities
  The case of the Lego Developer Net-
work
2002
6.  Peter Lohmann
 The Deleuzian Other of Organizational
 Change – Moving Perspectives of the
 Human
7.  Anne Marie Jess Hansen
 To lead from a distance: The dynamic
  interplay between strategy and strate-
gizing – A case study of the strategic
 management process
2003
8.  Lotte Henriksen
 Videndeling
  – om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæs-
sige udfordringer ved videndeling i
 praksis
9.  Niels Christian Nickelsen
  Arrangements of Knowing: Coordi-
nating Procedures Tools and Bodies in
 Industrial Production – a case study of
 the collective making of new products
2005
10.  Carsten Ørts Hansen
  Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og
 effektivitet
TITLER I DBA PH.D.-SERIEN
2007
1.  Peter Kastrup-Misir
 Endeavoring to Understand Market
 Orientation – and the concomitant
 co-mutation of the researched, the
 re searcher, the research itself and the
 truth
2009
1.  Torkild Leo Thellefsen
  Fundamental Signs and Significance 
effects
 A Semeiotic outline of Fundamental
 Signs, Significance-effects, Knowledge
 Profiling and their use in Knowledge
 Organization and Branding
2.  Daniel Ronzani
 When Bits Learn to Walk Don’t Make
 Them Trip. Technological Innovation
 and the Role of Regulation by Law
 in Information Systems Research: the
 Case of Radio Frequency Identification
 (RFID)
2010
1.  Alexander Carnera
 Magten over livet og livet som magt
 Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens
